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Samenvatting 
 
Het mysterie van hoe wij ons bewust worden van de wereld rondom ons, vormt voor 
filosofen, psychologen, en neurowetenschappers reeds decennia- zo niet eeuwenlang een bron 
van fascinatie. Onderzoek naar dit onderwerp heeft onder meer aangetoond dat er geen één-één 
relatie is tussen de fysieke input die op ons netvlies valt en de fenomenologie van onze visuele 
waarneming. Zo is het in specifieke gevallen bijvoorbeeld mogelijk om een visuele stimulus aan 
iemand te tonen zonder dat hij/zij deze effectief waarneemt. Het voorliggend 
doctoraatsonderzoek had als doel een beter begrip te krijgen over de representatie van een 
onzichtbare stimulus. Specifieker gesteld was onze overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag de 
volgende: “Tot op welke hoogte vindt perceptuele organisatie nog plaats in de visuele verwerking van 
stimuli die perceptueel onzichtbaar gemaakt zijn door middel van ‘continuous flash suppression’?” 
In het kader van dit doctoraat hebben we gebruik gemaakt van de methode van 
“continuous flash suppression (CFS)” om de zichtbaarheid van een stimulus te manipuleren. Het 
doctoraatsonderzoek is opgesplitst in twee verschillende delen. Het eerste deel focust 
voornamelijk op de onderliggende mechanismen van perceptuele onderdrukking die ten 
grondslag liggen aan CFS. In het tweede deel verschuift de focus voornamelijk naar de 
representatie van de onzichtbare stimulus.  
In de eerste twee hoofdstukken worden twee studies beschreven over de factoren van 
doeltreffende perceptuele onderdrukking door middel van CFS enerzijds en de temporele 
eigenschappen van de tijdsduur van perceptuele suppressie anderzijds. In Hoofdstuk 2 tonen we 
aan dat de kenmerkoverlap tussen onzichtbare stimulus en CFS mask een belangrijker factor is 
voor doeltreffende onderdrukking dan de dynamische eigenschappen van het CFS mask. In 
Hoofdstuk 3 observeren we verder dat de tijdsduren van perceptuele suppressie niet 
onafhankelijk zijn van elkaar, maar dat ze subtiele sequentiële afhankelijkheden vertonen, een 
integraal kenmerk van perceptuele multistabiliteit. Op basis van de resultaten van deze twee 
studies concluderen we dat de mechanismes waarop CFS berust, gelijkaardig zijn aan die van 
binoculaire rivaliteit, en dat CFS meer dan waarschijnlijk een sterkere vorm van binoculaire 
rivaliteit is. 
De volgende zeven hoofdstukken, die samen het tweede deel van deze thesis vormen, 
omvatten zeven studies die dieper ingaan op de representatie van de onzichtbare stimulus. 
Hoofdstuk 4 bevat een studie waarin we nagingen of het vlak geïnduceerd door de zogenaamde 
Kanizsa stimulus nog steeds gepresenteerd wordt tijdens perceptuele onderdrukking van deze 
stimulus. In Hoofdstuk 5 gingen we na of een hoorbaar geluid een invloed had op de verwerking 
van een onzichtbare stimulus. Hoofstukken 6 tot 8 bevatten respectievelijk studies waarin we 
aantonen dat causale gebeurtenissen sneller zichtbaar worden, biologische beweging geen 
inversie-effect vertoont, en gezichten in gekende configuraties sneller in het bewustzijn treden. 
Tot slot, in Hoofdstukken 9 en 10, bestuderen we of betekenisvolle aspecten van onzichtbare 
stimuli verwerkt worden. In Hoofdstuk 9 slagen we er niet in om een voorheen geobserveerd 
scene-congruentie effect te repliceren. In Hoofdstuk 10 tonen we vervolgens aan dat woorden 
niet verwerkt worden wanneer ze onzichtbaar zijn, door noch een woordfrequentie-effect, noch 
een effect van woordtype (woord vs. pseudo-woord) te observeren.  
Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat de resultaten uit het tweede deel van deze thesis 
duiden op een beperkte visuele verwerking van visuele stimuli die onzichtbaar gemaakt zijn 
door middel van CFS. De implicaties van deze resultaten worden uitvoerig besproken in 
Hoofdstuk 11.  
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Summary 
 
The mystery of conscious visual experience has intrigued many philosophers, 
psychologists, and neuroscientists for decades, if not centuries. One of the insights research on 
this topic has yielded is that there is no one-to-one correspondence between physical visual input 
and our corresponding perceptual experience. Indeed, in some specific situations visual input can 
be presented to the observer, while remaining invisible. The ultimate goal of this dissertation was 
to achieve a better understanding of the representational nature of a perceptually suppressed 
visual stimulus. More specifically, the overarching research question was: “To what extent does 
perceptual organization take place in the visual system for stimuli rendered invisible through continuous 
flash suppression?”. 
Indeed, throughout this PhD we have relied on a paradigm called “continuous flash 
suppression (CFS)” to manipulate the contents of visual awareness. The research presented in 
this dissertation is divided into two main parts, the first part being oriented to more theoretical 
aspects regarding the mechanisms of suppression through CFS while the second part focuses on 
the representation of the suppressed stimulus. 
The first two chapters present two studies on the determinants of effective suppression 
through CFS and the temporal characteristics of the time series of suppression durations. In 
Chapter 2, we show that feature overlap between the mask and suppressed stimulus is more 
important to enable effective suppression than the dynamic nature of the CFS mask. In Chapter 3, 
we report that suppression durations are not independent, yet show small, but significant 
sequential correlations, implying that CFS elicits a hallmark characteristic of other multistable 
phenomena, perceptual memory. Based on the results of these two studies, we conclude that CFS 
relies on mechanisms similar to binocular rivalry, and that it might constitute a stronger form of 
binocular rivalry.  
In the following seven chapters, which comprise the second part of the dissertation, we 
present seven studies that tap into the representation of the perceptually suppression stimulus. In 
Chapter 4, we consider whether the surface induced by the classic Kanizsa stimulus is 
represented during suppression. In Chapter 5, we ask whether a supraliminal auditory stimulus 
can influence suppression strength of a perceptually suppressed looming stimulus. In Chapters 6 
to 8, we show that launching events (an exemplary stimulus of causality perception) enter 
awareness faster than pass or pseudo-launch events, biological motion stimuli do not yield an 
inversion effect, and that faces presented in familiar configurations break suppression faster, 
respectively. Finally, Chapters 9 and 10 consider complex, high-level processing under CFS. In 
Chapter 9, we fail to replicate a previously observed result in which incongruent scenes broke 
suppression faster compared to congruent ones. In Chapter 10, we ask whether words are 
processed during suppression, but observe neither a word frequency nor a word type (word vs. 
pseudo-word) effect.  
In sum, the results presented in the second part of this dissertation show very limited 
visual processing during CFS, the implications of which are discussed in Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 1. 
General Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I mean, what exact buttons do I have to hit? 
Anthony Holland, 2011 
  
2 
 
Every time I wake up from a dark, seemingly dreamless night, something 
extraordinary happens: I open my eyes, and I see (Koenderink, 2012). When I sip from my 
coffee cup and I look outside my kitchen window, I witness something equally remarkable: 
“I see a house, trees, sky” (Wertheimer, 1923). I never see brightnesses, spatial frequencies, or 
orientations. This is fundamental. My visual experience of the world is organized and 
structured into distinct objects ordered in depth (Wagemans et al., 2012). It seems immediate 
and effortless. How is such rich conscious experience generated? Can we understand our 
phenomenology of the visual environment in terms of a complex transformation of the 
photons hitting the retina to visual awareness, involving several steps in a dynamic, 
hierarchically organized system entailing multiple feed-forward and feedback loops (Palmer, 
1999)? Unfortunately, or rather, obviously, I will not be able to provide an answer to that 
question. 
The mystery of visual awareness, or consciousness in general, has baffled many 
scientists for decades, if not centuries. The complexity of the problem has generated a rich 
and diverse literature that approaches consciousness from various angles. Philosophers, 
psychologists, and neuroscientists alike have provided many extensive, sometimes 
conflicting views, which has more than once yielded intense discussions on various topics 
(Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun, & Nakayama, 2012; Cohen & Dennett, 2011; Fahrenfort & Lamme, 
2012; Tsuchiya, Block, & Koch, 2012). The inquiries range from formulating theories and 
models of consciousness (i.e., what constitutes the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
consciousness to “arise”) (Baars, 1993; Cleeremans, 2008; Dennett, 1993; Jackendoff, 1987; Lau 
& Rosenthal, 2011; Oizumi, Albantakis, & Tononi, 2014; O’Regan & Noë, 2001) to studying 
states or levels of consciousness (e.g., what is the difference between an individual in a 
vegetative state versus one who is labelled with having a full conscious experience? is there 
some residual – or even full-blown? – consciousness left in the individual in the vegetative 
state?) (Owen et al., 2006). Can we pinpoint the neural correlates of consciousness, and if so, 
how should we interpret these (Crick & Koch, 1998, 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011)? How 
is consciousness different from processes such as attention and working memory (Koch & 
Tsuchiya, 2007; V. A. F. Lamme, 2003; Soto, Mäntylä, & Silvanto, 2011; Soto & Silvanto, 2014; 
Stein, Kaiser, & Hesselmann, 2016)? Does it even make sense to dissociate these concepts, or 
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are these merely fruitless exercises in taxonomy in which scientists so often indulge 
themselves? 
Although these are all interesting and relevant questions, this dissertation does not 
consider what consciousness is or how consciousness arises. This is taken for granted and we 
assume that some states of the visual system will yield conscious experience of a visual 
stimulus whereas others do not. Rather, we focus on the following general topic: “which types 
of stimulus processing can bypass visual awareness, and henceforth do not necessarily rely on a 
conscious experience of the stimulus?”  
In particular, the relationship between perceptual organization and visual awareness 
is at the core of this dissertation. The apparent ease with which perceptual organization 
“happens” in our visual conscious experience has spurred the question whether we need to 
be conscious of the visual input at all for it to be (perceptually) organized (Alais & Blake, 
2015; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2015). Embarking on such an endeavor necessarily entails the 
choice of a proper paradigm to present observers visual stimuli they cannot see (or rather, 
fail to report). Let us consider the types of psychophysical magic that are at our disposal 
(Kim & Blake, 2005). 
 
Rendering a stimulus invisible 
A central issue in studying how invisible stimuli are processed is how to render a 
visual stimulus invisible in the first place (Breitmeyer, 2015; Kim & Blake, 2005). Breitmeyer 
(2015) recently reviewed all available paradigms, arriving at a list of 24 (sometimes subtly) 
different methods to render a stimulus invisible. The choice of a suitable paradigm is by no 
means a trivial one, and despite their upsides, each also comes with its downsides. A first 
possibility is to present stimuli at such an impoverished intensity, such that they can no 
longer be discriminated from the background. This method is not frequently used in 
consciousness research, because degrading stimulus intensity can have the unintended side 
effect that the stimulus is not processed anymore at all. Thus, a desirable property of a 
blinding paradigm is that it allows one to present stimuli at intensity levels such that they 
are detectable when presented independently. 
An attractive set of paradigms that fulfills this criterion are visual masking paradigms 
(forward, backward, sandwich, metacontrast masking) (Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006). Here, a 
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stimulus is presented for a very short time (e.g., 16 or 32 milliseconds) and is either preceded 
or followed (or both) by a masking stimulus. Depending on the asynchrony between the 
target and masking stimulus, this renders the target stimulus fully invisible. The downside, 
however, is that stimuli can only be presented for a limited amount of time. Ideally, one 
would like to present a stimulus for more than some tens of milliseconds to allow for 
sufficient processing of the stimulus. Two different kinds of paradigms provide a potential 
solution to this: attention-based paradigms (Mack & Rock, 1998) and those involving 
dichoptic stimulus presentation (Alais & Blake, 2005). We will limit our discussion to the 
latter, because the former inevitably involves a manipulation of the attentional state of the 
observer, which changes the focus of the question in the direction of “can process X occur 
without attention?” Although blinding paradigms based on attentional manipulations also 
involve a manipulation of the awareness of the stimulus, the question whether awareness is 
necessary for processing stimulus property X becomes necessarily confounded with whether 
attention is necessary. This leads us to a last class of paradigms, in which one stimulus is 
presented to one eye while a different stimulus is presented to the other eye, at 
corresponding retinal locations. Although this situation occurs all the time in daily life due to 
retinal disparity (Arnold, 2011), a remarkable thing occurs when the mismatch between the 
input to both eyes is sufficiently large. Despite constant retinal input, our phenomenal 
experience of the input fluctuates in a seemingly stochastic manner between (mixtures of) the 
stimuli presented to both eyes, a phenomenon referred to as binocular rivalry (Blake & 
Logothetis, 2002; Blake, 1989; Kim & Blake, 2005; Tong, Meng, & Blake, 2006). Here, the 
advantage is that periods of dominance and suppression can last for several seconds, 
allowing one to render a stimulus invisible for a longer time period. A downside to this 
paradigm is that it is difficult to control how long a stimulus remains suppressed, but also 
which stimulus will be suppressed at onset. To control for initial dominance, flash 
suppression provides a solution (Brascamp, Knapen, Kanai, van Ee, & van den Berg, 2007; 
van Ee, 2011; Wolfe, 1984). In flash suppression, the to be suppressed stimulus is first 
presented for a second or so, before presenting the other stimulus to the other eye. This 
allows the visual system to adapt to this stimulus first, and reliably renders it invisible 
(suppressed) when the other stimulus is presented to the other eye. However, this is not a 
desirable situation if it is particularly important that observers are never aware of the 
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invisible stimulus. A solution to all of these problems – short stimulus presentation and 
reliable suppression at trial onset – is offered by a paradigm that has been introduced about 
10 years ago, and on which we will rely throughout this dissertation. 
 
Continuous flash suppression – a free lunch? 
In this dissertation a paradigm called continuous flash suppression (CFS) is used to 
manipulate the contents of visual awareness (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, 
& Blake, 2006). CFS involves a situation of dichoptic stimulation in which a continuously 
changing mask is presented to one eye, while (most of the time) a static stimulus is presented 
to the other eye (see Figure 1.1 for an example). In most, if not all, cases this dynamic mask 
gains initial dominance over the other stimulus. Furthermore, in comparison with binocular 
rivalry, the CFS mask more strongly and reliably suppresses the other stimulus (Tsuchiya et 
al., 2006; E. Yang & Blake, 2012). These two attributes, initial dominance and effective 
suppression, have made CFS an attractive paradigm for consciousness research. 
 
Figure 1.1. An example of continuous flash suppression (CFS). Here, an oriented Gabor patch 
is presented to the left eye, while the typical “Mondrian mask” consisting of squares of 
random size, position, and color is presented to the right eye. The CFS mask is typically 
refreshed every 100 ms (i.e., for all individual elements a new random position is generated). 
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Studying unconscious processing with CFS 
To measure unconscious processing of a stimulus, CFS has been used in two different 
ways, referred to as direct and indirect measures of unconscious processing. In the latter 
case, a stimulus is presented in the absence of awareness and one measures subsequent 
adaptation aftereffects (Adams, Gray, Garner, & Graf, 2010; Bahrami, Carmel, Walsh, Rees, & 
Lavie, 2008a, 2008b; Kanai, Tsuchiya, & Verstraten, 2006; L. Kaunitz, Fracasso, & Melcher, 
2011; Maruya, Watanabe, & Watanabe, 2008; Moradi, Koch, & Shimojo, 2005; Stein, Peelen, & 
Sterzer, 2012; Stein & Sterzer, 2011; Sweeny, Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 2011), attentional shifts 
elicited by the suppressed stimulus (Jiang, Costello, Fang, Huang, & He, 2006; Palmer & 
Ramsey, 2012), or priming effects (Almeida, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2010; Almeida, Mahon, 
Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2008; Bahrami et al., 2010; Barbot & Kouider, 2011; Sakuraba, 
Sakai, Yamanaka, Yokosawa, & Hirayama, 2012). An advantage of these measures is that 
they follow the classic dissociation logic in that a direct (subjective or objective) measure of 
stimulus awareness (of the suppressed stimulus) is contrasted with an indirect measure of 
stimulus processing (i.e., all the measures described above). A particularly tricky aspect of 
these experiments, however, is how to properly measure awareness of the suppressed 
stimulus. Traditional “objective” sensitivity measures such as d’ have been criticized as a 
proper measure for assessing stimulus awareness (Amihai, 2012; Vermeiren & Cleeremans, 
2012). Subjective measures such as the Perceptual Awareness Scale (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 
2004), in which participants have to indicate their awareness of the suppressed stimulus on a 
4-point scale on a trial-by-trial basis, may prove to be a potential solution, but these have 
their downsides as well. Depending on how effective suppression is, the consequence often 
is that up to half of the data needs to be removed due to some partial awareness of the 
stimulus on some trials. 
Therefore, the direct measure to assess unconscious processing during CFS, the 
breaking CFS (b-CFS) paradigm, has gained more popularity (Gayet, Van Der Stigchel, & 
Paffen, 2014). In b-CFS, a trial typically starts with presenting a stimulus initially at a low 
contrast such that it will be perceptually suppressed. Subsequently, the contrast of the 
suppressed stimulus is gradually increased. The time it takes for the stimulus to break 
suppression (i.e., become detectable) is used as an index of unconscious processing. The task 
participants have to perform usually pertains to an aspect of the stimulus orthogonal to the 
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stimulus manipulation (e.g., location). The reasoning behind this paradigm is that 
differential suppression times for different stimuli must be due to some kind of unconscious 
representation of the stimulus that has been built up during suppression biasing the 
interocular competition process and yielding differential suppression times (Jiang, Costello, 
& He, 2007). Therefore, these suppression times are taken as an index of unconscious 
processing. b-CFS has been criticized, however, as a paradigm to study unconscious 
processing. That is, suppression times rely on detecting an aspect of the stimulus as soon as it 
reaches awareness. Therefore, differences between suppression times might be attributable 
to criterion differences related to the detection of the stimulus (i.e., different stimuli break 
suppression at the same time on average, yet have differential detection or decision criteria). 
To counter this, a binocular control condition in which the target and mask are presented to 
both eyes has been used. The absence of a difference between “suppression times” in this 
control condition is then argued to preclude the possibility that differential suppression 
times in the CFS condition are due to criterion differences in detection. However, because the 
target and mask are presented to both eyes in this condition, and no interocular suppression 
is elicited, it has been argued that this condition is too different from the CFS condition to 
unambiguously provide evidence for unconscious processing (Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011; 
Stein & Sterzer, 2014). 
 
Perceptual organization and continuous flash suppression 
The relationship between perceptual organization and visual awareness in general 
paints a complicated picture, with the results often being contingent on the exact paradigm 
used to render stimuli non-conscious and with many different perceptual organizational 
processes being involved. From these studies, it is probably fair to conclude, however, that 
there is evidence that some forms of perceptual organization still take place for stimuli 
rendered invisible through attentional manipulations (Gillebert & Humphreys, 2015; Kimchi, 
2009; Moore & Egeth, 1997; Pitts, Martínez, & Hillyard, 2012; Vandenbroucke, Fahrenfort, 
Sligte, & Lamme, 2014). Likewise, there is also some evidence that certain forms of 
perceptual organization still manifest themselves in the absence of awareness (Mitroff & 
Scholl, 2005; Montoro, Luna, & Ortells, 2014; Norman, Heywood, & Kentridge, 2013; 
Poscoliero, Marzi, & Girelli, 2013). 
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The appealing properties of CFS as a blinding paradigm, the relative scarcity of its 
use to study invisible stimuli in the context of perceptual organization, and the fact that the 
suppression mechanisms of CFS remain poorly understood have shaped the focus of the 
studies presented in this dissertation. As will be apparent, only some chapters explicitly 
focus on classic perceptual organization phenomena (i.e., Chapter 4 on figure-ground 
organization, Chapter 6 on the perception of causality, Chapter 7 on biological motion). The 
motivation for the studies presented in the other chapters derived mainly from a range of 
interests in related topics. For example, in Chapter 5 we focus on whether perceptually 
suppressed stimuli are represented such that they could be integrated with auditory stimuli. 
In Chapter 8, we consider whether we could obtain evidence for a “natural input” 
hypothesis governing differences in suppression times ( although this hypothesis is only 
spelled out in the General Discussion of this dissertation), Last, Chapters 9 and 10 consider 
whether some stunning findings on semantic processing of invisible stimuli could be 
replicated. As will be apparent from the results reported in these chapters, these studies also 
provide insight on the level up to which perceptually suppressed stimuli are processed. The 
last type of studies reported in this dissertation pertains to the study of CFS itself. That is, it 
is particularly important to understand the characteristics and mechanisms of a blinding 
paradigm. Upon its introduction, Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) interpreted CFS as a mix of 
binocular rivalry and flash suppression (hence, its name). Little work has been done to 
further validate this stance. Therefore, in Chapters 2 and 3, we explore the extent to which 
CFS is actually distinct from binocular rivalry by focusing on the importance of the spatial 
properties of the CFS mask in Chapter 2 and the structure of the sequence of suppression 
durations obtained in a typical b-CFS experiment in Chapter 3. 
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the studies presented in all chapters, it might be 
useful to rephrase our original, general research question as a more specific one, in the light 
of which all studies - to some extent – provide an answer: “What is the representation of a visual 
stimulus that is perceptually suppressed through continuous flash suppression, with a focus on 
perceptual organization?”  
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The structure of this dissertation 
There is no logical build-up from Chapters 2 to 10, neither with respect to complexity 
or content, nor with respect to chronological order. Rather, this dissertation can be 
considered to consist of two parts. Chapters 2 and 3 can be considered as Part One, in which 
we study the mechanisms of CFS itself. Part Two – Chapters 4 to 10 – consists of 
experimental studies that can be captured under the umbrella of “the fate of the suppressed 
stimulus”. The ordering of these chapters could be considered as going from “mid-level” to 
“high-level” processing, yet imposing such a structure would do no justice to the continuous, 
parallel, and dynamical nature of the mechanisms involved in the phenomena being 
considered. 
The last section of this Introduction summarizes some thoughts on contemporary 
statistical practice in psychology, and science more generally. It also includes a motivation 
and description of the statistical framework that is used in nearly every chapter of this 
dissertation, Bayesian statistics. The reader may freely skip this section if he/she is familiar 
with these methods, or has no interest in statistics whatsoever.  
 
A note on statistical practice 
Let us start with a bold statement: I think contemporary statistical practice in 
psychology has led us astray, has reduced theorizing and experimenting to the dull and 
banal question “but is it significant?” (causing a huge file drawer, Rosenthal, 1979), and is 
one of the primary causes of the so-called “crisis of confidence” (Button et al., 2013; 
Ioannidis, 2005; Pashler & Harris, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). 
In psychology and other scientific disciplines more generally, the predominant 
framework to perform statistical inference is a frequentist null hypothesis significance testing 
(NHST) framework. Here, one formulates a so-called “null” hypothesis on a certain 
parameter (often the population mean or difference between population means). The 
parameter value associated with the null hypothesis can in principle take on any value, but 
in practice it is nearly always zero (“the null ritual”, Gigerenzer, 2004). Depending on the 
directionality of the predictions, an alternative hypothesis is then formulated in which the 
parameter is different from, smaller or larger than the value associated with the null (for a 
thought-provoking discussion of the implications of making directional predictions in the 
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context of this statistical framework, see Meehl, 1967). Next, one formulates a test statistic 
(e.g., z-statistic or t-statistic) of which the sampling distribution is derived based on the 
assumption of infinitely repeating the experiment, assuming that the null hypothesis is true, 
and formulating some distributional assumptions on the data (Fisher, 1925; Student, 1908). 
The observed statistic is then compared to the sampling distribution by calculating the 
probability to observe a more extreme value than the observed one, referred to as the p-
value. If this p-value exceeds a threshold (often set at .05 – although it is difficult to pinpoint 
the actual origin of this consensus, see http://www.jerrydallal.com/LHSP/p05.htm), it is 
agreed upon to reject the null hypothesis of no difference and to infer that there is, for 
example, evidence for a difference between the means of the dependent variables in two 
experimental conditions. Unfortunately, the framework is intrinsically asymmetric with 
respect to hypothesis testing. That is, it is only possible to reject the null hypothesis, rather 
than also to accept it (Gallistel, 2009; Meehl, 1978; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 
2009). It is interesting to note that this statistical procedure or “null ritual” is actually a 
hybrid form of the procedures originally developed by Fisher on the one hand and Neyman 
and Pearson on the other hand (Gigerenzer, 2004). A second curiosity is that NHST has not 
only been the subject of criticism for the last decade or so (since the rise of the “Bayesian 
movement”), but for over 50 years already (Bakan, 1966; Cohen, 1994; Lykken, 1968; Meehl, 
1967; Rozeboom, 1960; Wagenmakers, 2007). As a psychologist, it is a particular revealing 
example of how an academic community – smart and critical people – can remain deaf to 
these issues. I think some of these issues associated with p-value based inference are worth 
making explicit: (1) p-values do not teach us what we want to know, they quantify p(data | 
hypothesis), rather than p(hypothesis | data), (2) p-values depend on unobserved data, (3) p-
values depend on potentially unknown subjective intentions (e.g., “optional stopping”), (4) 
p-values overstate the evidence against the null, (5) p-values do not allow the collect 
evidence in favor of the null. To paraphrase Jeffreys (1961): “What the use of P implies, 
therefore, is that a hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted observable 
results that have not occurred.” 
One might wonder why I have chosen to reflect on these issues in the context of this 
dissertation. Apart from my genuine interest in statistics, I think it is particularly important 
to understand that this statistical framework runs short of providing us the answers we are 
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genuinely interested in, not only in this dissertation, but in consciousness research more 
generally. Especially with respect to the study of unconscious visual processing, one needs to 
be equipped with the tools that allow us to quantify evidence in favor of or against 
unconscious visual processing (operationalized in whatever way). To do so, we need to have 
the tools at our disposal to explicitly compare two statistical models, allowing us to quantify 
the evidence in favor for either of them. Bayesian statistics provides a coherent framework to 
address this question, although we should stress from the start that any model comparison 
approach suffices in this context – be it frequentist, Bayesian, or resampling methods (e.g., an 
interesting example of model comparison in a frequentist context is provided in Rouder et 
al., 2009). A primary advantage of Bayesian statistics is that any inference is conditional on 
the observed data rather than hypothetical replications of the data, as in frequentist 
inference. Because it provides such an attractive alternative to classical frequentist statistics, 
we have made the principled decision to use this statistical framework throughout the 
dissertation (except for Chapter 3, where we used nonparametric measures). Given that not 
everyone might be familiar with these methods, we provide a short introduction here and 
refer to more specialized books and papers for a more in-depth introduction to and 
discussion of these methods (Kruschke, 2010, 2011, 2013; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & 
Province, 2012; Rouder et al., 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). 
As in every statistical framework, Bayesian statistics provides the opportunity to do 
parameter estimation or hypothesis testing. Parameter estimation relies on the posterior 
distribution over the parameters of interest, whereas hypothesis testing relies on Bayes 
Factors. For both purposes, Bayes’ rule is crucial:  
 
| = |  
 
where  refers to a vector of parameters (e.g., the effect parameters of an ANOVA 
model) and  to the observed data. In Bayes’ rule, the prior probability distribution, , is 
then updated by the likelihood | to yield the posterior probability distribution, |. 
Because the normalizing constant or marginal likelihood, , often involves computing an 
intractable integral in the case of complex models, the use of Bayesian methods was limited 
to simple statistical models that were analytically tractable. In this respect, the advent of 
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software that allows to sample from the posterior distribution by relying on Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling has been a major contribution to the field (Lunn, Thomas, 
Best, & Spiegelhalter, 2000; Plummer, 2003; Stan Development Team, 2016). With fairly 
limited background knowledge, it is now possible to fit complex models in a Bayesian 
framework (for a great hands-on introduction, see Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014). 
 
In this dissertation, we mostly rely on model comparison rather than parameter 
estimation, by using Bayes Factors (Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995). In the Bayes Factor 
approach, the focus is on the marginal likelihood of Bayes’ rule, :  
 
 = 		|
 
 
The Bayes factor then refers to the ratio of marginal likelihoods of different statistical 
models under consideration (e.g., a model with main effects of congruency and inversion 
versus a model with only a main effect of congruency), quantifying the change from prior to 
posterior model odds: 
 
|
| = 	

	
|
| 
where  
 
 = || = 	
 |

 |

 
 
In itself, the Bayes Factor can only be interpreted as a relative measure of evidence for 
one statistical model compared to another (e.g., a model with two main effects versus a 
model with two main effects and their interaction). That is, the value of the Bayes Factor 
should always be interpreted relative to the statistical models under consideration. Because 
the prior distribution is integrated out in the marginal likelihood, the Bayes Factor 
automatically penalizes for model complexity (i.e., in more complex models the probability 
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density will be more “spread out”). Therefore, it is sometimes referred to as the automatic 
Occam’s razor.  
The Bayes Factor is an inherently continuous measure (bounded between zero and 
infinity), yet some cut-off values are sometimes used as a guideline for interpretation. A 
Bayes Factor of 3 (or 1/3) is frequently used as positive or substantial evidence in favor of or 
against the alternative hypothesis. Bayes Factors > 10 (or < 0.1) are considered to indicate 
strong evidence for either model. In this dissertation, we use these cut-off values as 
guidelines to interpret our results, yet it should be stressed from the outset that lumping 
together Bayes Factors into categorical interpretations does no justice to the fact that it is a 
continuous measure of evidence.  
 
A plea for open software 
The last couple of years, a lot of voices have been raised to increase the 
reproducibility of our research. There is an important distinction between reproducibility 
and replicability. That is, reproducible research refers to the fact that someone can reproduce 
the results you reported by redoing the analyses on your data. Replicable research refers to 
studies of which the findings can be replicated independently, but for which the numbers 
can vary due to a host of reasons (Leek, Patil, & Peng, 2015). Because reproducible research 
can hardly be achieved when research colleagues have to use commercial software which 
might not always be at their disposal, we have always relied as much as possible on open 
source software throughout this dissertation. For programming experiments, we have 
always used Python 2.7 and the PsychoPy software package (Peirce, 2007, 2009). For data 
analysis and visualization, we have always relied on R (R Core Team, 2014) and RStudio 
(RStudio Team, 2015). In particular, the following packages have been of great value: plyr 
(Wickham, 2011), dplyr (Wickham & Francois, 2015), lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015), BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2015), and many more. Because the creators of 
these software packages all too often are not sufficiently acknowledged, I would like to 
personally thank them for making my life easier, a lot easier. 
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Chapter 2. 
Moving stimuli are less effectively masked using 
traditional Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) 
compared to a Moving Mondrian Mask (MMM): a 
test case for feature-selective suppression and 
retinotopic adaptation. 
 
Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a powerful interocular suppression technique, which 
is often described as an effective means to reliably suppress stimuli from visual awareness. 
Suppression through CFS has been assumed to depend upon a reduction in (retinotopically 
specific) neural adaptation caused by the continual updating of the contents of the visual 
input to one eye. In this study, we started from the observation that suppressing a moving 
stimulus through CFS appeared to be more effective when using a mask that was actually 
more prone to retinotopically specific neural adaptation, but in which the properties of the 
mask were more similar to those of the to-be-suppressed stimulus. In two experiments, we 
find that using a moving Mondrian mask (i.e., one that includes motion) is more effective in 
suppressing a moving stimulus than a regular CFS mask. The observed pattern of results 
cannot be explained by a simple simulation that computes the degree of retinotopically 
specific neural adaptation over time, suggesting that this kind of neural adaptation does not 
play a large role in predicting the differences between conditions in this context. We also find 
some evidence consistent with the idea that the most effective CFS mask is the one that 
matches the properties (speed) of the suppressed stimulus. These results question the general 
importance of retinotopically specific neural adaptation in CFS, and potentially help to 
explain an implicit trend in the literature to adapt one’s CFS mask to match one’s to-be-
suppressed stimuli. Finally, the results should help to guide the methodological 
development of future research where continuous suppression of moving stimuli is desired. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moors, P., Wagemans, J., & de-Wit, L. (2014). Moving stimuli are less effectively masked using 
traditional Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS) compared to a Moving Mondrian Mask (MMM): A 
test case for feature-selective suppression and retinotopic adaptation. PLoS One, 9 (5), art.nr. 
e98298. 
  
16 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Crick and Koch (1998) set out a framework for studying the neural correlates of 
consciousness, a number of paradigms have been developed to study the neural activity 
associated with purely perceptual changes that allow one to study the correlates of 
consciousness without changing the visual input. Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a 
psychophysical technique that enables this by suppressing stimuli much more reliably than 
in standard binocular rivalry paradigms, and with much longer presentation times possible 
compared to visual masking paradigms (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). In essence, CFS is highly 
similar to binocular rivalry: Two different images are presented to the same regions of both 
eyes, but in one eye, a rapidly changing stimulus is presented, which effectively suppresses 
the stimulus in the other eye for relatively long periods of time (i.e., units of seconds  rather 
than seconds, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). Traditionally, this changing stimulus is a Mondrian 
fashioned pattern of rectangles and squares of random size and color that changes every 
100ms (10 Hz).  
Since CFS was introduced as a technique to reliably suppress stimuli from visual 
awareness, it has been used in more than 100 studies. In these experiments, CFS has been 
applied in two different ways. First, it has been used to present stimuli in the absence of 
awareness and to study the influence of the presentation of these subliminal stimuli on a 
subsequent task with visible stimuli. For example, Jiang, Costello, Fang, Huang, and He 
(2006) report an attentional effect of unconsciously presenting erotic pictures. CFS has been 
used in this way to study the orientation aftereffect (Bahrami et al., 2008a, 2008b), motion 
aftereffect (Kaunitz et al., 2011; Maruya et al., 2008), simultaneous motion contrast (Kawabe 
& Yamada, 2009), face adaptation (Adams et al., 2010; Moradi et al., 2005; Yang, Hong, & 
Blake, 2010), as well as a preconscious attentional bias in cigarette smokers (Yan et al., 2009). 
Secondly, CFS has been most often put into practice in the so-called “breaking CFS 
paradigm” (a term coined by Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011, based on the paradigm introduced by 
Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007). In this paradigm, participants have to detect when a stimulus 
suppressed through CFS breaks through the mask. Differential breakthrough times for 
different conditions are then taken as evidence that some kind of unconscious representation 
of the different stimuli must have been generated in order for them to break through at 
differential rates. Using this technique (abbreviated as “b-CFS”), Jiang et al. (2007) showed 
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that faces break through suppression faster than inverted faces. Since b-CFS was introduced, 
it has been used widely. Costello, Jiang, Baartman, McGlennen, and He (2009) provided 
evidence for unconscious semantic word priming, Bahrami et al. (2010) for unconscious 
numerical processing, Xu, Zhang, and Geng (2011) for gaze cuing in the absence for 
awareness, Wang, Weng, and He (2012) for perceptual grouping of a Kanizsa triangle under 
CFS and Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, and Deouell (2011) documented that incongruent scenes 
break through faster than congruent scenes. 
 
Despite the broad and increasing employment of this method, it is still is not clear 
which factors contribute to the effectiveness of CFS in suppressing stimuli from awareness. 
Some authors imply that the effectiveness of CFS derives from its saliency. For example, 
Bahrami, Lavie, and Rees (2007) describe their CFS mask as “highly salient, high-contrast, 
and rapidly changing blue masks” (p. 510); Raio, Carmel, Carrasco, and Phelps (2012) refer to 
a “salient dynamic stimulation” (p. R477). Other authors (Faivre, Berthet, & Kouider, 2012; 
Hesselmann, Hebart, & Malach, 2011; Hesselmann & Malach, 2011; Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 
2009; Shimaoka & Kaneko, 2011; Yamada & Kawabe, 2011, 2012) describe their CFS masks 
similarly. The most widespread explanation for the effectiveness of CFS, however, has been a 
general reduction in neural adaptation due to the fast transients associated with the mask (as 
in Tsuchiya et al., 2006; Yang & Blake, 2012). That is, the input at a (retinotopic) location is 
updated every ~100ms, causing neurons with a receptive field at that location to show less 
neural adaptation compared to static input. Indeed Tsuchiya et al. (2006) say: “We imagine 
that the enduring effectivess of CFS arises from its relative immunity to adaptation owing to 
the repeated presentation of a new stimulus” (p. 1075). Yang and Blake (2012) are more 
explicit and articulate: “Perhaps, then, the rapid, repetitive changes in the successively 
presented, random configurations of a CFS display minimize its tendency to undergo neural 
adaptation (…)” (p. 11). Thus, because at every retinotopic location features such as 
orientation and contrast change, neurons responsive for these features tend to adapt less 
compared to static input. In this sense CFS can be understood as a form of binocular rivalry, 
in which percept switches have been explained (in part) as the result of neural adaptation to 
the dominant percept and competition between monocular neurons in low-level visual areas 
(Alais, 2012; Blake, 1989). Since the interocular competition process in binocular rivalry has 
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mostly been characterized as happening in low-level visual areas (although recent models 
acknowledge the possibility for competition between different levels in the hierarchy of the 
visual system, Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Tong et al., 2006), we focus on the extent to which 
retinotopically specific neural adaptation can help to predict the effectiveness of CFS (see the 
General Discussion for further discussion of the role of higher-order adaptation processes in 
CFS). Framing the effectiveness of CFS as preventing retinotopically specific neural 
adaptation due to these fast changes in the mask would imply that the more changes over 
time the mask contains, the more effective CFS should be. Indeed, this assumption also 
appears to be implicit in the literature when the refresh rate of the CFS mask is changed. 
Although most authors continue to use the traditional 10Hz refresh rate as suggested in 
Tsuchiya and Koch (2005), when they do not, the refresh rate is mostly increased. Of the 81 
studies we considered, 72% used the canonical 10Hz refresh rate and 20% employed a 
refresh rate of more than 10Hz. Indeed, Xu et al. (2011) increased the refresh rate with the 
explicit assumption that this would lead to more robust interocular suppression than the 
traditional 10Hz frequency.  
This explanation in terms of a reduction to retinotopically specific neural adaptation 
provides no immediate explanation for the way in which the traditional Mondrian mask is 
often adapted in the literature when masking specific stimuli in different studies. Different 
authors seem to adapt the characteristics of the CFS mask to match the characteristics of the 
to-be-suppressed stimulus. We provide three illustrative examples. First, Stein, Hebart, et al. 
(2011) note that, although regular CFS allows for masking faces, it is much more effective to 
mask faces with a mask consisting of ellipses instead of squares. Second, the study of 
Bahrami et al. (2007) used random geometrical shapes, contours and moving dots to 
suppress line drawings. Again, this adapted mask appears more similar to the to-be-
suppressed line drawings than the standard Mondrian mask. Third, Sweeny et al. (2011) 
used a mask of randomly generated non-filled ellipses to mask an open or closed curve. 
Only recently the importance of the characteristics present in the CFS mask has been 
highlighted as an important factor with respect to the effectiveness of CFS (Hong & Blake, 
2009; Maehara, Huang, & Hess, 2009; Yang & Blake, 2012). Indeed, Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) 
never explicitly motivated their choice for the rapidly changing and flickering Mondrian-
style rectangles as an effective CFS mask. Yang and Blake (2012) proposed to address this 
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issue by studying the effectiveness of CFS in relation to the properties of the mask and the 
suppressed stimulus. With respect to the spatial properties of the mask and suppressed 
stimulus, their results show that (1) it is harder to mask stimuli with high spatial frequency 
properties and (2) that stimuli with low spatial frequency properties are most effectively 
masked with CFS masks containing mostly low spatial frequencies.  
Along the same line, an earlier study by Maehara et al. (2009) reported almost no 
difference between suppression strength of a static and a flickering mask in suppressing a 
target stimulus when the spatial frequencies of mask and target were at least 1.6 octaves 
away from each other. Based on this result, Maehara et al. (2009) proposed that the 
effectiveness of CFS presumably stems from within-channel masking. 
Thus, it seems to be the case that the depth of suppression during CFS is not fixed, 
but rather depends on the interaction between the characteristics of the mask with the 
suppressed stimulus. This perhaps reintegrates our understanding of CFS with existing 
studies of binocular rivalry in general concerning feature-selectivity and the effect of shared 
stimulus complexity on suppression strength (e.g., Alais & Melcher, 2007; Alais & Parker, 
2006; Stuit, Cass, Paffen, & Alais, 2009).  
The potential importance of feature-selective competition in CFS does not rule out a 
role for adaptation-based explanation of its effectiveness. Indeed, for all these examples it is 
hard to disentangle the contribution of retinotopic neural adaptation and feature selectivity. 
In the present study we explore the relative contributions of retinotopic adaptation and 
feature competition by manipulating the properties of the CFS mask in such a way that 
feature overlap with the suppressed stimulus and retinotopic adaptation can be 
disentangled. 
 
The Present Study 
As already highlighted, CFS is commonly described as a highly effective technique to 
suppress stimuli from visual awareness reliably and for longer time periods (Tsuchiya & 
Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya et al., 2006). Since CFS potentially offers long suppression times, it 
provides an excellent opportunity to be used in the context of suppressing dynamic stimuli 
that change over time (e.g., random-dot motion, biological motion, etc.). During pilot testing, 
however, we observed that regular CFS did not provide an effective means of suppressing 
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moving stimuli. Rather, it appeared that introducing spatiotemporal continuity (e.g., motion) 
into our CFS-style mask seemed to be required to provide useful suppression times. The 
need to introduce continuous spatiotemporal signals into the mask does not seem to logically 
follow from what would be predicted from an account based on a reduction to 
retinotopically based neural adaptation in driving the effectiveness of CFS. Indeed, the 
spatiotemporal continuity we used to develop effective suppression should, if anything, be 
more prone to retinotopic neural adaptation than regular CFS. Given this observation, we set 
out to test whether a moving Mondrian mask (MMM) indeed provides a better means of 
suppressing a simple moving stimulus compared to regular CFS. In order to formally test the 
potential importance of retinotopic neural adaptation we explicitly operationalized the term 
and implemented a simple computation to quantify the degree of retinotopically specific 
neural adaptation (see Methods & Results of Experiment 1). Thus, the goal of this study was 
to show that, for moving stimuli, a release from retinotopically specific neural adaptation 
due to the changes in the mask over time is not the only mechanism that drives the 
effectiveness of CFS nor is it potentially the most dominant or important in a given context 
(Maehara et al., 2009; Yang & Blake, 2012). 
To preview our results, our formalization of retinotopic neural adaptation proved to 
provide no basis for predicting the suppression strength of different MMMs containing 
different motion speeds. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In the first experiment, we used a MMM, manipulated the speed of the individual 
mask elements, and compared its effectiveness to a regular CFS mask in suppressing a 
moving target. Subsequently, we compared the observed effectiveness with what would be 
predicted to be the most effective mask based on a measure of retinotopically specific neural 
adaptation. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Ethics Statement. The study was conducted in line with the ethical principles 
regarding research with human participants as specified in The Code of Ethics of the World 
Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). The study was approved by the Ethical 
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Committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences (EC FPPW) of the 
University of Leuven, and the participants gave written informed consent before starting the 
experiment. 
 
Participants. Five students (1 male) of the undergraduate psychology program of the 
University of Leuven participated in the experiment for course credit. All had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Every participant was unaware of the goal of the study. 
 
Apparatus. Stimuli were shown on two 19.8-in. Sony Trinitron GDM F500-R (2048 x 
1536 pixels at 60 Hz, for each) monitors driven by a DELL Precision T3400 computer with an 
Intel Core Quad CPU Q9300 2.5 GHz processor running on Windows XP. Binocular 
presentation was achieved by a custom made stereo set-up. Two CRT monitors, which stood 
opposite to each other (distance of 220 cm), projected to the left and right eye respectively via 
two mirrors placed at a distance of 110 cm from the screen. A head- and chin rest (15 cm 
from the mirrors) was used to stabilize fixation. The effective viewing distance was 125 cm. 
Stimulus presentation, timing and keyboard responses were controlled with custom software 
programmed in C# using Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. 
 
Stimuli. A checkerboard pattern consisting of randomly positioned black and white 
squares of 0.37° by 0.37° was used to aid binocular fusion. The CFS masks consisted of 150 
squares of equal size (0.46° by 0.46°). The color of the squares was either red, green, blue or 
yellow. The target stimulus was a red circle (diameter 0.46°). The target moved horizontally 
across a  virtual square (5.5° by 5.5°) at a speed of 3°/s embedded in a larger square (7.32° by 
7.32°). The mask was presented in the other eye within a bounding square of the same size as 
the larger square in the other eye (7.32° by 7.32°, see Figure 2.1).  
The MMM differed from the traditional CFS mask. The main difference was that the 
individual elements of the mask were moving from frame to frame rather than flashing at 
randomly generated positions. Motion in the mask varied in six different directions 
(horizontal left/right and right/left, vertical up/down and down/up, diagonal bottom-
left/top-right and top-left/bottom-right). Every mask element had one of these motion 
directions during the trial and the different motion directions were equally divided amongst 
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the mask elements such that every motion direction was equally present in the display. For 
every motion direction, the colors of the individual elements were also evenly distributed. 
The initial position of every mask element was determined randomly with one constraint. To 
avoid that some parts of the display did not contain enough mask elements during a trial 
(creating blank spots), we divided the display into four quadrants and the positions, speeds 
and colors for each fourth of the mask elements were randomized within this quadrant. The 
size of the individual mask elements was the same as the size of the suppressed stimulus. 
When the positions of the mask elements overlapped, they were drawn on top of one 
another. Furthermore, when a mask element reached the edge of the display, it would 
reappear on the other side according to its motion trajectory. 
 
Procedure. On each trial, the CFS mask was shown in the participant’s dominant eye. 
Eye dominance was determined prior to the start of the experiment with Porta’s test (Porta, 
1593). Consequently, the target stimulus was presented in the non-dominant eye. The target 
stimulus and the MMM/CFS mask would onset simultaneously, but the target began at a low 
contrast level, and faded in during the first 20 frames of the event. The target stimulus 
moved on a horizontal plane from the right side to the left and disappeared from the screen 
after 3.6 seconds. The target moved either above or below fixation at one of six motion paths 
(three above and three below fixation) randomly selected on every trial (but balanced across 
the motion conditions). These motion paths were equally spaced from each other. The 
distance between every of the three different motion paths was twice the target size. After 
the target disappeared from the screen, participants had to indicate if the target moved 
above or below the fixation cross. Contrast thresholds for the different mask speeds were 
determined by a one-up, two-down staircase procedure converging at 70.71% correct (Levitt, 
1971). Two staircases were used for every mask speed. This resulted in twelve randomly 
interleaved staircases. The targets for the two staircases where given different starting 
values, in order to ensure the convergent consistency of the resulting thresholds. Because the 
task often was too easy for the high starting values, these staircases were accelerated by 
using a one-up, one-down procedure until the first incorrect response was recorded (for each 
of these staircases).  
 
23 
 
 
 
Design. Mask speed consisted of six different levels (1°/s, 2°/s, 3°/s, 5°/s, 8°/s and 
regular CFS) and two staircases were used for each mask speed. Participants performed 65 
trials for each staircase, resulting in 780 (65 trials x 6 speeds x 2 staircases) trials in total. The 
number of trials per staircase was selected based on pilot testing. Staircases were randomly 
interleaved and participants had the opportunity to take small breaks in-between. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. An example of the trial sequence. 
 
Simulations. Since we were interested in quantifying the degree of retinotopic neural 
adaptation for the different masks in our experiment, we conducted a simulation which 
implemented an approximation of the retinotopic representation of the input using Gabor 
filter banks often used in models of the early visual system (e.g., Riesenhuber & Poggio, 
1999). As  highlighted above, the effectiveness of CFS has most often been explained as a 
reduction in neural adaptation due to the successive presentations of new random 
configurations. In order to provide a more explicit model of this how this adaptation process 
might work in early retinotopic areas, we convolved the stimuli in our experiment with a 
Gabor filter bank to extract orientation- and contrast-selective responses at each location of 
the image (akin to responses of neurons in primary visual cortex) and then used these 
responses as input to an adaptation simulation. An exponential decay function was used to 
represent adaptation to the input, and an exponential recovery function to represent the 
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recovery of that retinotopic location when no input was present. These functions had the 
following form for decay and recovery, respectively:  
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where k0 is the initial response level set at 1, k1 the asymptotic response level set at 0 
for decay and 1 for recovery, and τ the time constant for the exponential. Note that this is not 
necessarily intended to provide a full or complete ‘model’ of retinotopic adaptation. Rather 
this simulation intends to make explicit what a simple approximation of retinotopic 
adaptation could look like. It is certainly possible that the adaptation dynamics in early 
retinotopic areas are much more complex, but this simulation enables us to quantify whether 
this very basic approximation of retinotopic adaptation can already predict our current 
results. 
We simulated 999 trials of each condition and transformed each frame of the trial to a 
grayscale image. Next, we filtered each frame with two oriented (at 0 and 90 degrees) odd-
symmetric Gabor filters with a spatial frequency set at the Nyquist frequency (412 c/image) 
and the standard deviation of the Gaussian set to: 
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where λ equals the wavelength in pixels and b the bandwith in octaves. These 
settings were chosen to efficiently extract the responses to the edges of the different 
configurations in the CFS mask. The size of the filters was set to be four times the standard 
deviation of the Gaussian (varying filter size had no effect on the filter responses). This 
filtering procedure was implemented in the Python MDP package (Zito, Wilbert, Wiskott, & 
Berkes, 2009). For each frame, this filtering step yields orientation- and contrast-specific 
responses for each pixel in the image, thresholded to be one out of five responses (2 
orientations times 2 polarities and no response). Next, we calculated the degree of adaptation 
for each pixel by letting an “activation value” (starting at 1) decay with a time constant of 
four seconds as long as the input was present. When the input was no longer present, this 
“activation value” would recover again with a time constant of six seconds and this process 
would go on until the end of the trial. Note that this adaptation process was specific to one of 
the four possible filter responses. Both orientation and contrast polarity had to be the same 
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across frames to yield adaptation. The time constants for adaptation and recovery were 
based on Giaschi, Douglas, Marlin, and Cynader (1993). This implementation yields an 
activity map for each location in the image for each of the four possible responses and we 
summed the values across all locations in an image to arrive at one summary statistic for the 
activation level associated with each mask condition. In other models of binocular rivalry, 
the output of the filtering step implemented here can be thought of as a representation of the 
‘strength’ of the stimulus, which in these models is usually expressed as a single value. In 
most models of binocular rivalry the adaptation process is simulated on this one summary 
value of stimulus strength. In order to approximate the nature of adaptation on early 
retinotopic maps however we calculate a ‘stimulus strength’ value at every location (based 
on a Gabor filter), and apply adaptation at every location. In this way we try to isolate the 
contribution of ‘retinotopic’ adaptation to the effectiveness of CFS. The longer the extracted 
stimulus features  remain the same at every retinotopic location, the more adaptation it will 
experience, thus the amount of adaptation at each location will be greater if the stimulus 
features remain the same over time. This should occur more in the slower motion conditions. 
The greater influence of adaptation in the slower motion conditions will result in a faster 
decrease in the ‘stimulus strength’ represented at every location, and this will be combined 
to influence the summary score. Thus, this summary score can be thought of as an (inverse) 
index of the degree of retinotopic adaptation, with more adaptation (associated with the 
slower motions) leading to a lower summary score.  
 
Results 
Each threshold was determined by taking the last 20 trials of the staircases. These 
trials were then averaged within every staircase and subsequently averaged over staircases 
within each mask speed. Because of large inter-individual differences between thresholds, 
we normalized the thresholds by dividing them with the mean of the thresholds per 
participant. These normalized thresholds were then subjected to a Bayesian version of a one-
way within-subjects ANOVA. Statistical inference throughout this paper did not use the  
classical frequentist framework but rather a Bayesian framework (see Kruschke, 2010a for an 
introduction). Bayesian statistics offer a lot of advantages over the classical frequentist 
framework (Kruschke, 2010a, 2010b; Rouder et al., 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007), which has 
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been disputed ever since it was introduced in psychology (e.g. from Rozeboom, 1960 to 
Wagenmakers, 2007). Moreover, using Bayesian inference as the principal way to do 
statistical inference is taken up more and more by researchers in vision science (e.g., see 
Rolfs, Dambacher, & Cavanagh, 2013). 
In our analyses, we first do model selection using Bayes Factors. Subsequently, we 
use Bayesian parameter estimation to further zoom in on the posterior distributions. In both 
cases (model selection and parameter estimation) we have used the tools that are currently 
available. Note that these tools rely on different models with different, but in both cases 
uninformative, priors. Techniques for an integrated Bayesian approach to both model 
selection and parameter estimation are currently quite complicated to implement. 
 
Bayesian model selection. Rouder, Morey, Speckman, and Province (2012) developed 
an approach in which a default class of priors is used to compute Bayes Factors in ANOVA 
designs. For an introduction, we refer to their paper. The Bayes Factor comparing a model 
with no effect and one with an effect of mask speed was equal to 13,992 indicating 
convincing evidence for a main effect of mask speed. Note that a classical repeated measures 
ANOVA yielded the same conclusion (F(5,20) = 6.205, p = .001). Figure 2.2 depicts the mean 
normalized threshold per condition and shows that the condition in which the speed of the 
CFS mask matched the speed of suppressed stimulus is the one with the highest threshold. 
In the next section, we will further zoom in on the results using Bayesian parameter 
estimation. 
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Figure 2.2. Mean normalized threshold in function of mask speed. The error bars denote 
95% within-subject confidence intervals. The squares indicate simulated adaptation values 
(in arbitrary units) for each mask speed and regular CFS. Note that high values indicate 
less adaptation. 
 
Bayesian parameter estimation. Figure S2.1 depicts the hierarchical model that was 
used to do Bayesian parameter estimation. This model was adapted from Gelman (2005) and 
Kruschke (2010a). The model is called hierarchical because it includes uncertainty at multiple 
levels. In contrast with classical repeated-measures ANOVA, the data were modeled as 
coming from a t-distribution instead of a normal to accommodate the possible influence of 
outliers. This method has also been called robust inference. Since the degrees of freedom of 
this t-distribution are unknown, it was treated as an unknown parameter and an 
uninformative uniform distribution was put on this parameter to let the data inform us about 
which degrees of freedom are in a credible range. The mean of the t-distribution is the result 
of a linear model (as in the classical repeated-measures ANOVA), comprising the general 
mean ( 0β ), the effect of mask speed ( i1β ) and the subjects factor ( j2β ). Furthermore, prior 
distributions are put on the parameters of the linear model. Note that these priors are not 
separate for each condition or subject, allowing that estimates for one condition inform 
estimates for the other or estimates for one subject are informed by estimates from other 
subjects. This is only one example of the flexibility of the Bayesian data-analytic approach 
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and the advantage is that one has to be explicit about the assumptions included in the model 
that is used to analyze the data. Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling was used to 
generate samples from the posterior distribution using the JAGS software.  
 
Since the posterior distributions for i1β  are deflections away from the baseline, 
contrasts can be computed to examine differences between two or more conditions – note 
that this is similar to performing a t-test. Here, we computed the difference between 3°/s and 
the average of all other conditions as well as pairwise comparisons between 3°/s and the 
other conditions. Figure S2.2 shows the posterior distributions associated with these 
contrasts. The black lines indicate the 95% highest density interval (HDI). This 95% HDI can 
be interpreted as an interval of credible parameter values. If this interval includes zero, we 
conclude that the compared conditions are not different and vice versa when zero falls out of 
the 95% HDI. Note that we can compute all these contrasts and do not have to use a 
correction for multiple comparisons. Indeed, there is just one (high-dimensional) posterior 
distribution and it does not change when you examine it in different ways (Kruschke, 2010a, 
pp. 284-285). 
 
In summary, the data suggest that the normalized threshold for a mask speed of 3°/s 
is credibly different from the average threshold of all other mask speeds. Furthermore, pair-
wise comparisons suggest that this difference holds for a mask speed of 1°/s and 8°/s. As a 
sanity check, Figure S2.3 depicts a posterior predictive check. In a posterior predictive check, 
every sample from the MCMC chain is used to predict a new data point by generating a 
random sample from the distribution you assume the data are generated from. If the model 
used for analyzing the data is not a good model, this would become clear from the 
predictions based on the believable parameter values. That is, these would deviate from the 
data or show a trend that is not present in the data. From Figure S2.3 it is apparent that the 
model used for this data set is a good model in the sense that it generates data that are in the 
range of the observed data. 
 
Comparison with the simulations. In the Introduction, we suggested that the 
effectiveness of CFS does not entirely depend on retinotopically specific neural adaptation 
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due to the continuous updates to the CFS mask. As the results of Experiment 1 indicate, the 
MMM that matched the motion properties of the suppressed target provided the most 
effective suppression. However, whilst it is logical to assume that the mask of 3°/s would 
show more retinotopically specific neural adaptation, it was important to quantify this 
explicitly, especially in relation to the traditional CFS mask. To address this, we computed a 
measure of the degree of retinotopic neural adaptation as described in the Methods section.  
The squares in Figure 2.2 depict the results of the simulations. As is apparent from 
this figure, our implementation of retinotopically specific neural adaptation showed a 
continuous increase from the slowest to the fastest mask speed and regular CFS, where an 
increase indicates less adaptation (as explained in the Methods section). However, our results 
deviate from these simulations as an increase in thresholds up to 3°/s and a decrease in 
thresholds for masks with faster speeds was observed. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, we manipulated the properties of MMMs and compared their 
effectiveness in suppressing a moving stimulus with regular CFS. We compared our pattern 
of results with that expected based on computations of the degree of retinotopic neural 
adaptation. If avoidance of retinotopically specific neural adaptation underlies the 
effectiveness of CFS, the mask with the most changes would prove to be the most effective. 
According to our measure of degree of retinotopic neural adaptation, the MMM and the 
regular CFS mask would show the least adaptation. However, the fastest mask speeds did 
not prove to be the most effective. It was apparent that the contrast threshold was highest for 
a MMM that matched the motion properties of the suppressed stimulus providing evidence 
for feature-selective depth of suppression during CFS (i.e., in line with Maehara et al., 2009; 
Yang & Blake, 2012).  
Given the seemingly widespread assumption that effective CFS masking is driven by 
robustness to (retinotopic) neural adaptation, we tried to replicate our finding from 
Experiment 1 using two different to-be-suppressed target speeds. Thus, in Experiment 2 we 
manipulated the speed of the suppressed stimulus to move at either 2°/s or 5°/s whilst 
keeping the same range of mask speeds used as in Experiment 1. This also enables us to test 
the role of feature-selective depth of suppression during CFS. Indeed, analogous to the 
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results of Yang & Blake (2012) and compared to the results of Experiment 1, one would 
predict that the peak in the contrast threshold would shift toward a CFS mask where the 
speed is matched at 2°/s or 5°/s respectively for targets moving at 2°/s and 5°/s. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Materials and Methods 
Participants. Six new participants (1 male), all students of the undergraduate 
psychology program of the University of Leuven participated in the experiment for course 
credit. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Every participant signed an informed 
consent prior to the start of the experiment and was naive to the goal of the study. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Design. Mask speed again consisted of six different levels (1°/s, 2°/s, 3°/s, 5°/s, 8°/s 
and regular CFS). Target speed was also manipulated and consisted of two levels (2°/s and 
5°/s), yielding a 2 x 6 within-subjects design. Participants performed 65 trials for each 
staircase, resulting in 1,560 (65 trials x 6 speeds x 2 target speeds x 2 staircases) trials in total. 
Target speed was blocked and counterbalanced across participants. In every block, staircases 
were randomly interleaved and participants had the opportunity to take small breaks in-
between.  
 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was the same as in Experiment 1. The 
targets moved on a horizontal plane from the right side to the left and disappeared from the 
screen after 5.5 and 2.2 seconds, respectively for the 2°/s and 5°/s target speed conditions. 
 
Results 
The data were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1. First, we report the 
results from Bayesian model selection and subsequently we elaborate on them using 
Bayesian parameter estimation.  
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Bayesian model selection. Bayes Factors were again computed based on Rouder et al. 
(Rouder et al., 2012). Different Bayes Factors are reported in Table 2.1, all of which can be 
interpreted as a comparison with a full model including the main effect of mask speed, the 
main effect of target speed and the interaction. Bayes Factors smaller than one indicate 
evidence for the full model.  
 
Table 2.1. Bayes Factors associated with a comparison with the full model. 
Model Bayes Factor 
Null 0.0003 
Mask Speed + Target Speed 0.178 
Target Speed + Mask Speed * Target Speed 0.0001 
Mask Speed + Mask Speed * Target Speed 5.1146 
 
As the table shows, the model with a main effect of mask speed and an interaction 
between mask speed and target speed is strongly preferred. Note that a classical repeated 
measures ANOVA yields a similar conclusion (main effect of mask speed: F(5,25) = 4.066, p = 
.008; no main effect of target speed: F(1,5) = 1.346, p = .298; interaction between mask and 
target speed: F(5,25) = 2.156, p = .09). As is apparent from Figure 2.3 and in line with our 
predictions, the data indeed shift for the condition in which the target moved at 2°/s. The 
pattern of results is more complicated for the condition of 5°/s, however. Here, the thresholds 
seem to “flatten out” when the target moves at this speed. 
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Figure 2.3. Mean normalized thresholds in function of target speed and mask speed. The 
error bars denote 95% within-subject confidence intervals. The squares indicate the 
simulated adaptation values (in arbitrary units) for each mask speed and regular CFS. Note 
that high values indicate less adaptation. 
 
Bayesian parameter estimation. Parameter estimation was done with a similar 
hierarchical model as in the analysis of Experiment 1, but with an extra main effect – target 
speed – added to the model. Figure S2.4 shows the associated graphical model. Because of 
the interaction, pair-wise comparisons were computed for every level of target speed. Figure 
S2.5 depicts the two pair-wise comparisons for a target speed of 2°/s that were credibly 
different from zero. In the 5°/s condition, no pair-wise comparisons were credibly different 
from zero. 
 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, the results clearly deviate with those expected based on 
simulations of the degree of retinotopic neural adaptation for each condition. Experiment 1 
also revealed a clear effect whereby the most effective mask was one in which the speeds 
were matched to those of the target. Using two new speeds in Experiment 2, we did find 
some additional evidence for the importance of the match between the speed of the mask 
and the stimulus, in that there was a significant interaction between the effectiveness of the 
different masking conditions across the two target speed conditions. Indeed for a target 
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moving at 2°/s, the peak of the distribution of thresholds shifted more towards 2°/s 
compared to the results of Experiment 1. For a target moving at 5°/s, the results were less 
clear, in fact there were no credible differences between the masking speeds with a target 
moving at 5°/s. This is possibly due to the fact that the conditions were equated for distance 
covered over the display and not for presentation time. That is, the target stimuli crossed the 
same distance over the screen independent of the speed at which they moved, and thus 
stimuli in the 5°/s target condition  are presented for a shorter time duration. It is possible 
therefore that, the shorter presentation time in the 5°/s condition renders it harder for the 
visual system to encode the speed of the target, and for this to then have any impact on the 
speeds used in the mask.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this study, we started from the observation that a MMM provided more effective 
suppression of a moving stimulus than a regular randomly updating CFS mask. This finding 
did not seem to readily follow from the current assumptions regarding why CFS is an 
effective suppression paradigm. The robust nature of CFS suppression is generally 
considered to be the result of the transient nature of the mask, reducing the amount neural 
adaptation during the interocular competition process at retinotopic stages of the visual 
system (which have often been implicated in the competition process, Alais, 2012; Blake, 
1989). The continuously moving masks we employed yielded a higher degree of simulated 
retinotopic neural adaptation than the regular CFS mask and therefore should have been less 
effective (particularly for the slower motion speeds).  
In Experiment 1, the speed of individual mask elements of the MMM was 
manipulated. The influence of varying this speed on masking a moving stimulus was tested 
and compared to traditional CFS. The data showed an effect of mask speed on the contrast 
thresholds at which the target could be detected. The highest threshold was obtained for the 
mask speed that matched the speed of 3°/s at which the target stimulus moved. The 
thresholds decreased as the CFS mask moved either slower or faster. This finding highlights 
that regular CFS is not always a powerful, readily applied interocular suppression technique. 
Instead, the findings of Experiment 1 highlight the feature-selective depth of interocular 
suppression through CFS. That is, when the properties of the mask are more similar to the 
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suppressed stimulus, suppression is stronger (see Yang & Blake, 2012 for a further discussion 
of feature-selective depth of suppression).  
Secondly, we explicitly contrasted our findings with a simulation of the degree of 
retinotopically specific neural adaptation. If transients were critical for CFS to be effective, 
the mask that contained most feature changes over time was expected to be the most 
effective. According to the adaptation measure we computed, the masks that showed the 
least adaptation were the regular CFS, and the moving masks with the highest speeds. 
However, as shown in Figure 2.2, these were not observed to be the most effective with 
respect to suppressing the target stimulus ruling out an explanation of the effectiveness of 
CFS in terms of a simple approximation of retinotopic neural adaptation.  
In Experiment 2, we manipulated the speed of the target stimulus and found that the 
distribution of thresholds changed when the speed of the target stimulus was changed. The 
results from the second experiment provided some additional support for the importance of 
matching between the stimulus and the mask, though this interaction was not clear in the 
5°/s condition. More critically to our current goal, the results from Experiment 2 again did 
not agree with the predictions of what would be the most effective mask based on our 
simulations of retinotopic adaptation. 
Although the predictions derived from the simulation of retinotopic adaptation did 
not agree with the data obtained in both experiments, we should note explicitly that we are 
not claiming that we have derived predictions from a complete or full-blown model of 
retinotopic adaptation. Our implementation aimed specifically at extracting edges at 
different locations in our CFS images and then applying an adaptation process depending on 
the orientation and contrast polarity of these edges, akin to what a primary visual cortex 
complex cell might be doing. Thus, in our simulations we did not consider varying spatial 
frequencies nor differential response properties for magno- and parvocellular pathways. 
Further, with respect to the adaptation process, we only used one timescale for adaptation 
and one for recovery (based on neurophysiological measurements), whereas adaptation on 
multiple timescales or different timescales for different features might be possible. Our 
simulation, therefore, should only be interpreted as a coarse approximation of retinotopic 
adaptation. Yet we think this  operationalization captures the essence of the concept of 
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retinotopic adaptation which has been proposed as being important for the effectiveness of 
CFS. 
Methodologically, our results highlight that one should consider using MMM instead 
of a traditional CFS mask in some contexts to achieve desirable suppression strength. Indeed, 
our most consistent finding was that a MMM, and especially one that contained motion 
features similar to the suppressed stimulus was more effective than a traditional CFS mask, 
highlighting the importance of binocular feature matching (Maehara et al., 2009; Yang & 
Blake, 2012). Thus, our results suggest that researchers wanting to suppress moving stimuli 
should also focus on developing MMMs. 
Theoretically, our results highlight that the transient nature of the mask is not always 
the most important aspect of CFS, in the sense that the more spatially transient the mask is, 
the more effective suppression will be. The initial innovation in developing CFS was exactly 
the introduction of a transient in one eye which indeed seems crucial for the increase in 
suppression strength (Tsuchiya et al., 2006). However, the relationship between mask 
transients and effective suppression does not seem to be as simple as one might assume 
based on retinotopically specific neural adaptation. Indeed, to achieve reliable suppression 
through CFS one has to consider the feature similarity between mask and target. This 
reconnects our understanding of CFS with observations from the binocular rivalry literature 
in which the importance of feature similarity of competing stimuli has repeatedly been 
shown (Alais & Melcher, 2007; Alais & Parker, 2006; Stuit et al., 2009).  
Whilst the current results challenge the idea that the effectiveness of CFS can be 
predicted based on a reduction in retinotopically specific neural adaptation, they do not 
imply that no adaptation-based processes underlie the effect. Indeed, these could potentially 
be explained by an adaptation mechanism acting at the level of motion speed, for example. 
That is, given that the visual system can adapt to motion speed (Krekelberg, Boynton, & van 
Wezel, 2006; Krekelberg, van Wezel, & Albright, 2006), the condition in which mask speed 
and target speed overlapped would increase the level of adaptation to that specific speed 
and potentially increase the thresholds for the detection of that speed consistent with our 
results.  
Alternatively, one could also speculate that a mask moving at 3°/s would activate 
parts of motion area MT that also would be required to represent the target moving at 3°/s. 
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This explanation would be more consistent with the idea that interocular competition results 
from a bottleneck imposed by the selective access to higher level areas. If the target and mask 
in CFS share more properties, then it is possible that they compete more directly for the same 
neural resources. The stronger motion signals in the mask could dictate that only the mask 
stimulus reaches higher areas and therefore stays dominant and increases detection 
thresholds for the suppressed stimulus. 
This second explanation could potentially be related to a broader mechanism 
implicated in the singleton pop-out literature using visual search. In this literature, target-
nontarget similarity has been shown to have an influence on the slope of the search function 
such that the slope is observed to be higher as the similarity between target and nontarget 
increases (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). Indeed, in our experiments we observed that it was 
increasingly easier for participants to detect the moving stimulus when the similarity 
between mask and target stimulus decreased. 
As is apparent from our experiments, and consistent with the work of Hong and 
Blake (2009), Maehara et al. (2009), and Yang and Blake (2012), the specific properties of the 
mask play an important role. Indeed, this is also reflected in a recent attempt to construct a 
dynamical systems model of CFS (Shimaoka & Kaneko, 2011). This model, which extends a 
minimal model for binocular rivalry introduced by (Wilson, 2007), includes a feature-
selective component in addition to the classical cross-inhibition and self-adaptation 
components. 
Thus, regular CFS does not seem to be a general panacea for suppressing stimuli. 
Indeed, one has to take into account the similarity between features that can be extracted 
based on the input to each eye, rather than simply increasing the transients in the mask. This 
finding could help to account for the (implicit) tendency in the literature for different authors 
to adapt the CFS mask based on the stimulus they are trying to suppress, presumably by 
matching more closely the characteristics of the to-be-suppressed stimuli and the mask. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we introduced a MMM that was shown to be more effective in 
suppressing a moving stimulus than a regular CFS mask. We developed an explicit 
quantification of the degree of retinotopically specific neural adaptation and used this to 
37 
 
 
 
make predictions on the effectiveness of our masks. Our results were not consistent with the 
predictions based on the approximation of retinotopic neural adaptation, and this questions 
the assumption that the most effective mask will always reflect the avoidance of neural 
adaptation due to the transient nature of the CFS mask. We conclude that a regular CFS 
mask that provides effective suppression for static stimuli is not necessarily suited for 
suppressing moving stimuli and that in general one has to consider the feature match 
between mask and suppressed stimulus when attempting to use CFS.  
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
 
 
Figure S2.1. Graphical model for the Bayesian version of a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA. The data are assumed to come from a t-distribution with a certain mean and 
standard deviation. The mean is equal to a linear combination of the effect of mask speed (
i1β ) and a participant-specific effect ( j2β ). 
 
Figure S2.2. Posterior distributions for the pair-wise comparisons between 3°/s and all other 
levels of mask speed and the regular CFS mask. 
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Figure S2.3. Posterior predictive checks for every participant. The red cross is the mean of 
the predicted values, the gray line the associated 95% HDI and the black dots are the 
individual data points for every condition. The conditions are ordered as in the bar plots 
going from a mask moving at 1°/s to regular CFS. 
 
 
Figure S2.4. Graphical model for the Bayesian version of a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA. The data are assumed to come from a distribution with a certain mean and 
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standard deviation. The mean is equal to a linear combination of the effect of mask speed (
i1β ), target speed ( j2β ), their interaction ( ij3β ) and a participant-specific effect ( k4β ). 
 
Figure S2.5. Posterior distributions for the pair-wise comparisons between a mask moving 
at 2°/s and 8°/s and 2°/s and CFS, respectively, for the 2°/s target speed condition. 
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Chapter 3.  
Serial correlations in Continuous Flash Suppression 
 
Research on visual rivalry has demonstrated that consecutive dominance durations are 
serially dependent, implying that the underlying competition mechanism is not driven by 
some random process but includes a memory component. Here we asked whether serial 
dependence is also observed in continuous flash suppression (CFS). We addressed this 
question by analyzing a large data set of time series of suppression durations obtained in a 
series of so-called ‘breaking CFS’ experiments in which the duration of the period is 
measured until a suppressed target breaks through the CFS mask. Across experimental 
manipulations, stimuli, and observers, we found that (1) the distribution of breakthrough 
rates was fit less well by a gamma distribution than in conventional visual rivalry 
paradigms, (2) the suppression duration on a previous trial influenced the suppression 
duration on a later trial up to as long as a lag of 8 trials, and (3) the mechanism underlying 
these serial correlations was predominantly monocular. We conclude that the underlying 
competition mechanism of CFS also includes a memory component that is primarily, but not 
necessarily exclusively, monocular in nature. We suggest that the temporal dependency 
structure of suppression durations in CFS is akin to those observed in binocular rivalry, 
which might imply that both phenomena tap into similar rather than distinct mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moors, P., Stein, T., Wagemans, J., van Ee, R. (2015). Serial correlations in continuous flash 
suppression. Neuroscience of Consciousness, niv010. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A main challenge for the visual system is to create a stable perceptual world from a 
noisy stream of sensory input. One way in which perceptual continuity can be achieved is by 
having the current percept not only be influenced by the current input, but also by the input 
from the recent past. This would necessarily entail a certain degree of serial dependence in 
time series pertaining to visual perception. Indeed, recent studies have indicated that 
perceived orientation, numerosity, or face identity are influenced by stimuli presented in the 
recent past (Cicchini, Anobile, & Burr, 2014; Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Liberman, Fischer, & 
Whitney, 2014).  
The question of serial (in)dependence in time series has also been addressed in 
studies on visual rivalry where perception alternates between competing interpretations of 
the sensory input in a seemingly random fashion (Alais, 2012; Alais & Blake, 2015; Blake & 
Logothetis, 2002). Early studies on visual rivalry reported that consecutive percept durations 
did not show any relationship, and if they did, the correlation was judged to be too small to 
be meaningful (Blake, Fox, & McIntyre, 1971; Borsellino, De Marco, Allazetta, Rinesi, & 
Bartolini, 1972; Fox & Herrmann, 1967; Lehky, 1995; Logothetis, Leopold, & Sheinberg, 1996; 
Walker, 1975). More recently, however, a number of studies have rejected the independence 
between successive dominance durations in visual rivalry (Mamassian & Goutcher, 2005; 
Pastukhov & Braun, 2011; van Ee, 2005, 2009). Small, but consistently significant serial 
correlations (most pronounced at lag 1) have been reported for both binocular rivalry as well 
as for the ambiguously rotating sphere (van Ee, 2009). The finding that consecutive percept 
durations are serially dependent is important because it provides a footprint of the neural 
alternation mechanism (van Ee, 2009). That is, it shows that the underlying dynamics are not 
completely random but include a memory component (as revealed by the serial correlations). 
 
In this paper, we focus on continuous flash suppression (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; 
Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 2006), an interocular suppression paradigm in which 
discrepant images are presented to corresponding retinal locations of both eyes. In CFS, the 
input to one of the eyes is continuously updated at a rate of about 100 ms (i.e., ~10 Hz) 
yielding prolonged and stable suppression of the stimulus presented to the other eye. 
Although it is still debated whether CFS is simply just a stronger form of binocular rivalry or 
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involves distinct mechanisms (Kaunitz, Fracasso, Skujevskis, & Melcher, 2014; P. Moors, 
Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2014; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya et al., 2006), the main factors 
involved in visual rivalry in general, cross-inhibition and self-adaptation, presumably also 
come into play during CFS (Shimaoka & Kaneko, 2011). As serial correlations could provide 
a footprint of the underlying alternation mechanism (van Ee, 2009), a first goal of this paper 
was to analyze the pattern of serial correlations in CFS by capitalizing on a large data set (n = 
393 sessions) consisting of suppression durations obtained in several different so-called 
breaking CFS (b-CFS) experiments (Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). b-CFS refers 
to a paradigm in which CFS has been implemented to study unconscious visual processing1. 
In a typical b-CFS study, the CFS mask and a target stimulus of interest are presented to 
different eyes on each trial. The target stimulus will initially be suppressed from visual 
awareness but will eventually, after several seconds, “break through” the CFS mask (i.e., 
become detectable). In these experiments, suppression duration is the main dependent 
variable and is used as a measure to assess whether different classes of stimuli break 
suppression differentially. For example, the classic study by Jiang et al. (2007) showed that 
mean suppression durations for upright faces are shorter than those for inverted faces. 
A second goal of this paper pertains to a longstanding debate in the literature on 
binocular rivalry with respect to the nature and site of interocular suppression. That is, does 
binocular rivalry suppression entail inhibitory interactions between neurons at a monocular 
level (Blake, 1989; Levelt, 1965; Verhoeff, 1935) or does competition also occur at levels 
upstream in the visual cortex, involving competition between binocular neurons (Logothetis 
et al., 1996; Walker, 1978)? Although this debate has been settled more or less by proposing a 
hybrid view of binocular rivalry in which rivalry is proposed to happen at multiple stages in 
the visual hierarchy, both at the monocular and binocular level (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; 
Tong et al., 2006), the nature of our data set enabled us to shed some more light on this issue. 
That is, our data set contains two different types of b-CFS experiments, one in which the eye 
to which the CFS mask was presented was determined randomly on each trial (variable eye 
presentation) and the other in which the eye to which the CFS mask is presented was kept 
fixed throughout the experiment (fixed eye presentation). This enabled us to test the extent to 
which potential serial correlations in CFS are driven by monocular rather than binocular 
                                                   
1
 Note that the validity of using b-CFS to infer unconscious visual processing has been questioned (Stein, Hebart, 
& Sterzer, 2011; Stein & Sterzer, 2014), yet a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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mechanisms. Furthermore, it is currently still debated whether differences in suppression 
times are mostly driven by low-level rather than high-level mechanisms (Gayet et al., 2014; 
Hesselmann & Moors, 2015; Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Pinto, van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & 
Seth, 2015). The extent to which potential serial correlations are predominantly relying on 
monocular or binocular mechanisms could also shed some light on this discussion. 
In the remainder of this paper, we start by describing the data set that was used for 
the analysis. In the first part of the analysis, we summarize the data set through a classical 
analysis of fitting a gamma distribution to the breakthrough rate distribution. In the second 
part, we report on serial correlations of suppression durations observed across experiments 
with different observers, target stimuli, and CFS masks.  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The data set 
Our data set consists of 24 different experiments ran in four separate studies (see 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Three of these studies (16 experiments) have already been published 
(Heyman & Moors, 2014; Stein, Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2014; Stein, Sterzer, & Peelen, 
2012). We refer to these studies for the methodological and procedural details of each 
experiment. All reported studies were conducted in line with the ethical principles regarding 
research with human participants as specified in The Code of Ethics of the World Medical 
Association (Declaration of Helsinki). The study was approved by the respective local ethics 
committees (Ethical Committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences (EC 
FPPW) of the University of Leuven, and the Charité ethics committee), and all participants 
gave written informed consent before starting the experiment. Note that Experiment 2 
reported in Heyman and Moors (2014) consisted of a test-retest design in which the same 
experiment was run on the same set of subjects on two consecutive days. Given that these 
sessions were run on separate days, these two experimental sessions are regarded as two 
experiments in our analysis. Note, however, that including only one of the sessions rather 
than both did not change the results. The remaining experiments comprise hitherto 
unpublished data. All unpublished PM experiments involved presenting illusory shape 
stimuli in a typical b-CFS design (for a partial report of these data, we refer to Moors, van 
Crombruggen, Wagemans, van Ee, & de-Wit, 2013). TS16 comprises an unpublished control 
47 
 
 
 
experiment belonging to the set of experiments reported in Stein et al. (2014). TS4 and TS5 
refer to unpublished data sets in the context of Stein et al. (2012). The number of trials in all 
these experiments ranged between 192 and 768. We aimed at including only experiments 
that contained ~200 trials at least since this yields ~90% power to detect a correlation of ~0.2 
(van Ee, 2009). 
As mentioned in the Introduction, our data set contains two different types of b-CFS 
experiments, depending on whether the CFS mask was presented in the same eye 
throughout the experiment or randomly to one of both eyes on each trial. We refer to these 
experiments as fixed eye (n = 290) and variable eye experiments (n = 103), respectively. A 
summary of some experimental details for both data sets can be found in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  
All experiments consisted of the typical b-CFS design. A CFS mask (with varying 
properties, see Tables) was presented to the dominant or non-dominant eye or variably to 
one of both eyes and the suppressed stimulus was presented to the other eye and gradually 
increased in contrast. Additionally, in all TS experiments the CFS mask was gradually 
decreased in contrast throughout a trial, to ensure sufficient breakthroughs for all 
participants (E. Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007) (none of the PM experiments relied on this 
procedure). The specifics of this mask fade-out procedure are reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
It is important to note that this mask fade-out procedure has important implications for the 
resulting suppression durations. Given that the mask invariably disappears after a fixed 
presentation time, the suppression duration distribution is necessarily censored at this point. 
Upon breakthrough, participants always had to perform a localization task (i.e., indicate 
whether the stimulus was presented above or below fixation or whether it was presented left 
or right of fixation, or in which quadrant the stimulus was shown) and the time it took 
participants to make the localization response was recorded as the suppression duration. 
Because blocking rather than randomizing experimental conditions could artificially induce 
serial correlations, only experiments in which all experimental conditions were randomized 
across trials were included in the data set. 
 
 
48 
 
 
Table 3.1. Description of data set for fixed eye CFS experiments.  
Experiment Participants Number of 
Trials 
Stimulus 
Fade-in 
Time (s) 
Mask 
Fade-
Out 
Onset (s) 
Mask 
Fade-
Out 
Time (s) 
Max trial 
duration (s) 
Mask type Published as 
PM1 19 300 2 / / / 100 squares 
between 1° and 
2° 
Moors, van 
Crombruggen, 
Wagemans, van Ee, 
& de-Wit (2013) 
PM2 20 192 2 / / / 144 geometrical 
shapes 
Moors et al. (2013) 
PM3 20 288 2 / / / 144 geometrical 
shapes 
Unpublished 
PM4 18 308 2 / / / 200 squares 
between 0.2° 
and 1.2° 
Heyman & Moors 
(2014) 
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PM5 31 460 2 / / / 200 squares 
between 0.2° 
and 1.2° 
Heyman & Moors 
(2014) 
PM6 31 460 2 / / / 200 squares 
between 0.2° 
and 1.2° 
Heyman & Moors 
(2014) 
PM7 21 288 2 / / / 144 geometrical 
shapes 
Unpublished 
PM8 20 288 2 / / / 48 geometrical 
shapes 
Unpublished 
TS9 12 576 1.1 1.1 4 7 Circles between 
0.3° and 1.4° 
Stein, Seymour, 
Hebart, & Sterzer 
(2014) – Exp 1a 
TS10 16 384 1.1 1.1 4 7 Circles between 
0.3° and 1.4° 
Stein et al. (2014) – 
Exp 1b 
TS11 16 384 1.1 1.1 7 10 Circles between 
0.3° and 1.4° 
Stein et al. (2014) – 
Exp 1c 
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TS12 12 384 1.1 1.1 4 7 Circles between 
0.3° and 1.4° 
Stein et al. (2014) – 
Control Exp 1a 
TS13 14 7682 1.1 1.1 4 7 Circles between 
0.3° and 1.4° 
Stein et al. (2014) – 
Control Exp 1b 
TS14 12 2563 1.1 1.1 7 10 Circles between 
0.3° and 1.4° 
Stein et al. (2014) – 
Control Exp 2 
TS15 12 256 1.11 1.1 7 10 Circles between 
0.3° and 1.4° 
Stein et al. (2014) – 
Control Exp 3 
TS16 16 3844 1.1 1.1 7 10 Circles between 
0.3° and 1.4° 
Unpublished 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
2
 The experiment crashed for 1 participant and only 524 trials were recorded for this participant. 
3
 The experiment crashed for 2 participant and only 252 and 240 trials were recorded for these participants. 
4
 The experiment crashed for 1 participant and only 260 trials were recorded fort his participant. 
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Table 3.2. Description of data set for variable eye CFS experiments. 
Experiment Participants Number of 
Trials 
Stimulus 
Fade-in Time 
(s) 
Mask 
Fade-out 
Onset (s) 
Mask 
Fade-out 
Time (s) 
Maximum 
Trial Duration 
(s) 
Mask type Published as 
TS1 12 288 1 1.1 7 10 Circles 
between 
0.4° and 1.8° 
Stein, Sterzer, & 
Peelen (2012) – 
Exp 2 
TS2 11 320 1 1.1 7 10 Circles 
between 
0.4° and 1.8° 
Stein et al. (2012) – 
Exp 4 
TS3 10 200 1 1.1 7 10 Circles 
between 
0.4° and 1.8° 
Stein et al. (2012) – 
Exp 5 
TS4 10 320 /1 1.1 7 10 / Unpublished 
 
TS5 21 240 /1 1.1 7 10 / Unpublished 
TS6 13 192 1 1 7 10 Circles 
between 
0.4° and 1.8° 
Stein, Peelen, & 
Sterzer (2011) – 
Exp 1 
TS7 13 192 1 1 7 10 Circles Stein et al. (2011) – 
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between 
0.4° and 1.8° 
Exp 2 
TS8 13 192 1 1 7 10 Circles 
between 
0.4° and 1.8° 
Stein et al. (2011) – 
Exp 3 
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Data analysis 
The first part of the analysis consisted of cleaning the data in two steps to ensure no 
correlations would be observed that could be attributable to either of the following two 
factors. First, we excluded for each observer the first 5 trials of each session (i.e., akin to the 
removal of the first 30 seconds of each trial in van Ee, 2009). Second, we corrected the data 
for drift (i.e., suppression times tend to become shorter, on average, over the course of the 
experiment). Because the drift was potentially non-linear, we performed a local regression 
(LOESS) on the data set, with trial number as the predictor of suppression duration. The 
smoothing parameter was automatically selected based on the bias-corrected Akaike 
information criterion (Hurvich, Simonoff, & Tsai, 1998). 
As highlighted in the description of the data set, all TS experiments relied on a mask 
fade-out procedure, in which the CFS mask contrast was gradually ramped down over the 
course of a trial. Because this introduces an artificial cut-off in the suppression duration 
distributions (i.e., when the CFS mask disappears, participants will always see the stimulus 
in the following second or so), we removed all trials in which the recorded suppression 
duration was higher than the time point at which the CFS mask disappeared. If this led to a 
removal of more than 10% of trials, we removed this participant from the data set. We used 
this cut-off to ensure that potential serial correlations could not be induced by responses to 
stimuli in the absence of a CFS mask. This procedure led to a removal of 12 and 24 
participants for the fixed and variable eye experiments, respectively. Please note however 
that the overall pattern of serial correlations (especially with respect to the early lags) does 
not change when these participants are included (see Supplementary Files for a figure 
including these participants, as well as excluding the cleaning steps). 
Because the suppression durations follow a non-normal distribution, we calculated 
Spearman rank correlations at the various lags, where lag n refers to the nth trial before the 
current trial. The maximum lag that was considered was lag 10 because this proved to be the 
lag up to which the data were most reliable for most participants. A Fisher-z transformation 
was applied to the Spearman correlations before averaging them (due to the range of trials in 
the experiments included, a weighted average was used, where the weight was the number 
of trials used in the experiment). After averaging, the resulting correlation was back-
transformed using the inverse transformation. The significance of the average Spearman 
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correlations was assessed using one-sample randomization tests in Fisher-z space. Since this 
analysis essentially involves comparing 10 different p-values against zero, the significance of 
the p-values was determined by controlling the false discovery rate (FDR, at 5%), using the 
method introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). A summary of the analysis pipeline 
is visualized in Figure 3.1. Additionally, to compare both experiment types, we used 
polynomial mixed-effect regression modelling with random intercepts and random slopes 
for participants (without correlations between random effects). Polynomial regression was 
used to account for the nonlinear relationship between lag and the observed Spearman 
correlation (infra). Drop-in-deviance tests were used to compare different statistical models. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. An overview of the analysis pipeline. 
 
RESULTS 
Suppression duration variability across observers 
We first provide a description of the data set in terms of a classic analysis of 
suppression durations. Because Brascamp et al. (2005) showed better fits for alternation rates 
rather than percept duration for a range of visual rivalry stimuli, we fitted a gamma 
distribution to the distribution of breakthrough rates rather than suppression durations (i.e., 
breakthrough rate is 1/suppression duration). Figure 3.2 depicts the distributions of two 
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different observers overlaid with the best fitting gamma distributions (see Supplementary 
Figures S3.1, S3.2, and S3.3 for an overview of all observers, split up by eye for the variable 
eye experiments, for the fixed and variable eye experiments, respectively). For both 
experiment types,  scatter plots of the shape and scale parameters of the individual observer 
fits are depicted. Note that there is considerable inter-individual variability in the estimates 
of the shape and scale parameters, reflecting the variability in breakthrough rates across 
observers. Furthermore, it should be noted that the tight negative relationship between 
shape and scale parameters in log-log space is to be expected due to the parameterization of 
the gamma distribution (Borsellino et al., 1972; Brouwer & van Ee, 2006; van Ee, Noest, 
Brascamp, & van den Berg, 2006; Wagenmakers & Brown, 2007). The boxplots summarize 
the goodness of fit quantified through the probability pKS obtained from the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which involves the largest overall deviation between the empirical and fitted 
cumulative distribution (Brascamp et al., 2005) (referred to as the D statistic). pKS ranges 
between 0 and 1 where higher values indicate good fit. Because estimated parameters were 
used for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the associated pKS value is no longer valid (Durbin, 
1973). Therefore, we used a Monte Carlo procedure to compute pKS. In this procedure, we 
generated new data sets for each participant based on the estimated parameters and 
computed the D statistic for each simulated data set. For each participant, we repeated this 
procedure 10,000 times and computed pKS as the proportion of simulated D values more 
extreme than the D value observed in the data. 
As is apparent from Figure 3.2, the median pKS value is equal to .08 (.17 and .11 for 
the variable eye experiments, right and left eye respectively), indicating that the fit quality is 
generally low for the breakthrough rate distributions, especially compared to Brascamp et al. 
Indeed, for both the fixed and variable eye experiments, the upper limit of the interquartile 
range of the pKS never exceeds the lower limit of the interquartile range reported in 
Brascamp et al. This discrepancy between the quality of fits generally observed in visual 
rivalry and the ones observed here is further touched upon in the discussion. 
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Figure 3.2. Distribution analysis of breakthrough rate. (left) Fixed eye experiments. The 
histogram depicts the distribution of one typical observer overlaid with the best fitting 
gamma distribution. The middle left figure depicts the shape and scale estimates for all 
observers in log-log space. Goodness of fit was quantified through the pKS statistic, relying 
on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. A summary is depicted in the bottom left boxplot (high 
values indicate good fit). (right) Variable eye experiments.  
 
Aggregated serial correlation data 
Figure 3.3 depicts the Spearman rank correlation coefficients up to lag 10 aggregated 
across all observers using a weighted average (weighed by the number of trials used in the 
experiment) (black line; shaded gray area indicates the bootstrapped 95% confidence 
interval), for both data sets. To assess the variability across experiments, the aggregated data 
are also plotted for each experiment separately (colored lines). For the fixed eye experiments, 
the correlation at lag 1 is positive and significantly different from zero (r = .10). Furthermore, 
rather than immediately dropping to zero, the serial correlations gradually decay to zero 
until they are no longer significant from lag 9 onwards. In contrast, for the variable eye 
experiments, a markedly different pattern arises. The correlation at lag 1 is slightly lower (r = 
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.09) and quickly drops to zero from lag 3 onwards. This difference between experiment types 
is confirmed by a polynomial mixed effects regression analysis. A model including main 
effects of lag (polynomials up to the order of three) and experiment type and their interaction 
was preferred over a model only including the main effects (drop-in-deviance test, χ(3) = 
9.4079, p = .024).  
 
Figure 3.3. Aggregated serial correlation data for the fixed (left) and variable (right) eye 
experiments. Mean Spearman rank correlations across all observers as a function of lag. The 
gray, shaded area indicates the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. The colored lines 
depict the mean Spearman rank correlations for each experiment separately. 
 
The variable eye experiments contain both trials in which the CFS mask is kept 
constant on trial n + 1 as well as switched to the previously suppressed eye. Thus, we were 
interested in examining the influence of swapping eyes across trials for these experiments. 
Therefore, we split the data for each observer into a data set in which for all trials the CFS 
mask was presented to the same or different eye on the previous trial (i.e., lag 1). We 
restricted our analyses to lag 1 only to ensure that we still had sufficient data. Figure 3.4 
depicts the results of this analysis. As is apparent from this figure, the major contribution to 
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the positive lag 1 correlation observed for the variable eye experiments stems from the trials 
in which the CFS mask is presented to the same eye as in the previous trial. Moreover, rather 
than being positive, the lag 1 correlation for the swap trials is low and negative, presumably 
due to the participants’ eye dominance.  
 
Figure 3.4. Lag 1 correlation analysis for the variable eye experiments. The bar plot depicts 
the lag 1 Spearman correlations for the full data set (as depicted in Figure 3.3), and the data 
set split up in trials in which the CFS mask was always presented to the same or different eye 
on the previous trial. The same eye trials contribute significantly to the positive lag 1 
correlations. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Control data 
To ensure that our results were specific to CFS and not any reaction-time based 
process in general, we subjected the data of the control experiments reported in Stein, 
Hebart, et al. (2011) (Experiment 1) and Stein, Peelen, and Sterzer (2011) to the same analysis 
as we did above. Their particular experiments tested whether upright faces (or face-like 
stimuli) would break suppression faster than inverted faces in a control condition in which 
the target and mask stimulus were both presented in both eyes. Because the inclusion criteria 
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for these experiments were quite stringent (same fade-in time and onset as in the CFS 
condition, CFS and control condition blocked rather than mixed), these experiments 
contained less trials than those in the main data set (n = 120). Figure 3.5 depicts the 
aggregated serial correlation data for these two experiments. As is apparent from this figure, 
no consistent serial correlation pattern was observed. Indeed, a mixed-effects regression 
model with a main effect of lag was not preferred over one not including the main effect (χ(1) 
= 2.42, p = .1197) 
 
Figure 3.5. Serial correlations for the control data set. For the binocular control condition (i.e., 
the CFS mask and the target stimulus are both presented to both eyes), there is no consistent 
decay in serial correlations. 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of this study was to analyze whether successive suppression durations 
obtained in a b-CFS experiment show serial dependence, as this is considered to be a marker 
of the underlying neural alternation mechanism. When serial correlations are observed, this 
indicates that the underlying mechanism is not random and includes a memory component 
(van Ee, 2009). We have performed a serial correlation analysis on a large data set of b-CFS 
sessions. In line with previous reports on binocular and perceptual rivalry, we observed 
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small, but significant serial correlations in the suppression durations obtained in several, 
different b-CFS experiments. It should be noted that none of these experiments was 
originally designed to test the temporal dependency structure of suppression durations in a 
b-CFS paradigm. Therefore, one might argue that the results we obtained are merely due to 
methodological peculiarities inherent to some of the experiments we included. In contrast, 
we consider the diversity of our data set as a strength and are encouraged by the fact that 
similar temporal dependency patterns (taking into account sampling variability) are 
observed across observers, stimuli, and laboratories. 
The observations reported in this study further substantiate a growing literature on 
serial dependence in visual rivalry and furthermore provides insight into the temporal 
dynamics of interocular suppression induced through continuous flash suppression (CFS). It 
has been debated whether CFS relies on distinct mechanisms or operates similar to binocular 
rivalry (L. N. Kaunitz et al., 2014; P. Moors et al., 2014; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya et 
al., 2006). Our results suggest that the temporal dependency structure of suppression 
durations in CFS is akin to those observed in binocular rivalry which might imply that both 
phenomena tap into similar rather than distinct mechanisms. Interestingly, our distributional 
analysis of breakthrough rates indicated that fitting a gamma distribution to breakthrough 
rates yielded considerably worse fits (as quantified through the probability pKS) compared 
to what has been observed in other studies (Brascamp et al., 2005). This should not be too 
surprising, however, given that CFS is known to substantially increase the proportion of long 
suppression durations. On top of the positively skewed distribution that is generally 
observed, this aspect introduces a long and thick tail in the distribution that is not well 
captured by a gamma distribution. Moreover, the mask fade-out procedure that was 
employed in some of the experiments introduced, for some observers, a second peak in the 
distribution when the CFS mask reached a low contrast. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the overall low fit quality was also observed in the experiments that did not rely on this 
procedure (i.e., all PM experiments, see Table 3.1). When comparing both experiment types, 
however, the variable eye experiments yielded somewhat better fits compared to the fixed 
type experiments. This might be explained by the fact that these experiments all relied on a 
mask fade-out procedure, which might have facilitated breakthroughs for some observers 
and yielded a better fit compared to the absence of a mask fade-out procedure (despite the 
61 
 
 
 
censoring of the breakthrough rate distribution). In sum, it remains to be investigated 
whether the distribution of suppression durations or breakthrough rates can be captured by 
a single distribution or rather that a mixture of different distributions is more suitable to take 
into account the very long suppression durations observed in a typical b-CFS experiment. 
Previous studies have generally shown evidence for serial dependence in dominance 
durations, mostly restricted to lag 1. Interestingly, we observed a gradual decay of serial 
correlations in the fixed eye experiments. In the variable eye experiments, the pattern of 
serial correlations was more in line with a previous study from visual rivalry (van Ee, 2009) 
in that they were most pronounced at lags 1 and 2 and fell off quickly to zero for longer lags. 
The same study simulated significant serial correlations at lag 1 using a computational model 
of visual rivalry (Noest, van Ee, Nijs, & van Wezel, 2007) to which white noise was added at 
the slow timescale of percept adaptation (van Ee, 2009). The divergence between the 
observed serial correlation patterns in our fixed and variable eye experiments can also be 
interpreted in the light of these simulation results. That is, in the fixed eye experiments in 
which the CFS mask is continuously presented to the same eye, we observed gradually 
decreasing serial correlations for increasing lags. If the adaptation state of neurons involved 
in representing the CFS mask is responsible for the serial correlations in suppression 
durations, one would expect a longer-lasting influence for conditions in which the perceptual 
dominance of the CFS mask is caused by the continuous presentation to the same eye. 
Those simulations, using white noise added at the slow timescale of percept 
adaptation (van Ee, 2009), did not allow for the reproduction of serial correlations at higher 
lags. To intuit how higher-order serial correlations (beyond lag 1) can be obtained, the 
phenomenon of perceptual stabilization for an ambiguous stimulus upon intermittent 
presentation might be relevant. That is, if an ambiguous stimulus is intermittently presented, 
it is observed that its perception stabilizes upon repeated presentation (i.e. the percept at 
repetition n–1 transfers to repetition n) (Leopold, Wilke, Maier, & Logothetis, 2002). This 
phenomenon is generally explained by a short-lived perceptual memory mechanism that 
favors the most recent percept. A number of studies have shown, however, that perceptual 
stabilization also involves a longer-term memory mechanism based on the relative 
proportion of dominance of one or the other stimulus (Brascamp et al., 2008; de Jong, 
Knapen, & van Ee, 2012). It is possible to model the higher-order serial dependencies by 
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extending a conventional model in visual rivalry (Noest et al., 2007) to include adaptation at 
multiple time-scales (Brascamp et al., 2008). More recent work concluded that previously 
perceived interpretations dominate at the onset of ambiguous sensory information, whereas 
alternative interpretations dominate prolonged viewing (de Jong et al., 2012). At first 
instance ambiguous information seems to be judged using familiar percepts, while re-
evaluation later on allows for alternative interpretations. Thus, the observed serial 
dependency structure might be modelled by including adaptation dynamics at multiple time 
scales (including noise at each of these levels). On a speculative note, the higher-order serial 
dependency structure observed across all observers might be due to the fact that, during a 
single trial, CFS invokes mechanisms similar to perceptual stabilization. The continuous 
updating of the contents of the CFS mask may be thought of as intermittently presenting a 
stream of visual stimuli that might stabilize the current percept (the CFS mask) and therefore 
prolong dominance durations compared to regular binocular rivalry.  
 
A second goal of our study pertained to the nature and site of the underlying 
mechanisms generating the serial dependency in suppression durations. That is, the nature 
of our data set (fixed versus variable eye experiments) enabled us to test the relative 
influence of presenting the CFS mask continuously to the same eye rather than randomly 
swapping it throughout the experiment. As the analysis of the aggregated data indicated, the 
pattern of serial correlations diverges between the types of experiments considered, fixed 
versus variable eye presentation of the CFS masks. At first sight this would seem to suggest 
that both monocular and binocular mechanisms are at play in generating these serial 
correlations. Furthermore, given the discrepancy between both data sets at lags beyond 2, 
monocular mechanisms would be primarily responsible for the serial correlations observed 
at those lags. An additional analysis of the variable eye experiments indicated that the serial 
correlations observed in these experiments seem to be mostly driven by the trials in which 
the CFS mask is not switched to the other eye across consecutive trials. Thus, our data 
suggest that the mechanisms responsible for generating the observed temporal dynamics in 
CFS are primarily, but not necessarily exclusively, monocular in nature. This observation is 
well in line with other CFS studies highlighting that adaptation, perceptual learning, and 
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stimulus-reward learning are primarily monocular (Mastropasqua, Tse, & Turatto, 2015; 
Seitz et al., 2009; Stein & Sterzer, 2011).  
In this respect, it is interesting to note that Logothetis et al. (1996) also observed a lag 
1 correlation of ~0.1 for stimulus rivalry. Stimulus rivalry refers to the observation that 
rapidly and repetitively swapping the rivalling stimuli between the eyes does not 
substantially change the rivalry dynamics, indicating that rivalry would not be purely eye-
based. However, Lee and Blake (1999) have shown that stimulus rivalry is limited to a 
certain combination of spatiotemporal parameters. Otherwise, eye rivalry dominates. 
Furthermore, recent studies showed that monocular channels contribute to stimulus rivalry 
(Brascamp, Sohn, Lee, & Blake, 2013) and that individual differences in the temporal 
dynamics of conventional binocular rivalry and stimulus rivalry are tightly linked (Patel, 
Stuit, & Blake, 2014), suggesting that both forms of rivalry might rely on similar mechanisms. 
In combination with our data, this might indicate that serial correlations in stimulus rivalry 
also have a monocular basis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we asked whether consecutive suppression durations obtained across 
several different breaking CFS experiments are serially dependent, which would provide 
evidence for the underlying mechanism being nonrandom and having a memory 
component. Our serial correlation analysis indicated a gradual decay of serial correlations at 
the aggregate level for experiments in which the eye to which the CFS mask was presented 
was kept constant across trials. Thus, we conclude that the underlying competition 
mechanism of CFS includes a memory component. A different pattern emerged in the 
experiments in which the eye to which the CFS mask was presented was randomly 
determined on each trial. Here, serial correlations decayed more rapidly to zero beyond lag 
2. However, these correlations at early lags were shown to be due to trials in which the CFS 
mask was not switched across consecutive trials. This indicates that the observed serial 
correlations are predominantly driven by a process that is monocular in nature. A control 
analysis confirmed that the serial correlations were not due to any generic reaction time 
based process. These findings further substantiate the literature on serial dependence in 
visual rivalry and furthermore shed light on the similarities and differences between the 
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underlying dynamics in these breaking CFS experiments and those observed in binocular 
rivalry. We suggest that the temporal dependency structure of suppression durations in CFS 
is akin to those observed in binocular rivalry, which might imply that both phenomena tap 
into similar rather than distinct mechanisms. 
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Chapter 4.  
No evidence for surface organization in Kanizsa 
configurations during continuous flash suppression 
 
Does one need to be aware of a visual stimulus for it to be perceptually organized into a 
coherent whole? The answer to this question regarding the interplay between Gestalts and 
visual awareness remains unclear. Using interocular suppression as the paradigm for 
rendering stimuli invisible, conflicting evidence has been obtained as to whether the 
traditional Kanizsa surface is constructed during interocular suppression. While Sobel and 
Blake (2003) and Harris, Schwarzkopf, Song, Bahrami, and Rees (2011) failed to find evidence 
for this, Wang, Weng, and He (2012) showed that standard configurations of Kanizsa 
pacmen would break interocular suppression faster than their rotated counterparts. In the 
current study, we replicate the findings by Wang et al. (2012) but show that neither an 
account based on the construction of a surface nor one based on the long-range collinearities 
in the standard Kanizsa configuration stimulus could fully explain the difference in 
breakthrough times. We discuss these findings in the context of differences in the amplitudes 
of the Fourier orientation spectra for all stimulus types. Thus, we find no evidence that the 
integration of separate elements takes place during interocular suppression of Kanizsa 
stimuli, suggesting that this Gestalt involving figure-ground assignment is not constructed 
when rendered non-conscious using interocular suppression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moors, P., Wagemans, J., van Ee, R., de-Wit, L. (2015). No evidence for surface organization in 
Kanizsa configurations during continuous flash suppression. Attention, Perception, & Psychophyics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our phenomenological experience consists of a perceptually organized whole in 
which the signals sent from the retina have been structured into a meaningful scene 
composed of distinct objects and surfaces (S. E. Palmer, 1999). This process of perceptual 
organization occurs in accordance with a set of grouping principles, including proximity, 
similarity, good continuation, common fate, connectedness, or closure (Wagemans et al., 
2012). Given the apparent ease with which perceptual grouping happens, several studies 
have tested the extent to which it operates independently from attention and/or awareness 
(Alais & Blake, 2015; Gillebert & Humphreys, 2015; Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2015). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the results of these studies paint a complicated picture, with the results often 
being contingent on the exact paradigm used to render stimuli non-conscious and with many 
different perceptual organizational processes being involved. It is probably fair to conclude, 
however, that there is evidence that some forms of perceptual organization still take place in 
the absence of attention (Gillebert & Humphreys, 2015; Kimchi, 2009; Moore & Egeth, 1997). 
Likewise, there is also some evidence that certain forms of perceptual organization still 
manifest themselves in the absence of awareness (Mitroff & Scholl, 2005; Montoro et al., 2014; 
Norman et al., 2013). 
The question, therefore, becomes what kinds of perceptual organization can occur 
without attention or awareness, and to what extent does this depend on the paradigm used 
to render stimuli invisible. In this study, we focus on the Kanizsa stimulus, using a paradigm 
for suppressing stimuli from awareness that should disrupt higher level processing. 
Previous work from our lab has highlighted a potential distinction between 
perceptual organizational phenomena that involve the grouping of elements in a display and 
the assignment of figure-ground relationships (Machilsen & Wagemans, 2011; Vancleef et al., 
2015; Vancleef, Wagemans, & Humphreys, 2013). Both contour grouping and figure-ground 
assignment have been shown to contribute to the perception of a surface when presented 
with the standard Kanizsa stimulus (Conci et al., 2009; Kogo, Strecha, Van Gool, & 
Wagemans, 2010; Kogo & Wagemans, 2013), yet the contribution of both has been shown to 
be different with respect to timing and neural correlates (Cox & Maier, 2015; Poort et al., 
2012). Indeed, there is evidence that the perceptual organization involved in the construction 
of a Kanizsa surface is dependent upon the functioning of higher areas in the visual ventral 
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stream, namely the lateral occipital complex (LOC) (de-Wit, Kentridge, & Milner, 2009; 
Seghier & Vuilleumier, 2006; Stanley & Rubin, 2003). Other studies have documented activity 
in areas such as V1 and V2 when perceiving Kanizsa figures, but the latency of these neural 
responses suggests that feedback processes are involved (T. S. Lee & Nguyen, 2001; von der 
Heydt, Peterhans, & Baumgartner, 1984). Indeed, a recent TMS study by Wokke, 
Vandenbroucke, Scholte, and Lamme (2013) suggests that feedback to early visual areas is 
critical for surface perception in the Kanizsa stimulus. In sum, there is evidence for a 
distinction between contour grouping and the perception of figure-ground relationships, and 
that figure-ground perception for the Kanizsa figure in particular relies on processing at 
higher stages of the ventral stream.  
In parallel to this, a paradigm for rendering stimuli invisible, called “continuous flash 
suppression (CFS)”, is known to have a large impact in reducing the flow of visual input to 
higher visual areas like LOC (Fang & He, 2005; Hesselmann & Malach, 2011). This paradigm 
renders stimuli invisible by continuously flashing stimuli to one eye, rendering the input to 
the other eye inaccessible to awareness for extended periods of time (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). 
Given this theoretical background, it would seem logical to predict that it would be 
impossible for this Gestalt to be constructed or influence behavior when suppressed from 
awareness using CFS (see also Alais and Blake, 2015), because the flow of activity to higher 
areas involved in the construction of the Kanizsa stimulus is blocked with CFS. The evidence 
however, is currently mixed.  
 
In the first study on the perception of Kanizsa figures using CFS, Harris, 
Schwarzkopf, Song, Bahrami, and Rees (2011) showed that observers were unable to 
discriminate in which direction a suppressed Kanizsa triangle configuration was pointing, 
yet could do so perfectly when the stimulus was visible. This is consistent with previous 
work using binocular rivalry, in which Sobel and Blake (2003) set out to test whether the 
perception of so-called illusory contours (induced by certain Kanizsa stimuli) had similar 
effects on initiating switches between eyes compared to contours derived from physically 
presented contrast edges. When physically presented edges moved over a suppressed 
stimulus, the suppressed stimulus became visible to the participant, while this did not 
happen for configurations that elicited a contour percept that did not derive from a 
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physically presented edge. In a more recent study, however, Wang, Weng, and He (2012) 
used a variant of the CFS (the breaking-CFS or b-CFS) paradigm to measure how long it took 
for configurations of standard pacmen (that are able to induce a surface percept when fully 
visible) to overcome suppression induced by CFS. In apparent contrast with the previous 
studies, Wang et al. (2012) observed that configurations able to induce a triangular Kanizsa 
surface break suppression faster than non-surface-inducing control conditions (even when 
controlling for mirror symmetry in the control stimulus). Wang et al. (2012) suggested that 
this result provided evidence that the processes involved in constructing the Kanizsa surface 
are able to manifest even when suppressed from awareness using CFS5. This result would 
further suggest that some forms of figure-ground assignment might be possible in the 
absence of perceptual awareness, even while little visual input is able to reach higher areas of 
the ventral stream thought to mediate these processes. 
 
Given the potential importance of this result, we first set out to replicate the result by 
Wang et al. (2012) using the b-CFS paradigm. We then tested two different sets of control 
stimuli to disentangle the contribution of the alignment of the edges in the image and the 
potential to perceive a surface induced by different variants of the Kanizsa configuration. 
Indeed, in the original Wang et al. study, no attempt was made to dissociate contributions of 
edge alignment from the perception of a surface. That is, for the configurations in which a 
surface could be perceived, the edges of the individual elements were always co-linear to 
each other (which is known to make a distinct contribution, see Conci et al., 2009). To control 
for the role of edge alignment in the image, we used a cross stimulus (instead of the standard 
pacmen) in which there is the same degree (or perhaps more) alignment between the edges 
in the image, but in which a Kanizsa surface is not normally elicited even when fully visible 
(Figure 4.1A, third column). If the suppression time difference observed in Wang et al. (2012) 
was due to the alignment of the edges rather than the construction of a surface (and 
engagement of figure-ground assignment), then the suppression time difference for a 
standard (aligned) and rotated (non-aligned) cross stimulus should be predicted to be similar 
to the one seen for the traditional Kanizsa stimulus. A second control stimulus was 
developed based on the stimuli used by Stanley and Rubin (2003), in which a surface percept 
                                                   
5
 Note that Wang et al. (2012) interpreted their results explicitly in terms of unconscious processing, the validity 
of which has been debated by Stein and Sterzer (2014) and by Gayet, van der Stigchel, and Paffen (2014). 
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is evoked by curved pacmen. The edges in these curved pacmen are obviously not collinear 
like those in the traditional Kanizsa or the cross stimuli, yet the stimulus still evokes a 
surface percept when fully visible (Figure 4.1A, middle column). If the potential for the 
stimulus to elicit a surface percept contributes to the suppression time difference observed 
for the traditional pacmen configuration, then the suppression time difference for the curved 
pacmen should be of a similar magnitude. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
In Experiment 1, we manipulated Stimulus Type (traditional pacmen, cross, or curved 
pacmen) and Configuration Type (standard or rotated). The comparison of a standard and 
rotated traditional pacmen configuration enables us to replicate the results from Wang et al. 
(2012), whilst the inclusion of a cross stimulus and curved pacmen (both also in standard and 
rotated configurations) enables us to test the relative contribution of edge collinearity and 
surface construction to any potential differences in suppression time. Furthermore, given 
that the surface percept in the curved pacmen configuration is weaker than the one elicited 
by the traditional pacmen configuration (Stanley & Rubin, 2003), one could predict that, if a 
surface is constructed during interocular suppression, breakthrough times would vary 
according to surface strength. Our predictions can be summarized as follows:  
• If the configuration effect (standard vs. rotated) is due to the ability to induce 
a Kanizsa surface during CFS, we predict an effect of configuration that does 
not differ between the traditional versus curved pacmen, but does differ 
between traditional pacmen and cross stimuli, as well as between curved 
pacmen and cross stimuli. 
• If the configuration effect (standard vs. rotated) is due to the existence of 
aligned edges, we predict an effect of configuration that does not differ 
between the traditional versus cross stimuli, but does differ between 
traditional and curved pacmen, as well as between cross stimuli and curved 
pacmen.  
In all conditions observers were presented with a stimulus in one eye rendered 
invisible by the presentation of a flashing CFS stimulus (at 10 Hz) presented to the other eye. 
The critical dependent variable in all conditions was the time taken to ‘break’ this 
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suppression, such that participants could reliably report the location of the previously 
suppressed stimulus. 
 
METHODS 
Participants 
20 people (age range: 18 – 30 years) participated in the experiment in exchange for 
monetary compensation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
naïve with respect to the goal of the study. The study was approved by the local ethical 
committee and all participants provided informed consent at the start of the experiment.  
 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were shown on two 19.8-in. Sony Trinitron GDM F500-R (2048 x 1536 pixels at 
60 Hz, for each) monitors driven by a DELL Precision T3400 computer with an Intel Core 
Quad CPU Q9300 2.5 GHz processor running on Windows XP. Binocular presentation was 
achieved by a custom made stereo set-up. Two CRT monitors, which stood opposite to each 
other (distance of 220 cm), projected to the left and right eye respectively via two mirrors 
placed at a distance of 110 cm from the screen. A head- and chin rest (15 cm from the 
mirrors) was used to stabilize fixation. The effective viewing distance was 125 cm. Stimulus 
presentation, timing and keyboard responses were controlled with custom software 
programmed in Python using the PsychoPy library (Peirce, 2007, 2009). 
 
Stimuli 
The background of the display consisted of a random checkerboard pattern to achieve 
stable binocular fusion. The individual elements of the checkerboard were 0.34° by 0.34°. In 
both eyes, a white frame (10° by 10°) where the stimuli would be presented was 
superimposed on the checkerboard pattern. A black (eye dominance measurement) or red 
(main experiment) fixation cross was continuously present during the experiment (size 0.5° 
by 0.5°). In the eye dominance measurement phase, the target consisted of an arrow 
(maximal width 4°, maximal height 2°) and the CFS mask consisted of 150 squares with 
randomly picked sizes between 1° and 2° and a random luminance value.  
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The radius of the traditional pacman stimulus was 0.8° and the diagonal distance 
between the pacmen was 2°. The cross stimulus consisted of four crosses and was created 
such that the overall density of each cross matched that of the traditional pacmen stimuli 
(1.75° x 1.75°). The curved pacmen stimulus was created by superimposing two small discs 
(radius 0.34°) on the half of a full disc on which a white ellipse was drawn (major radius 
1.19°, minor radius 0.37°). For all three stimuli, the area of the inner surface between the 
inducers was as equal as possible (exactly the same for the traditional pacmen and cross 
stimulus and slightly different for the curved pacmen stimulus). The rotated versions of the 
stimulus were generated by rotating the individual elements 45° with a jitter of +- 10° (see 
Figure 4.1A, middle row). 
Given the importance in feature overlap between mask and stimuli in determining 
the effectiveness of CFS (Hong & Blake, 2009; Maehara et al., 2009; P. Moors et al., 2014; E. 
Yang & Blake, 2012), and the fact that the stimuli in the different conditions differed in 
various ways, we did not use a traditional Mondrian style CFS mask in the main experiment. 
Indeed, pilot results using a classical CFS mask indicated prolonged suppression for the 
cross condition, containing only vertical and horizontal orientations as in the traditional 
Mondrian CFS mask, indicating feature-selective depth of suppression (Yang & Blake, 2012). 
Therefore, we generated CFS masks that consisted of the individual elements of all different 
stimuli (see Figure 4.1B). This set of masks was generated before the start of the experiment 
(but was kept the same for every participant) and on each refresh (i.e., every 100 
milliseconds) a new mask was selected from the pool with the restriction that the previous 
mask could not be used twice in a row. 
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Figure 4.1. (A) Stimulus set used in Experiments 1 (two top rows) and 2 (all rows). (B) Basic 
trial sequence used in all experiments. A fixation cross was presented for 1000 ms after 
which the CFS mask was displayed in the dominant eye and the suppressed stimulus in the 
non-dominant eye. The suppressed stimulus was gradually increased in contrast over the 
course of 2000 ms after which it remained at full contrast until it broke suppression. 
 
Procedure 
Before starting the main experiment, participants’ eye dominance was measured 
using the method set out by Yang, Blake, and McDonald (2010). On every trial, a fixation 
cross was presented for 1000 ms. Next, an arrow was presented in one eye and the CFS mask 
in the other (10 Hz refresh rate). Participants had to indicate the direction of an arrow as 
soon as it broke through the CFS mask by pressing “1” (for left) or “3” (for right) on a 
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numerical keyboard. The CFS mask was randomly presented to the left or right eye (40 trials 
per eye) and after 80 trials eye dominance was determined as the eye in which the mean 
suppression time of the arrow was lowest. In all subsequent parts of the experiment, the CFS 
mask was presented to the participants’ dominant eye.  
During the main experiment, participants were presented with the different stimuli 
from Figure 4.1A (first two rows only) of which the position relative to fixation was 
manipulated on each trial (i.e., shifted 0.5° left-, right-, up- or downwards). During the rest of 
the experiment, the participants always had to indicate as fast as possible in which direction 
the target stimulus was shifted by pressing “2”, “4”, “6”, or “8” on a numerical keyboard for 
down, left, right, and up, respectively. Every trial started with a 1 second fixation period 
after which the target stimulus was presented to the non-dominant eye and the CFS mask to 
the dominant eye (refreshing at 10 Hz). The contrast of the target stimulus increased linearly 
from 0 to 100% over 2000 ms and then remained at full contrast until the stimulus was 
detected. Participants first completed a practice block in which the stimuli were presented 
without suppression in order to acquaint them with the task. In a second practice block, the 
CFS mask was presented together with the target stimuli. If everything was clear after the 
two practice blocks, participants began the actual experiment. 
 
Design 
The procedure to assess eye dominance included 80 trials. The two practice blocks 
contained 24 trials each. The main experiment consisted of 192 trials in total. The design of 
the main experiment was a full factorial 3 x 2 within-subjects design with three levels of the 
Stimulus Type factor (traditional pacmen, cross, and curved pacmen) and two levels of the 
Configuration Type factor (two levels: standard, rotated). The order of all experimental 
conditions was always randomized. After each sequence of 64 trials, participants were 
instructed to take a break of at least one minute. 
 
RESULTS 
Correct suppression times (95% of the data) were analyzed after log-transforming 
them due to the positive skew in the suppression time distributions. Outliers were defined as 
three times the standard deviation of the mean suppression time and these were removed 
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from the data set (2% of the data). Most of the outlying data points were presumably due to 
extremely effective suppression. The mean suppression times for each condition are 
summarized in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. Results of Experiment 1. The bars depict the mean suppression time for each 
condition. The error bars denote 95% within-subject confidence intervals using the procedure 
set out by Morey (2008). 
 
Statistical inference was done in a Bayesian framework relying on model selection 
using Bayes Factors (Rouder & Morey, 2012; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012; 
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). The Bayes Factor quantifies the relative 
degree of evidence of one statistical model over another and therefore provides an intuitive 
measure to quantify the degree of belief in one statistical model over another (e.g., a model 
with and without a main effect of Configuration Type). The R package BayesFactor (version 
0.9.9) was used to compute the Bayes Factors (Morey & Rouder, 2015). All considered models 
were ANOVA style models including random intercepts for participants, and the default 
settings for the priors (medium prior scale for fixed effects and nuisance prior scale for the 
participant effect). As a guideline to interpret the resulting Bayes Factors, we use the 
classification proposed by Jeffreys (1961) in that Bayes Factors from 3 onwards constitute 
substantial evidence for one model over the other.  
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The Bayes Factor analysis is summarized in Table 4.1. The best fitting model is 
depicted as having a Bayes Factor of 1 and all the other Bayes Factors can be interpreted as 
how much more likely the best model is compared to another model. As is apparent from 
Table 4.1, the preferred model includes main effects of both Stimulus Type and 
Configuration Type, and no interaction between these factors. Indeed, a model including an 
interaction is 53 times less likely as a model not including it. The main effect of Stimulus 
Type was largely due to the cross stimulus breaking suppression faster than the other 
stimuli. The main effect of Configuration Type indicates that standard stimuli broke 
suppression faster, on average, than rotated stimuli.  
 
Table 4.1. Bayes Factor analysis for Experiment 1.  
Model Bayes Factor 
ST + CT 1 
ST + CT + ST*CT 53 
All other models > 100 
Note. All Bayes Factors are relative to the best fitting model (i.e. in this case, the model of 
which the Bayes Factor is 1). All other models include all combinations from an empty to a 
full model not reported in the table. ST = Stimulus Type; CT = Configuration Type. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 1, we replicated the suppression time difference between a standard 
and rotated version of the traditional pacmen stimulus, in line with the results of Wang et al. 
(2012). However, this configuration effect did not interact with the type of stimulus that was 
used. That is, it was statistically indistinguishable from the configuration effect observed in 
the curved pacmen and cross conditions. Therefore, the difference between the standard and 
rotated traditional pacmen conditions is presumably not driven by the potential for the 
stimulus to induce a surface percept or the alignment of the edges during interocular 
suppression. Indeed, irrespective of which process exactly contributes to the observed 
differences between conditions, the results of Experiment 1 indicate that the advantage for 
the standard configuration is not specific to the traditional pacmen configuration. 
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Given the pattern of results observed in Experiment 1, we were interested to further 
explore two potential explanations for the observed advantage for the standard 
configuration in a second experiment. That is, one could argue that the advantage for the 
standard Kanizsa was due to the configural relationship between the 4 elements. 
Alternatively, the observed advantage for the standard configuration could be due to 
independent contributions of the single elements comprising the configuration, based on 
their individual locations in the visual field and their orientation. For example, we know that 
observers are more sensitive to cardinal (horizontal and vertical) orientations compared to 
oblique ones (Appelle, 1972; Campbell & Kulikowski, 1966) and that these cardinal 
orientations are over-represented in the visual cortex (Li, Peterson, & Freeman, 2003; Yacoub, 
Harel, & Ugurbil, 2008). Thus, it could be that differences in the number of different 
orientations are directly influencing suppression strength. 
Based on these two potential explanations, we included a scrambled version of each 
stimulus type in the stimulus set (Figure 4.1A, third row) and repeated the experiment in a 
different set of observers. This scrambled version was created by also manipulating the 
orientation of the individual elements as well as the distance from the center of the 
configuration. To more directly test whether differences were being driven by the differences 
between each of the individual elements (rather than their configuration) we also conducted 
a second experiment (with the same observers), in which we measured suppression times for 
the individual elements of each of the different configurations (cross, traditional pacman and 
curved pacman).  
 
EXPERIMENT 2  
The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to replicate the main finding from Experiment 
1, that neither the ability to induce a Kanizsa surface, nor the collinearity of the lines 
increased the likelihood of breakthrough during CFS. The addition of two new conditions 
enabled us to ask two additional questions regarding the idea that surface completion 
mechanisms influence suppression times in CFS. First, a ‘scrambled’ condition was added to 
the ‘standard’ and ‘rotated’ conditions to test whether more deviation from the ‘standard’ 
configuration would further increase suppression times. Second, an ‘individual element’ 
condition was included for all of the stimulus configurations (‘standard’, ‘rotated’ and 
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‘scrambled’) to test whether any differences evident in the ‘full configuration’ might also be 
evident in the ‘single element’ condition. In addition to the predictions formulated for 
Experiment 1, our predictions for Experiment 2 can be summarized as follows:  
• If the configuration effect observed in Experiment 1 reflects the configural 
relationship between the four elements, we predict that the scrambled 
configuration will yield slower breakthrough times compared to the standard 
and rotated configurations.  
• If the configuration effect observed in Experiment 1 is due to the independent 
contributions of the four elements comprising the configuration, we predict 
that any effects of ‘Configuration Type’ will also be evident in the single 
element conditions, and that there will be no interaction between the 
Configuration Type and the Number of Elements (full configuration versus 
single elements).  
METHODS 
Participants 
24 people (age range: 18 – 30 years) participated in the experiment and received 
monetary compensation for their participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were naïve with respect to the goal of the study. The study was approved 
by the local ethical committee and all participants provided informed consent at the start of 
the experiment. 3 participants had to be excluded because suppression was too effective in 
either of the two sessions, with breakthrough times being three standard deviations longer 
than the mean value for all observers. One participant did not return for the second session 
and was therefore excluded from the analysis. 
 
Apparatus 
The experimental setup was the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, except that a scrambled version was 
added to the Configuration Type factor and a single element condition was developed. To 
create the scrambled condition, we picked four different angles relative to fixation at which 
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the individual elements would be drawn and four different orientations of the individual 
elements, kept constant across different Stimulus Types. We refer to this additional 
manipulation as the ‘scrambled’ configuration (in contrast to the ‘standard’ and ‘rotated’ 
conditions). This stimulus set is also depicted in Figure 4.1 (third row). It should be noted 
that only one ‘scrambled’ exemplar was created for this condition, being the one shown in 
Figure 4.1A. This choice allows us to avoid a difference in familiarity between the different 
stimuli because there is also only one exemplar in the other conditions. 
In the single element condition we presented individual elements (just one pacman or 
cross rather than all four) at one of the same locations at which they were presented in the 
full configuration experiment. 
 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 1, except for the 
session in which the individual elements of the stimuli were presented, in which the task was 
changed. In this condition, participants had to indicate in which quadrant of the display the 
stimulus was presented by pressing “1”, “3”, “4”, or “6” for bottom left, bottom right, up left, 
and up right, respectively.  
 
Design 
The design of the experiment was a 3 x 3 x 2 full-factorial within-subjects design with 
three levels of the Stimulus Type factor (traditional pacmen, curved pacmen, and cross), 
three levels of the Configuration Type factor (standard, rotated, and scrambled) and two 
levels of the Number of Elements factor (full configuration and single element). Participants 
completed 288 trials in total for the main experiment in both the full configuration as well as 
the single element session. The practice blocks consisted of 36 trials each. After completing 
the first session, participants returned a week later to complete the second session. The 
ordering in which the sessions were completed was randomized across participants. 
 
RESULTS 
The data were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1. We removed outliers 
(full configuration session: 1.6%; single element session: 1.5%) defined as higher than three 
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standard deviations from the mean and analyzed only correct (full configuration session: 
94%; single element session: 97%) suppression times after logarithmically transforming them. 
The results for the full configuration and single element sessions are depicted in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3. Results of Experiment 2. The bars depict the mean suppression time for each 
condition. The error bars denote 95% within-subject confidence intervals according to Morey 
(2008). (left) Full configuration session. (right) Single elements sessions. 
 
A first goal was to assess whether the results were similar to those in Experiment 1. 
Therefore, we first report an analysis of only the conditions used in Experiment 1 
(summarized in Table 4.2). As the analysis indicates, the preferred model is now one 
including an interaction between Stimulus Type and Configuration Type on top of the main 
effects of Stimulus Type and Configuration Type. Follow-up analyses indicated that this 
interaction was mostly driven by a tendency towards the absence of a configuration effect in 
the curved pacmen condition (BF = 2.5 in favor of the null model). Indeed, a configuration 
effect was still obtained in both the traditional pacmen as well as the cross condition (both 
BFs > 100 in favor of a configuration effect). Thus, if only a subset of the data similar to the 
data observed in Experiment 1 is considered, the data obtained in Experiment 2 indicate that 
the configuration effect is mostly driven by the existence of aligned edges in the traditional 
pacmen and cross configurations. We now turn to an analysis of the full data set.  
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Table 4.2. Bayes Factor analysis for the full configuration session of Experiment 2 (only the 
conditions used in Experiment 1 are included). 
Model Bayes Factor 
ST + CT + ST*CT 1 
ST + CT 19 
All other models > 100 
Note. All Bayes Factors are relative to the best fitting model (i.e. in this case, the model of 
which the Bayes Factor is 1). All other models include all combinations from an empty to a 
full model not reported in the table. ST = Stimulus Type; CT = Configuration Type. 
 
The next analysis focuses on the two predictions outlined for Experiment 2 (i.e., 
influence of scrambled configuration, and the difference between single and full element 
sessions). To assess the similarity of the results obtained in both single and full element 
sessions, we combined the data from both sessions and included an extra factor called 
Number of Elements in the analysis (i.e., full configurations vs. single elements). The results 
of the BF analysis are depicted in Table 4.3. As in Experiment 1, the best fitting model 
included main effects of Stimulus and Configuration Type, but now also included an 
interaction between those factors as well as a main effect of Number of Elements (i.e. stimuli 
consisting of four elements broke suppression faster than those consisting of a single 
element). However, it should be noted that the best model in the combined analysis was only 
slightly preferred (BF = 1.5) over a model including an interaction between Configuration 
Type and Number of Elements.  
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Table 4.3. Bayes Factor analysis for both experiment types combined. 
Model Bayes Factor 
ST + CT + ST*CT + NE 1 
ST + CT + ST*CT + NE + CT*NE 1.5 
ST + CT + ST*CT + NE + ST*NE 20 
ST + CT + ST*CT + NE + CT*NE + ST*NE 31 
All other models  > 100 
Note. All Bayes Factors are relative to the best fitting model (i.e. in this case, the model of 
which the Bayes Factor is 1). All other models include all combinations from an empty to a 
full model not reported in the table. ST = Stimulus Type; CT = Configuration Type; NE = 
Number of Elements. 
 
Given that the BF analysis did not distinguish between the model with and without 
the interaction between Configuration and Number of Elements (BF = 1.5), we analyzed the 
more complex model further (i.e., the one including the interaction). Because the 
interpretation of this model was complicated by the interaction between Configuration and 
Stimulus Type, we probed the interaction between Configuration Type and Number of 
Elements for each Stimulus Type separately. This analysis explicitly addresses the question 
whether the number of elements (full configuration vs. single element) modulated the effect 
of Configuration for each Stimulus Type separately and is summarized in Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.4. Bayes Factor analysis of Configuration and Number of Elements, separately for 
each Stimulus Type. 
Traditional pacmen Curved pacmen Cross 
Model Bayes Factor Model  Bayes Factor Model  Bayes Factor 
CT+ NE 1 NE 1 CT + 
NE 
1 
CT * NE 1.82 CT * NE  30 CT * 
NE 
31 
All other 
models 
> 100 All other 
models 
> 100 All 
other 
models 
> 100 
Note. All Bayes Factors are relative to the best fitting model (i.e. in this case, the model of 
which the Bayes Factor is 1). All other models include all combinations from an empty to a 
full model not reported in the table. CT = Configuration Type; NE = Number of Elements. 
 
In the case of the traditional pacmen, the BF analysis does not distinguish between 
main effects of Configuration Type and Number of Elements or a model also including their 
interaction (BF = 1.82). When this interaction is further resolved (i.e., split up by Number of 
Elements), strong evidence for a configuration effect is found for the full configuration 
session (BF > 100), yet the reverse is observed in the single element session. Here, the BF 
indicates convincing evidence in favor of the null model (BF = 7). As is apparent from Figure 
4.3, for the full configuration experiment, the mean suppression durations are in the 
direction predicted if the global configuration plays a key role (i.e., the scrambled 
configuration yielded the longest suppression durations). Although a similar pattern is 
observed in the single element experiment, the BF analysis indicated evidence for the 
absence of any differences between conditions.  
In the case of the curved pacmen, the preferred model is one that includes a main 
effect of Number of Elements only. Here, the pattern of results is in the direction based on a 
prediction of the influence of the global configuration (in that the scrambled condition is 
slowest to break suppression) but interestingly this pattern is completely reversed in the 
single element session. Analyzing both experiments together, however, does not yield 
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sufficient evidence for an interaction between Configuration Type and Number of Elements 
and actually indicates no effect of configuration. Thus, for the curved pacmen, the results are 
in accordance with the prediction of the single-element account, in that the type of 
experiment did not interact with a potential configuration effect. 
For the cross stimulus, the BF analysis indicates strong evidence for a model 
including a main effect of Configuration Type and Number of Elements, yet no interaction 
between both factors (BF = 31). In this case, the data are not consistent with the prediction 
that the scrambled condition would yield the slowest suppression durations (i.e., the rotated 
stimuli yielded the slowest durations). However, the absence of an interaction indicates that 
the configuration effect did not vary according to the Number of Elements, suggesting that 
the differences seen in the full configuration might be driven by the same processes 
influencing suppression in the single element condition.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to explore whether the configuration effect observed in 
Experiment 1 was due to the global characteristics of the stimulus or whether the differences 
could arise based on the differences in the individual elements that make up these 
configurations. To this end, a scrambled stimulus was included in Experiment 2 and 
participants were then tested in two experimental sessions, one in which the full 
configurations were presented and another in which the single elements of the 
configurations were used in isolation. We predicted that, if the global configuration was 
mostly responsible for the configuration effect observed in Experiment 1, the configurations 
of the scrambled condition would show slower suppression times compared to the standard 
and rotated stimulus configurations. Alternatively, if the single elements comprising each 
configuration were driving the configuration effect observed in Experiment 1, we predicted 
that the Number of Elements (full configuration vs. single element experiment) would not 
yield differential effects (interactions) with the Configuration Type. 
The pattern of results that was observed in Experiment 2 could not be simply 
interpreted in either direction. That is, the stimuli that were generated for the scrambled 
condition yielded longer suppression times for the traditional pacmen only. In the case of the 
cross stimulus, the scrambled configuration yielded shorter suppression times compared to 
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the rotated configuration. For the cross, this pattern was also observed in the single element 
session. However, for the other two conditions (traditional and curved pacmen), the single 
element session was less readily comparable with the full configuration session. For the 
curved pacmen, the BF analysis indicated strong evidence for a main effect of Number of 
Elements only, indicating no differential pattern of results across both sessions (yet also no 
effect of Configuration Type). For the traditional pacmen, , the BF analysis indicated a 
potential interaction between Configuration Type and Number of Elements, although the 
results obtained in both sessions were qualitatively similar. When this interaction was 
further resolved, an effect of configuration was obtained only in the full configuration 
session. Furthermore, when the data were analyzed for the subset of stimuli used in 
Experiment 1 only, an interaction between configuration and Stimulus Type was observed. 
This interaction was primarily driven by the absence of a configuration effect for the curved 
pacmen. Thus, compared to Experiment 1, this subset of the data now indicated that aligned 
edges in the stimulus were primarily driving the configuration effect.  
What is the most parsimonious interpretation of these results given the hypotheses 
laid out at the start of Experiment 2 and the results that were observed? We have clearly 
replicated one aspect of our findings from Experiment 1, namely that the ability for the 
stimuli to evoke a Kanizsa surface percept plays no role in breakthrough times. The fact that 
there was no consistent influence of scrambling for the three Stimulus Types also makes it 
hard to justify an effect based on the global configuration. On the one hand, there were some 
differences between the single element and full-configuration conditions, so the results in the 
full configurations cannot be fully predicted by the effects for the single elements. On the 
other hand, there was no interaction between Configuration Type and Number of Elements 
for the curved pacmen and the cross conditions, while qualitatively similar results were 
obtained for the full and single-element stimuli in the traditional pacmen condition. All in 
all, an account based on the features present in the individual elements and across the 
configuration as a whole seems to offer the most likely explanation for the effects of 
configuration observed here and in Experiment 1. Reflecting retrospectively on our results, it 
is worth pointing out that the visual system is most sensitive to cardinal orientations 
(horizontal and vertical), and less so to oblique ones (Appelle, 1972; Campbell & Kulikowski, 
1966; Li et al., 2003; Yacoub et al., 2008). From this perspective, the configuration effects 
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observed in both experiments could potentially be explained by the differences between the 
orientations most prominently present in the stimuli, at the spatial scales of the individual 
elements and of the configuration as a whole. Indeed, for all Stimulus Types, the standard 
stimuli show strong peaks at the cardinal orientations in the Fourier orientation spectrum, 
compared to the rotated and scrambled stimuli (Figure 4.4). This difference at the cardinal 
orientations is most evident in the cross and traditional pacmen conditions, which can 
explain the consistent differences observed between the standard and rotated configurations. 
The configurations for the curved pacmen, on the other hand, show considerable overlap, 
which could explain why the results obtained for the curved pacmen condition are less 
consistent between experiments.  
The stimuli that were generated for the scrambled condition include orientations in-
between cardinal and oblique orientations, which is most pronounced in the orientation 
spectrum of the cross stimulus. In this respect, it makes sense that the scrambled cross 
configuration broke suppression faster compared to the rotated one (and similarly so for the 
single element condition). Furthermore, in the case of the single element condition, the 
orientation spectra of both the traditional and curved pacmen show strong overlap for all 
different configurations, which might explain the absence of a configuration effect for these 
stimuli in the single element condition. Moreover, one has to take into account that the visual 
inputs vary considerably between the full configuration and single elements, making it more 
difficult to obtain significant effects from potentially subtle differences between stimuli for 
the latter condition (unless they are strongly represented as in the cross configurations). 
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Figure 4.4. Fourier orientation spectrum for all stimuli. A fast Fourier transform was applied 
to all stimuli and the orientation spectrum was obtained by averaging the amplitude 
spectrum across all spatial frequencies for each orientation, separately.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this study, we set out to test whether the advantage of a traditional pacmen 
stimulus in breaking CFS (compared to a rotated control configuration) was due to the 
ability of that configuration to induce the perception of a surface or the existence of collinear 
edges in the image. Experiment 1 was a conceptual replication and extension of Wang et al. 
(2012). In addition to a traditional pacmen stimulus, two types of control stimuli were 
included. A cross configuration was used to assess whether the suppression time benefit of 
traditional pacmen configurations could be caused by the alignment of the edges rather than 
the ability for the stimulus to elicit a surface percept. Additionally, we included a 
configuration that consisted of curved pacmen. This stimulus elicited a surface percept but, 
critically, none of the contours of the inducers were collinear with each other. The use of 
these two types of control stimuli enabled us to test whether the suppression time difference 
observed in Wang et al. (2012) could be explained by a genuine surface-based figure-ground 
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assignment process (evident in the curved pacmen stimulus) or rather by the local alignment 
of edges in the inducers (evident in the cross stimulus). The results of Experiment 1 showed a 
clear replication of the suppression time difference between standard and rotated traditional 
pacmen stimuli observed in Wang et al. (2012), but, this effect did not distinguish between 
the stimulus types employed. That is, in all conditions a difference between a standard and 
rotated global configuration was observed. This observation indicates that the suppression 
time difference in the traditional pacmen condition was not specific to the potential for the 
stimulus to induce a surface percept.  
As a follow up, we conducted a second experiment in which we explored whether the 
global configuration was driving the observed differences between conditions in Experiment 
1 or, alternatively, that the differences were being driven by the differences between the 
single elements belonging to these configurations. To this end, we used the same stimuli as 
in Experiment 1 with the addition of a set of scrambled stimuli (by manipulating the distance 
and orientation of the individual elements relative to the fixation cross, as well as their 
individual orientation) and tested participants in two sessions. In one of them, the full 
configurations were used as stimuli. In the other, on each trial a single element of one of the 
configurations was presented. If the configuration effect observed in Experiment 1 was due 
to the global stimulus configuration, we predicted that the scrambled stimulus configuration 
would elicit slower suppression times compared to the rotated configuration. Alternatively, 
if the elements of the configurations were driving the differences, we predicted to observe a 
similar pattern of results in both full and single-element experimental sessions.  
The results revealed no consistent longer suppression durations for the scrambled 
configurations compared to the standard and rotated ones. Furthermore, although the data 
were qualitatively similar between the full configuration and single element sessions (except 
for the curved pacmen), no conclusive evidence was obtained that the results of the single 
element session were the same as in the full configuration session. Based on these results, we 
argued that a possible account for the data could be the differences in low-level stimulus 
features such as orientation. That is, cardinal orientations – to which the visual system is 
most sensitive – were more strongly represented in the stimuli that broke suppression fastest 
and these differences were most pronounced in the full configuration experiment because of 
the presentation of the simultaneous presentation of four rather than one element. 
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Our study was motivated by the observation that there was a discrepancy between 
the findings of Sobel and Blake (2003) and Harris et al. (2011) on the one hand and Wang et 
al. (2012) on the other. Although we replicated the findings reported in the latter study, the 
overall pattern of our results clearly supports the conclusions advanced in the former 
studies. That is, our results fail to provide evidence that, during CFS, traditional pacmen 
stimuli can induce figure-ground processes that might lead to a differential effect for stimuli 
able to induce a surface percept. This observation is consistent with a broader set of recent 
studies focusing on the extent to which mid- and high-level stimuli are represented during 
CFS (Faivre & Koch, 2014a; Gayet et al., 2014; Hedger, Adams, & Garner, 2015a; Hesselmann 
& Knops, 2014; Hesselmann & Moors, 2015; Heyman & Moors, 2014; P. Moors, Huygelier, 
Wagemans, de-Wit, & van Ee, 2015). That is, there is converging evidence that suppressed 
stimuli are processed to a limited extent during CFS and that any process that requires 
complex integration of several features of the suppressed stimulus is unlikely to take place. 
Given that the construction of a Kanizsa surface percept not only requires grouping, but also 
figure-ground assignment, it is logical to predict that it should not manifest under CFS. This 
is furthermore reinforced by the studies reporting on neural activity associated with stimuli 
suppressed during CFS (Fogelson, Kohler, Miller, Granger, & Tse, 2014; Hesselmann & 
Malach, 2011; Ludwig, Kathmann, Sterzer, & Hesselmann, 2014; Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, 
Rothkirch, & Hesselmann, 2014; Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013). Invariably, these studies 
show that activity related to the suppressed stimulus is limited to early visual areas such as 
V1 and V2. Parallel work on the Kanizsa stimulus, from functional neuroimaging studies 
(Seghier & Vuilleumier, 2006; Stanley & Rubin, 2003), neuropsychological research (de-Wit et 
al., 2009), and comparative studies with monkeys (Huxlin, Saunders, Marchionini, Pham, & 
Merigan, 2000) suggests that higher areas in the ventral stream (and the lateral occipital 
complex in particular) are critically involved in the construction of the surface percept for 
traditional pacmen stimuli. Thus, combining this knowledge on the extent to which CFS 
should block information transfer to higher areas, and the role of higher ventral areas in the 
construction of the Kanizsa surface percept the results reported in this study are not 
surprising. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of using a range of control conditions 
to be sure that any difference observed between experimental conditions is actually the result 
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of the perceptual difference elicited by the stimuli used in those conditions, especially for 
perceptually compelling phenomena like the Kanizsa surface. 
Given that the relationship between perceptual organization and awareness 
necessarily involves the choice of a suitable paradigm to render a stimulus invisible, it 
remains plausible that Kanizsa surfaces can be constructed in the absence of visual awareness 
depending on the nature of suppression of the paradigm that was employed (Breitmeyer, 
2015; Breitmeyer, Koç, Oğmen, & Ziegler, 2008; Hesselmann & Moors, 2015). Indeed, using 
visual masking, a paradigm for which it has been argued that the initial feedforward transfer 
of input to higher areas, there is evidence that masked Kanizsa like stimuli can influence 
performance on a subsequent shape discrimination task (Poscoliero et al., 2013). Similarly, a 
recent neuroimaging study relying on an inattentional blindness paradigm reported 
evidence for similar processing of Kanizsa figures for groups of participants that either could 
or could not distinguish a Kanizsa figure in a forced-choice task after having performed an 
attentionally demanding task (and, hence, had been inattentionally blind to the Kanizsa 
figure). Moreover, neuropsychological studies relying on patients suffering from 
visuospatial neglect, a condition mainly caused by stroke in the parietal region, also 
provided evidence for processing of illusory shapes and contours (Conci et al., 2009; Driver 
& Mattingley, 1998; Mattingley, Davis, & Driver, 1997). 
Thus, the main message of this study is not necessarily that one needs to be aware of 
a visual stimulus for some form of perceptual grouping and figure-ground assignment to 
take place, but that one needs to consider the specific mechanisms by which a particular 
paradigm renders stimuli invisible. Depending on the level at which suppression takes place, 
one might reasonably hypothesize that a process can happen in the absence of visual 
awareness. For CFS or other binocular suppression techniques, however, it seems highly 
likely that the processing of a suppressed stimulus is rather limited. 
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FILE DRAWER 
Important disclaimer 
This material has NOT been peer reviewed. The level of detail on the experiments is 
NOT comparable to what should be reported in a paper. I intend to fix this in the future, but 
due to time constraints, I'm currently writing down everything in a general form. 
 
Introduction 
Every published study highly likely has its fair share of unreported (sometimes 
failed) experiments. I have always tried to include every experiment (which has the status of 
being more than a pilot experiment) in my published papers. For various reasons (outlined 
below), this has not happened for the breaking CFS study on the Kanizsa stimulus, recently 
published in Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics (Moors, Wagemans, van Ee, & de-
Wit, 2016). I have thought a lot on whether to report on these unpublished experiments. I do 
think however they have some value for further interpretation of the results reported in our 
published paper. Thus, in this document, I will report on two additional experiments we 
have performed in the context of our recent study. I will sketch the context in which these 
experiments were performed, why they were not included in the paper, and will report on 
their results, and briefly discuss their implications. 
 
Experiment 1 
This results of this first experiment actually inspired us to perform the first 
experiment reported in our AP&P paper, and they have been presented at the European 
Conference on Visual Perception 2013. 
The context in which this experiment was set up was that we were considering whether CFS 
could be used as some kind of "simulation" of visuospatial neglect, by presenting the CFS 
mask to the left half of the visual field. We were inspired by the study of Conci et al. (2009), 
in which it was shown that both contours and surfaces contributed to the reduction in 
extinction for regular versus random Kanizsa stimuli that was previously observed in 
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participants with hemispatial neglect. We reasoned that, for CFS to be a viable model for 
neglect, it should be possible to replicate these results in a CFS experiment. Thus, we set up 
an experiment in which we used a half field CFS mask to suppress the left half the Kanizsa 
stimuli that were similar to the ones in the study of Conci et al., which were the following 
four stimuli: 
 
 
Figure S4.1. Stimulus set used in Experiment 1. (top left) Random stimulus, (top right) 
Contour stimulus, (bottom left) Partial surface stimulus, (bottom right) Regular stimulus. 
 
The upper left stimulus is referred to as the "random" stimulus, the upper right one is 
the "contour" stimulus, the lower left one the "partial surface" stimulus, and the lower right 
one the "regular" stimulus. The idea behind the stimuli is that the full-blown surface percept 
is incrementally built up going from random to Kanizsa (with collinearities between the 
pacmen in the contour stimulus, and a partial surface in the, well, partial surface stimulus). 
We designed the stimuli such that the visible part (the right part) never could fully predict 
what would be presented in the suppressed half of the stimulus. We presented these stimuli 
in a standard b-CFS experiment, in which the contrast was gradually increased and 
participants had to indicate when the left part of the stimulus broke suppression. To ensure 
participants were not randomly responding, they had to perform a task on the pacmen that 
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entered awareness. That is, upon breakthrough, participants had to indicate in which 
direction both pacmen were pointing. The order (upper or lower first) was counterbalanced 
across participants. Because this wasn't an easy task, participants were allowed to practice it 
extensively on the fully visible stimuli. The trial structure in this experiment was as follows: 
 
 
Figure S4.2. Basic trial sequence used in the experiment. A fixation cross was presented for 
1000 ms after which the half-CFS mask was displayed in the dominant eye and the 
suppressed stimulus in the non-dominant eye. The suppressed stimulus was gradually 
increased in contrast over the course of 2000 ms after which it remained at full contrast until 
it broke suppression. As soon as the pacmen became visible, participants had to indicate the 
pointing direction of the pacmen. 
 
We tested 19 participants in total, three of which were removed due to poor 
performance on the task. The experiment consisted of 300 trials in total (75 trials in each 
condition). Trials were presented in a completely random order, and participants were 
allowed to take breaks after each quarter of the trials was completed. Mean suppression 
times suppression times for all conditions are depicted in the following figure: 
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Figure S4.3. . Results of Experiment 1. The bars depict the mean suppression time for each 
condition. The error bars denote 95% within-subject confidence intervals using the procedure 
set out by Morey (2008). 
 
Statistical analyses indicated that the regular condition was not different from the 
partial surface condition, yet was different from the contour and random condition. The 
partial surface condition then did not differ from the contour condition, but only from the 
random condition and similary for the contour condition. Although we interpreted these 
results as replicating those of Conci et al. (2009), we also realised that a simple explanation 
based on the collinearities in the stimulus (none for the random, two crossing from the right 
to the left hemifield in the contour condition, one in the suppressed part of the stimulus in 
the partial surface and the contour condition). So, according to us, it seemed to be the case 
that "long-range" collinearities in the stimulus could equally well explain the results, and that 
we did not have to invoke an explantion based on a contribution of surfaces. Therefore, we 
designed the experiment which is reported as a first experiment in our AP&P paper. 
Why didn't we report on this experiment? Well, first of all, we used a half field CFS 
mask of which reviewers might ask why we used it in the first place. Given that the focus of 
our paper was not on the relationship between suppression through CFS and suppression in 
visuospatial neglect, we thought this would be difficult to motivate. Secondly, the task we 
used allowed for some extensive processing when the stimulus entered awareness. Indeed, 
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participants had to perform a task on the pacmen, rather than on their location (which we 
fixed in our reported experiments). The combination of these two factors made us reason it 
would be difficult to meaningfully integrate this experiment into a coherent line of 
reasoning. But hey, here it is, for all of us to see and comment on. 
 
Experiment 2 
The second unreported experiment is quite similar to the "full configurations" 
experiment we reported as part of Experiment 2. In this experiment, we did not yet include 
the "single elements" part of the experiment, but wanted to test the effect of further 
randomizing the Kanizsa stimuli. Due to a programming error, however, I only manipulated 
the rotation of the pacmen, but not the distance to the fixation cross. Therefore, we had to 
run this experiment again, and in the meantime we also included the part in which we only 
showed the single elements. Nevertheless, this experiment was not a failed experiment, and 
the results are equally interesting to report. So essentially, the experiment is the same as the 
full configurations one reported in Experiment 2, but I failed to properly manipulate the 
stimuli as described in the methods secition of Experiment 2. I did randomize the 
orientations of the pacmen, but I did not randomize the distance to fixation. 
We tested 20 participants, who completed 288 trials in total (32 trials per condition). 
The data were analyzed in the same way as reported in our published paper. The mean 
suppression times looked as follows: 
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Figure S4.4. . Results of Experiment 2. The bars depict the mean suppression time for each 
condition. The error bars denote 95% within-subject confidence intervals using the procedure 
set out by Morey (2008). 
 
The analysis on the conditions that were included in Experiment 1 (of the paper) 
revealed the same result (in contrast to what we observed in Experiment 2 of the paper). That 
is, the Bayes Factor for a model including main effects of stimulus type and configuration 
type compared to a model including the main effects and their interaction was 77. 
The analysis including the scrambled condition revelead a similar result, yet the 
Bayes Factor now was reduced to 3, highlighting that there is only moderate evidence for the 
absence of an interaction effect. In sum, the results obtained in this unreported experiment 
replicate the results of Experiment 1, and are somewhat inbetween compared to the results 
we obtained in Experiment 2. That is, for the cross and traditional pacmen conditions, we 
obtained similar results. For the curved pacmen condition, the result was in the reverse 
direction (compared to Experiment 2). 
 
Short Discussion 
I think these results add to and provide further evidence for the main interpretation 
of the results of our published paper. That is, in both experiments, we do not find any 
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convincing evidence that the difference in suppression time between a standard and rotated 
traditional pacmen stimulus is due to presence of an (illusory) surface. 
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Chapter 5. 
Suppressed visual looming stimuli are not integrated 
with auditory looming signals: evidence from 
continuous flash suppression 
 
Previous studies using binocular rivalry have shown that signals in a modality other than the 
visual can bias dominance durations depending on their congruency with the rivaling 
stimuli. More recently, studies using continuous flash suppression (CFS) have reported that 
multisensory integration influences how long visual stimuli remain suppressed. In this 
study, using CFS, we examined whether the contrast thresholds for detecting visual looming 
stimuli are influenced by a congruent auditory stimulus. In Experiment 1, we show that a 
looming visual stimulus can result in lower detection thresholds compared to a static 
concentric grating, but that auditory tone pips congruent with the looming stimulus did not 
lower suppression thresholds any further. In Experiments 2, 3 and 4, we again observed no 
advantage for congruent multisensory stimuli. These results add to our understanding of the 
conditions under which multisensory integration is possible, and suggest that certain forms 
of multisensory integration are not evident when the visual stimulus is suppressed from 
awareness using CFS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moors, P., Huygelier, H., Wagemans, J., de-Wit, L., van Ee, R. (2015). Suppressed visual looming 
stimuli are not integrated with auditory signals: evidence from continuous flash suppression. i-
Perception, 6(1), 48-62. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When both eyes are presented with incompatible images, the phenomenological 
consequence usually is one of binocular rivalry in which the percept alternates between the 
two images instead of mixing them into one coherent interpretation (Blake & Logothetis, 
2002; Tong et al., 2006). Alternations between rivaling percepts can be modulated by 
numerous factors, including the contrast (Fox & Rasche, 1969) or spatial frequency (Fahle, 
1982) of the stimuli, the allocation of attention (Meng & Tong, 2004; Ooi & He, 1999; Paffen, 
Alais, & Verstraten, 2006; van Ee, van Dam, & Brouwer, 2005), and stimulus predictability 
(Chopin & Mamassian, 2012). In addition, it has become clear that non-visual stimuli can 
influence the rivalry between visual stimuli, from audition (Alais, van Boxtel, Parker, & van 
Ee, 2010; Chen, Yeh, & Spence, 2011; Conrad et al., 2013; Conrad, Bartels, Kleiner, & 
Noppeney, 2010; Guzman-Martinez, Ortega, Grabowecky, Mossbridge, & Suzuki, 2012; Kang 
& Blake, 2005; van Ee, van Boxtel, Parker, & Alais, 2009), to touch (Lunghi & Alais, 2013; 
Lunghi, Binda, & Morrone, 2010; Lunghi, Morrone, & Alais, 2014; Lunghi & Morrone, 2013), 
and even olfaction (Zhou, Zhang, Chen, Wang, & Chen, 2012; Zhou, Jiang, He, & Chen, 
2010). Most of these studies have demonstrated that the influence of multisensory 
stimulation from the auditory modality specifically increases the duration of the already 
dominant (conscious) stimulus, rather than causing visual perception to switch to a non-
dominant (unconscious) stimulus (Chen et al., 2011; Conrad et al., 2010; Kang & Blake, 2005). 
However, some evidence has also been reported for an increased probability of switching to 
the currently non-dominant stimulus when it was congruent with an auditory (Lunghi et al., 
2014) or tactile signal (Lunghi & Alais, 2013; Lunghi et al., 2010, 2014; Lunghi & Morrone, 
2013). 
The question whether multisensory integration can be achieved for a stimulus 
suppressed from visual awareness through interocular suppression has recently been 
readdressed in studies in which continuous flash suppression (CFS) was used as the 
interocular suppression paradigm (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 
2006). CFS is a binocular rivalry variant in which a dynamic noise pattern (usually consisting 
of shapes of random size and orientation, called a CFS mask) is presented to one eye. In most 
implementations, the mask content refreshes every 100 milliseconds (ms) (i.e., at 10 Hz), 
yielding robust suppression of the stimulus presented to the other eye. CFS provides 
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interesting advantages over the use of regular binocular rivalry for assessing multisensory 
integration in the absence of visual awareness. The CFS mask is usually dominant at 
stimulus onset, enabling stricter control over which stimulus dominates in visual awareness 
at the start of each trial. This provides the opportunity to assess specifically whether the 
suppressed stimulus is integrated with the stimulus presented in the non-visual modality. 
Studies in which CFS was used as the interocular suppression paradigm have 
reported evidence that multisensory integration can occur in the absence of awareness 
(Alsius & Munhall, 2013; Palmer & Ramsey, 2012; Plass, Guzman-Martinez, Ortega, 
Grabowecky, & Suzuki, 2014; Salomon, Lim, Herbelin, Hesselmann, & Blanke, 2013; Yang & 
Yeh, 2014; Zhou et al., 2010). Most of these studies have relied on breaking CFS (b-CFS) (a 
term coined by Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011, based on a paradigm introduced by Jiang, 
Costello, & He, 2007) in which a stimulus is suppressed through CFS and gradually 
increased in contrast until it “breaks through” the CFS mask (i.e., becomes detectable). Upon 
breakthrough, participants usually have to perform a speeded localization task on the 
stimulus. Differential suppression times for different stimuli are then attributed to 
differences in stimulus processing during suppression (e.g., as in Jiang et al., 2007). For 
example, Zhou et al. (2010) reported that the congruency between an olfactory stimulus (i.e., 
the smell of a rose or a marker) and a visual stimulus (i.e., an image of a rose or a marker) 
suppressed by CFS can bias suppression times such that congruent stimuli break through 
suppression faster than incongruent stimuli. Similarly, Alsius and Munhall (2013) reported 
that the congruency relation between auditory stimuli and a visual lip-stream sequence 
suppressed from awareness by CFS modulates suppression times such that the congruent 
stimulus combination breaks through suppression faster. These findings seem to indicate 
that multisensory integration can indeed take place in the absence of awareness of one of the 
modalities (the visual one) and that the supraliminal modality can bias the breakthrough 
times of the suppressed stimulus. However, these studies have relied on b-CFS, and the 
validity of this paradigm to assess unconscious processing of the suppressed stimulus has 
recently been questioned (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011; Stein & Sterzer, 2014). Because the 
responses in the b-CFS paradigm rely on the participants being conscious of the stimulus of 
interest, it is necessary to ensure that the difference in suppression times is driven by a 
difference in the time at which stimuli break through suppression. That is, different stimuli 
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could break through suppression on average at the same time, yet the critical stimulus 
manipulation could influence the participants’ response time to one of the stimulus classes. 
This would yield a difference in suppression times that is not attributable to differences in 
processing during suppression, but rather to post-perceptual or decisional factors. To rule 
this out, a control condition is traditionally used in which the CFS mask and the stimulus are 
both presented to both eyes (binocular control condition in which no interocular suppression 
takes place). However, this control condition has been shown to be  insufficiently 
comparable to the CFS condition to infer unconscious processing (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). 
This has led Stein and Sterzer (2014) to argue that b-CFS, as it is currently used, cannot 
provide evidence for unconscious processing. 
 
The present study 
In this study, we set out to reevaluate whether multisensory integration can be 
achieved between a suppressed visual stimulus and a supraliminal auditory stimulus using a 
different paradigm than b-CFS. To do so, we tested whether a visual looming stimulus (as 
previously used by van Ee et al., 2009), while being suppressed by CFS, can be integrated 
with a concurrently presented tone pip or looming sound, by measuring detection thresholds 
of the visual looming stimulus in different conditions. As in the previous studies on 
multisensory integration during interocular suppression, we opted to use CFS because it can 
ensure that the visual looming stimulus is suppressed at trial onset. To avoid the problems 
associated with b-CFS, we fixed the presentation time of the stimuli and measured contrast 
detection thresholds for the visual looming stimulus. Such an accuracy-based measure has 
been used in previous studies (Kaunitz, Fracasso, Lingnau, & Melcher, 2013; Stein et al., 2011; 
Tsuchiya et al., 2006; van der Groen, van der Burg, Lunghi, & Alais, 2013; Yang & Blake, 
2012) and largely avoids the potential problem of differential response criteria in the classic 
implementation of b-CFS (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). Furthermore, we reasoned that if 
audiovisual integration indeed takes place in the absence of awareness of the visual looming 
stimulus, suppression strength in this condition would be lower than in the other conditions 
(Kang & Blake, 2005). Consequently, the thresholds in this condition would be expected to be 
lower compared to an incongruent or visual only condition. 
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We were interested in testing whether a suppressed visual looming stimulus could be 
integrated with a supraliminal auditory (looming) stimulus not only because looming is a 
biologically relevant signal that might be crucial for survival (Bach, Neuhoff, Perrig, & 
Seifritz, 2009; Fotowat & Gabbiani, 2011; Ghazanfar, Neuhoff, & Logothetis, 2002; Maier, 
Neuhoff, Logothetis, & Ghazanfar, 2004; Neuhoff, 1998, 2001; Schiff, Caviness, & Gibson, 
1962), but also because previous studies already have demonstrated that a looming stimulus 
dominates perception in binocular rivalry and that attentional allocation to a rhythmically 
congruent auditory looming signal can boost the attentional effect of holding the looming 
stimulus in perceptual dominance (Conrad et al., 2013; Parker & Alais, 2007; van Ee et al., 
2009). Furthermore, neuropsychological evidence suggests that looming stimuli can be 
processed in the absence of awareness. That is, extinction due to brain damage has been 
reported to be less severe for looming stimuli compared to contracting stimuli (Dent & 
Humphreys, 2011). Lastly, with respect to the neural locus of audiovisual looming 
integration, a recent fMRI study by Tyll et al. (2013) documented super-additive fMRI 
responses in visual cortex for multisensory looming signals compared to unisensory signals. 
Furthermore, the authors reported enhanced functional connectivity between the superior 
temporal sulcus and lower-level visual areas during multisensory looming stimulation. Since 
multisensory looming signals appear to be processed at least partially in early visual cortex, 
this finding prompts the question as to whether CFS completely abolishes the potential for 
audiovisual looming integration or whether the visual looming signal is sufficiently 
preserved to allow for the auditory signal to interact with the visual looming signal.  
In sum, based on the available evidence on multisensory integration between a 
suppressed visual stimulus and a suprathreshold stimulus of the non-visual modality, the 
present study addressed the extent to which a suppressed visual looming stimulus could be 
integrated with an auditory (looming) signal. This question was particularly motivated by 
the biological relevance of looming, the available neuropsychological evidence on 
audiovisual looming integration in brain-damaged patients as well as the neural locus of 
fully visible audiovisual looming stimuli. Furthermore, by measuring contrast detection 
thresholds of the visual looming stimulus in different experimental conditions, we were able 
to explicitly test whether auditory stimulation directly influenced the strength of the 
suppressed stimulus. We conducted four experiments to assess whether an auditory 
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(looming) signal influenced contrast detection thresholds of a visual looming stimulus. To 
preview our results, we obtained no evidence in favor of audiovisual integration of 
suppressed visual looming stimuli and auditory tone pips (Experiments 1, 2, and 4) or 
looming sounds (Experiment 3). 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to assess whether visual looming per se would lead to 
lower contrast detection thresholds compared to a static concentric grating. Secondly, we 
sought to test whether an auditory tone pip could further lower contrast detection thresholds 
when presented in a rhythmically congruent fashion with the visual looming stimulus. Thus, 
Experiment 1 consisted of three conditions: visual static, visual looming, and audiovisual 
looming. On each trial, participants had to indicate whether the target stimulus, initially 
suppressed from visual awareness through CFS, was presented above or below fixation and 
contrast detection thresholds were measured using a QUEST staircase procedure (Watson & 
Pelli, 1983). 
 
Methods 
Participants. Seventeen participants took part in this study, two of which were the 
first authors. All participants had normal hearing and normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
The mean age was 22.5 years (SD = 1.71). All participants signed an informed consent. All 
experiments were conducted in line with the ethical principles regarding research with 
human participants as specified in The Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association 
(Declaration of Helsinki). The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Faculty 
of Psychology and Educational Sciences (EC FPPW) of the University of Leuven. 
Apparatus and stimuli. All experiments were conducted in a dark room. The stimuli 
were created with PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007, 2009) and presented on two gamma-corrected 
color cathode ray tube (CRT) monitors (2048 x 1536 resolution for each monitor). Participants 
viewed a pair of dichoptic displays through a mirror stereoscope at a distance of 125 
centimeters with a chin rest. The refresh rate of the monitor was 60 Hz. A checkerboard 
pattern was continuously presented to ensure binocular fusion (checker size 0.34°). A 
fixation cross with (0.6° x 0.6°) was continuously presented in the center of the screen.  
107 
 
 
In the eye dominance measurement phase, the target stimulus was an arrow 
(maximal length 4°; maximal height 2°) pointing leftwards or rightwards which was 
presented at the center of the screen. A grayscale CFS mask consisting of Mondrian patterns 
was presented against a uniform grey background at mean luminance (25 cd/m2) with a 
frame size of 5° x 5°. The CFS mask consisted of 150 elements (squares) presented within a 
range of 3° x 3° with a contrast (root mean square) of 27.5 % and refreshed every 0.10 
seconds (i.e. at 10 Hz). The position and size of the mask elements were randomly alternated. 
The size of the elements ranged from 1° to 2°.  
For the main part of the experiment, visual stimuli were presented on a uniform grey 
background with a size of 2.5° x 2.5° at mean luminance (see Figure 5.1 for an example of the 
trial sequence). The target stimulus consisted of a concentric sine wave grating with a size of 
1° and a spatial frequency of 3 cycles per degree. The stimulus was either presented static or 
with looming motion. The appearance of looming was created by phase shifts. The 
magnitude of the phase shift was increased exponentially over a 0.8 second period from 0 to 
4 Hz and was slowed down according to a cosine decay for 0.2 seconds such that one 
looming cycle lasted 1 second (i.e., looming motion at 1 Hz). This implementation of looming 
motion was based on stimuli used in previous experiments (Parker & Alais, 2007; van Ee et 
al., 2009). The auditory stimulus was a pure tone of 200Hz that was presented together with 
the visual looming stimulus at the peak of each looming cycle for 0.28 seconds (the 
amplitude of the tone was modulated such that it peaked after 0.14 seconds). The CFS mask 
consisted of 50 circular mask elements alternating randomly in position and size (within a 
range of 1° and 2°). The mask was refreshed every 0.10 seconds. The CFS mask was 
presented in the left half of the visual field (1.5° x 1°; 27.5 % contrast, root mean square). The 
target stimulus was always presented 1.25° left of fixation and either 1.25° above or below 
fixation. 
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Figure 5.1. Trial sequence in all the experiments. A trial always started with 1 second of 
fixation after which the CFS mask and target stimulus (above or below fixation) were 
presented for 3 (Experiment 1) or 4 seconds (Experiments 2, 3, and 4). After stimulus 
presentation, the fixation display was presented until participants made their response. 
 
Procedure and Design. Participants read written instructions before the experiment 
started. They were instructed that they could use the auditory stimulation to perform better 
on the task. This instruction was given because van Ee et al. (2009) reported that attending 
the auditory looming signal was critical for observing the multisensory facilitating effect on 
holding the visual looming stimulus in perceptual dominance. Participants were asked to 
fixate the fixation cross during the entire experiment. The most important instructions were 
verbally repeated. First, eye dominance was measured for each participant, based on the 
technique developed by Yang, Blake, and McDonald (2010). On each trial, an arrow which 
was gradually ramped up in contrast (100% after 2 seconds) was presented to one eye while 
the CFS mask was presented to the other eye, yielding initial perceptual suppression of the 
arrow. Upon breakthrough of the arrow, participants had to determine the direction of the 
arrow as fast as possible. In half of the trials, the arrow was presented to the left eye and in 
the other half to the right eye, for 80 trials in total (40 for each eye). The index for eye 
dominance was determined by calculating the ratio of the mean suppression time when the 
arrow was presented in the left eye and the mean suppression time when the arrow was 
presented in the right eye (Yang et al., 2010). After determining eye dominance, the CFS 
mask was always presented to the dominant eye during the rest of the experiment. A fifteen-
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minute break was given after the eye-dominance measurement. The break was necessary to 
ensure the effectiveness of suppression on participants in the second part of the experiment.  
In the second part, the instructions were repeated and – when ready – participants 
started the experiment. In the visual static condition (VS), only the concentric grating was 
presented to the non-dominant eye. In the visual looming condition (VL), the concentric 
grating was presented with looming motion. Lastly, in the audiovisual looming condition 
(AVL), the auditory tone pips were presented concurrently with the visual looming stimulus 
at the peak of each looming cycle, using a headset. Each condition consisted of 50 trials. On 
each trial, one of the conditions was randomly selected. A trial started with 1 second of 
fixation, after which the CFS mask and target stimulus (at the current contrast level of the 
staircase) were presented for 3 seconds. After 3 seconds, both disappeared and the 
participant had to respond at which spatial position – above or below fixation – the target 
stimulus had been presented (the spatial location of the target was randomly determined on 
each trial, but balanced across the experiment). Participants were instructed to guess if they 
had not seen the target during a trial. A QUEST staircase procedure was used to measure 
75% contrast detection thresholds (Watson & Pelli, 1983) for each condition separately. The 
number of trials necessary for an accurate measurement of the detection threshold was based 
on a pilot study. 
 
Results 
Before subjecting the data to any statistical test, the thresholds were normalized to the 
mean threshold for each participant (computed across conditions). One participant was 
excluded from data-analysis due to suppression being too effective. For this participant the 
looming stimulus had to be presented at full contrast in all conditions in nearly all trials with 
performance levels still around chance (50%). In comparison, the average 75% contrast 
threshold across conditions and participants was 10%.  
All analyses were done in a Bayesian framework, relying on Bayes Factors (BF) and 
95% credible intervals (CI) on effect sizes. Calculation of BFs was done with the BayesFactor 
package (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012). The models used to analyze the data 
are conceptually very similar, if not the same, to the classical repeated measures ANOVA. 
The advantages of statistical inference in a Bayesian compared to a frequentist framework 
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have been elaborately discussed elsewhere (Kruschke, 2010; Kruschke, 2010; Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). With respect to this study, a 
major advantage of the use of BFs is that it quantifies the relative evidence for one model 
compared to another. Thus, and critical for our study, BFs can also be used to quantify the 
evidence for a null model (containing no effect of condition) compared to a model containing 
an effect of condition, which is impossible in standard null hypothesis significance testing. 
We use the classification proposed by Jeffreys (1961) as a guideline for interpreting the BFs 
(i.e., BFs > 3 or BFs < 1/3 will be considered substantial evidence for the one or the other 
model). 95% CIs were based on the posterior distribution of the effect size parameter of the 
model that was estimated (see Rouder et al., 2012, 2009). 
Figure 5.2A depicts the mean normalized thresholds and the individual data for each 
subject. The BF analysis revealed that a condition effect was indeed present in the data (BF = 
17). To disentangle the relative contribution of each condition to this effect, different 
contrasts were computed (summarized in Table 5.1). From Table 5.1, it is clear that the 
condition effect is driven by the difference between the AVL and VS condition. Although the 
AVL and VL conditions do not differ from each other, their combination does differ from the 
VS condition. This analysis is complemented by the 95% CIs which do not include zero for 
the AVL vs. VS and AVL/VL vs. VS contrasts. 
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Figure 5.2. Summary of all four experiments. Bar plots depict the mean normalized contrast 
threshold for each condition. The dots indicate the normalized contrast thresholds for each 
participant. Connected dots refer to the same participant. 
 
Table 5.1. Contrast analysis for Experiment 1.  
Contrast BF (relative to null) Delta 95% CI 
AVL vs. VL 0.41 -0.23 [-0.69; 0.22] 
AVL vs. VS 15 -0.79 [-1.36; -0.23] 
VL vs. VS 0.88 -0.37 [-0.89; 0.09] 
AVL and VL vs. VS 6 -0.65 [-1.21; -0.12] 
Note. Bayes Factors > 3 indicates substantial evidence against the null model. Delta refers to 
the mean posterior effect size. The 95% CI was calculated for this delta parameter. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, a strong effect was found for the combination of auditory 
stimulation and looming motion on detection thresholds compared to the static stimulus. 
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However, the results did not indicate that an audiovisual looming stimulus could be 
detected more easily - when initially suppressed from awareness - than a visual looming 
stimulus. Comparing both conditions that contained looming motion to the static stimulus 
indicated that the improvement in detection in the audiovisual looming condition seemed to 
be mostly driven by the looming motion characteristics of the target stimulus and was not 
driven by presenting auditory congruent stimulation together with the looming motion. 
Because the average contrast at which participants detected the target was quite low 
(~10%), a floor effect might have obscured any, potentially bigger effects in a part of our 
sample. Therefore, we sought to improve the effectiveness of our CFS mask. Recently, some 
studies have reported evidence on the importance of feature similarity between the CFS 
mask and the suppressed stimulus to achieve effective suppression (Hong & Blake, 2009; 
Maehara, Huang, & Hess, 2009; Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2014; Yang & Blake, 2012). 
Therefore, we changed the properties of our mask to contain spatial frequency information 
matching that of the target stimulus.  
Stimulus presentation during every trial amounted to 3 seconds in Experiment 1, and 
this might have been too short to allow for integration between the visual and auditory 
stimulus. Therefore, we increased the trial duration in the second experiment. The visual 
static condition was excluded, because the results of Experiment 1 indicated that the 
detection of the target stimulus in the static condition was reliably worse than in the 
audiovisual looming condition. An incongruent audiovisual condition was added to 
determine whether any facilitating effect of the audiovisual condition was due to generic 
auditory stimulation rather than multisensory integration of congruent signals. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Methods 
Participants. Fourteen of the same participants as in Experiment 1 and the two first 
authors took part in the second study. The participant that had to be excluded in the analysis 
of the first experiment was not invited to participate again. Two other participants did not 
wish to return to participate in the second study. The mean age of participants was 22 years 
(SD = 1.46). All participants signed an informed consent. 
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Apparatus and stimuli. The same settings were used as in Experiment 1 for the 
background, checkerboard pattern, fixation cross, and visual target stimulus. The CFS mask 
was adjusted to more optimally match the characteristics of the target stimulus. The new 
mask consisted of 50 circular square wave gratings with a randomly alternating size within a 
range of 1° and 2° (Figure 5.1). The spatial frequency of each element was randomly selected 
within a range of 2 to 4 cycles/degree and the orientation of each element ranged between 0 
and π radians. In the audiovisual congruent condition, the tone pips were presented in the 
same way as in Experiment 1. In the audiovisual incongruent condition, the tone pips were 
rhythmically incongruent with the visual looming stimulus and presented at 0.8 Hz instead 
of 1 Hz as in the audiovisual congruent condition. All other settings of the experiment were 
kept the same as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure and Design. Participants signed an informed consent and read written 
instructions. Since the majority of participants participated in Experiment 1, eye dominance 
did not need to be measured again for these participants. The visual looming (VL) and 
audiovisual congruent (AVC) conditions were the same as in Experiment 1. In the 
audiovisual incongruent (AVIC) condition, the tone pips were presented in a rhythmically 
incongruent fashion with the visual looming stimulus (i.e., at 0.8 Hz instead of 1 Hz). At the 
start of each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 1 second after which the target stimulus 
and CFS mask were presented for 4 seconds. After stimulus presentation, participants 
responded whether they saw the target stimulus above or below fixation. Target position 
was again randomly determined on each trial, but balanced across the experiment. The three 
different conditions – visual, audiovisual congruent and audiovisual incongruent – were 
presented in a random order for 50 trials per condition. 75% contrast detection thresholds 
were measured again using a QUEST staircase procedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983). 
 
Results 
Since the participants were partly the same as in Experiment 1, we could explicitly 
test whether the new CFS mask improved suppression compared to the one in Experiment 1. 
An improvement in average contrast was indeed observed (BF = 5; posterior mean effect size 
0.51; 95% CI = [0.11; 0.91]). Figure 5.2B depicts the results of Experiment 2. The data were 
again analyzed using the normalized contrast thresholds (relative to the mean of each 
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participant across conditions). One subject was not included in the analysis because the 
mean contrast threshold deviated more than 3 standard deviations from the mean contrast 
threshold across all subjects. The BF analysis indicated no convincing evidence (BF = 2.11) for 
an effect of condition on the normalized contrast thresholds. The follow-up contrast analysis 
is summarized in Table 5.2. It is clear that the evidence for an effect of the AVC condition 
versus the other conditions is indecisive, i.e. both the null model and the model that indicates 
a difference between conditions are favored equally. Moreover, the results were strongly 
influenced by one participant with a normalized contrast threshold of approximately 0.5 in 
the AVL condition. Exclusion of this influential data point reversed the direction of the BF to 
weak evidence for the null model (BF = 0.68). 
 
Table 5.2. Contrast analysis for Experiment 2. 
Contrast BF (relative to null) Delta 95% CI 
Including influential data point    
AVC vs. AVIC 1 -0.40 [-0.91;0.08] 
AVC vs. VL 1 -0.40 [-0.92;0.1] 
AVIC vs. VL 0.26 -0.02 [-0.48;0.44] 
AVC vs. AVIC and VL 1.29 -0.45 [-.97;0.05] 
    
Excluding influential data point    
AVC vs. AVIC 0.70 -0.35 [-0.88;0.14] 
AVC vs. VL 0.85 -0.38 [-0.91;0.13] 
AVIC vs. VL 0.27 0.02 [-0.47;0.50] 
AVC vs. AVIC and VL 1.60 -0.50 [-1.05;0.02] 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, again, no support was found for the hypothesis that the detection of 
the visual looming target would improve when presented in combination with congruent 
sound. In sum, in a sample nearly the same as in Experiment 1, we obtained, with an 
improved design, no evidence for audiovisual looming integration in the context of a 
subliminal visual looming stimulus. The estimates for the effect sizes for a difference 
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between the audiovisual congruent condition and one of the other conditions were about 
0.40, generally considered to be a moderate effect according to the classification proposed by 
Cohen (1977). If we ignore the Proteus phenomenon (Button et al., 2013) and consider this an 
accurate estimate of the true effect, a power analysis for an effect size of 0.40 indicates that 
we should at least quadruple our sample to achieve 90% power. 
Instead of quadrupling our sample, we decided to redesign our experiment such that, 
if multisensory integration is driving the direction of the differences observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2, these differences should be more pronounced in this experiment or, at 
least, the same. That is, van Ee et al. (2009) observed an attentional benefit of multisensory 
stimulation when the looming pattern was presented at fixation (similarly for the looming 
bias observed in Parker & Alais, 2007). Therefore, we presented the looming stimulus at 
fixation in Experiment 3. Furthermore, although tone pips were argued to be equally 
effective in van Ee et al. (2009), we implemented a continuous looming sound to increase the 
(in)congruency of the auditory and visual signals. That is, in Experiment 3, at every moment 
in time for the audiovisual conditions, either congruent or incongruent auditory signals were 
presented together with the visual signal. Last, to ensure that our effects were not specific to 
our previous sample of participants, we collected data from a new sample of participants. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Methods 
Participants. 16 new observers and one of the first authors participated in the 
experiment. All new observers participated in return for course credit. The mean age was 19 
years (SD = 2.06). All participants signed an informed consent. 
Apparatus and Stimuli. The visual target stimulus and CFS mask were identical to 
those in Experiment 2, but they were now presented at fixation. Instead of a tone pip, the 
auditory stimulus was a looming sound in the current experiment. A pure tone of 200 Hz 
was presented, periodically increasing and decreasing in amplitude. The increase in 
amplitude coincided with the phase-shifts of the visual looming motion (1 Hz) in the 
audiovisual congruent condition. In the audiovisual incongruent condition the frequency of 
the looming sound was 0.87 Hz. All other settings of the experiment were identical to 
Experiment 2. 
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Procedure and Design. The procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
except for the task participants had to perform. Since the target stimulus was always 
presented at fixation, participants had to indicate on each trial whether they had seen the 
target stimulus or not (yes/no classification) (Figure 5.1). The experiment consisted of the 
three same conditions as in Experiment 2 (visual looming, audiovisual congruent, and 
audiovisual incongruent). Catch trials (in which no target stimulus was presented) were 
included for all three conditions such that the absence or presence of sound would not be 
predictive for target presence. For each condition, we again measured contrast thresholds 
through a QUEST staircase procedure, for 50 trials per staircase. 50 catch trials were also 
included and at each trial it was determined randomly whether an “(in)congruent” sound 
would be presented during the catch trial or not. Thus, participants performed 200 trials in 
total. The different conditions were again randomized across trials.  
 
Results 
A mean accuracy level of 75% on the catch trials was the cut-off to include data. Two 
participants did not meet this criterion (8% and 63% accuracy). The mean accuracy of 
participants included in further analysis was 91.5% (SD = 7.3).  
Figure 5.2C depicts the results of Experiment 3. The BF analysis was again done on 
the normalized contrast thresholds. As is already apparent from Figure 5.2C, the omnibus 
analysis did not indicate evidence for an effect of condition (BF = 0.20). Table 5.3 summarizes 
the contrast analysis. Here again, no evidence for an effect is found. To the contrary, the BFs 
for the omnibus analysis and contrasts indicate strong evidence in favour of the null model 
(i.e., all BFs < 0.33). Moreover, the direction of the differences between conditions seems to 
have reversed in Experiment 3 compared to Experiment 2. That is, numerically, the audio-
visual congruent condition now had the highest mean normalized contrast detection 
threshold.  
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
 
Table 5.3. Contrast analysis for Experiment 3. 
Contrast BF (relative to null) Delta 95% CI 
AVC vs. AVIC 0.30 0.11 [-0.35;0.58] 
AVC vs. VL 0.28 0.09 [-0.37;0.56] 
AVIC vs. VL 0.27 -0.04 [-0.51;0.42] 
AVC vs. AVIC and VL 0.30 0.11 [-0.34;0.57] 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we tested a new sample of participants with a further refined design 
to maximize our chances of finding an effect of multisensory integration on detecting a 
suppressed visual looming stimulus. That is, we presented the looming stimulus at fixation 
and we used a continuously looming sound that was either congruent or incongruent with 
the visual looming stimulus. Again, no effects of (synchronous) auditory stimulation were 
observed. All BFs indicated strong evidence for the absence of an effect for any comparison 
between conditions that was considered.  
To increase our confidence in this null effect, we decided to run Experiment 2 again 
on another sample of participants. We reasoned that if a true effect underlay the direction of 
the differences in Experiment 2, we should at least be able to replicate this pattern in a new 
sample of subjects, albeit the sample size not providing sufficient power. In contrast, if a null 
effect underlay the data of Experiment 2, we would expect that this new sample might show 
differences between conditions in different directions compared to Experiment 2. Crucially, 
however, analyzing the sample of Experiment 2 together with the new sample should cancel 
out any differences observed in both samples separately, if we are dealing with a null effect. 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
Methods 
Participants. 15 paid observers participated in the experiment. Their age ranged 
between 18 and 30 years. All observers provided informed consent before the start of the 
experiment.  
Apparatus and Stimuli. The experimental set-up and stimuli were identical to 
Experiment 2.  
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Procedure and Design. The procedure and design were exactly the same as in 
Experiment 2.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 5.2D depicts the results of Experiment 4. The data were again analyzed using 
the normalized contrast thresholds. Two participants were excluded from the analysis 
because at least one of their contrast thresholds estimated by the QUEST procedure exceeded 
the maximum contrast level. The BF analysis now indicated strong evidence in favor of an 
effect for condition (BF = 6). However, comparing these results with those obtained in 
Experiment 2, it becomes clear that the direction of the differences has now reversed. Thus, 
in a second analysis, we collapsed the data of Experiment 2 and Experiment 4 (Figure 5.3). 
The BF analysis now indicated substantial evidence for the null model (BF = 8). Thus, 
collecting additional data for Experiment 2 revealed that in the new sample an effect of 
condition was present (and stronger compared to Experiment 2, yet in a different direction), 
but an analysis of the aggregate data indicated substantial evidence for no differences 
between conditions.  
 
Figure 5.3. Mean normalized contrast thresholds collapsed for Experiments 2 and 4. The dots 
indicate the normalized contrast thresholds for each participant. Connected dots refer to the 
same participant. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We examined whether an auditory signal can be integrated with a visual stimulus 
suppressed from awareness through Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS). To this end, we 
used a visual looming stimulus and concurrently presented tone pips (Experiments 1, 2, and 
4) or a continuous looming sound (Experiment 3) and measured contrast detection 
thresholds of the visual looming stimulus. Multisensory integration between the 
supraliminal auditory stimulus and subliminal visual stimulus should lead to lower contrast 
detection thresholds in the congruent audio-visual condition compared to a unisensory 
visual condition or a multisensory condition in which the auditory stimulus was incongruent 
with the visual looming stimulus. In other words, due to multisensory integration, the 
strength of the representation of the suppressed visual stimulus would increase relative to 
the other conditions, effectively lowering suppression strength of the CFS mask and 
therefore requiring lower contrast to achieve the same performance. Across four experiments 
we obtained no evidence for audio-visual integration during interocular suppression. That is, 
the results were either equally supportive for either an effect of condition or no effect of 
condition (Experiments 1 and 2) or provided substantial evidence for the null model of no 
condition effect (Experiment 3, and Experiments 2 and 4 combined). Furthermore, in the 
contrast analyses, we never obtained convincing evidence for contrast thresholds being 
lower in the audio-visual congruent condition compared to the audio-visual incongruent or 
visual only conditions. Based on these results, the most parsimonious conclusion seems to be 
that, for the stimulus combinations we have used, integration between an auditory (looming) 
signal and a visual looming stimulus cannot be achieved in the absence of awareness of the 
visual stimulus (induced through interocular suppression), or at least, cannot bias breaking 
suppression in a manner consistent with predictions based on multisensory integration. 
Our results thus seem to stand in apparent contrast with other studies using CFS to 
assess multisensory integration in the absence of awareness (Alsius & Munhall, 2013; Palmer 
& Ramsey, 2012; Plass et al., 2014; Salomon et al., 2013; Yang & Yeh, 2014; Zhou et al., 2010). 
The question thus remains as to why other studies have found an effect of multisensory 
integration for visual stimuli suppressed from awareness, when none was found here. 
Obviously, we are not in a position to resolve this apparent inconsistency immediately, but it 
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is worth noting a number of the core differences between different studies, particularly in 
terms of the types of methods and stimuli used. 
 
Although the CFS paradigm provides unique opportunities to assess whether 
multisensory integration can occur in the absence of visual awareness (Deroy, Chen, & 
Spence, 2014), previous studies have often relied on breaking CFS (b-CFS) (Alsius & 
Munhall, 2013; Salomon et al., 2013; Yang & Yeh, 2014; Zhou et al., 2010). As already 
highlighted in the introduction, this approach is not without its critiques (Stein et al., 2011; 
Stein & Sterzer, 2014, see also a recent review by Gayet, Van Der Stigchel, and Paffen, 2014), 
one particular concern being that the observed difference in suppression time between 
conditions cannot be unambiguously attributed to processing differences during 
suppression. It might thus be that the absence of an effect in the current study reflects the use 
of a more stringent measure, being the contrast threshold at which something can be 
detected, rather than the time taken for a stimulus to break through suppression. 
Nevertheless, not all of these studies have relied on b-CFS, so this does not provide a full 
explanation for the discrepancy between the current study and previous studies. 
 
It is interesting to note that both studies that have not used b-CFS to study 
multisensory integration for a suppressed visual stimulus were on the subject of audiovisual 
speech integration. For example, in the study of Palmer and Ramsey (2012) two visual lip-
stream sequences were presented while suppressed through CFS and concurrently an 
auditory stream was presented, congruent with one of the visual lip-stream sequences. After 
presenting this sequence, the authors probed whether participants had allocated their 
attention to the spatial location at which the visual lip-stream sequence was either congruent 
or incongruent with the auditory stream. They did so by presenting a near threshold Gabor 
patch in one of the two locations, of which participants had to indicate the location and 
orientation. The results indicated that participants performed better on valid cue-target trials. 
Palmer and Ramsey (2012) argued that to be able to do this, the congruency relation between 
visual and auditory input has to be extracted, presumably through multisensory integration 
of both signals. A different study showed that participants respond faster to spoken words 
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when a concurrently presented face suppressed by CFS articulates that word compared to 
when the suppressed face articulates a different word (Plass et al., 2014).  
Although our interest in testing whether auditory (looming) stimuli could be 
integrated with suppressed visual looming stimuli was partly motivated by the ecological 
and potentially evolutionary relevance of looming stimuli, it seems to be the case that, based 
on the results of these two studies, visual stimuli that are more naturalistic and potentially 
more relevant (ecologically and evolutionary) do seem to be integrated with supraliminal 
auditory stimuli. Indeed, the naturalistic structure of a stimulus has been shown to be an 
important determinant of audio-visual integration in binocular rivalry (Conrad et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that audio-visual speech stimuli provide more constraints as 
to which part of the auditory input should match which part of the visual input, which might 
be beneficial for integration when one of the inputs is rendered unconscious. Lastly, the 
results of these two studies particularly pertain to attentional orienting or response 
preparation in function of integrating subliminal visual and supraliminal auditory input. 
This type of integration might as well happen for the stimulus used in this study. Yet it could 
be that, due to the fact that the site of interocular suppression is usually located fairly early in 
the visual processing hierarchy (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Logothetis, 1998), the 
representation of the suppressed stimulus is such that the synergistic effects observed for 
visible looming stimuli fail to play out in this situation (Cappe, Thelen, Romei, Thut, & 
Murray, 2012; Tyll et al., 2013). 
 
If we broaden the scope of the discussion to also include studies that used regular 
binocular rivalry, it is interesting to note that most studies on audio-visual interactions in 
binocular rivalry observed an effect of the auditory stimulus that was restricted to an 
extension of dominance periods for the congruent visual stimulus (Chen et al., 2011; Conrad 
et al., 2010; Kang & Blake, 2005). In that respect, this study could be said to reveal a similar 
pattern, since there is no effect of auditory stimuli on contrast detection thresholds of 
suppressed visual looming stimuli. A remarkably different pattern emerges, however, if one 
considers the interaction between tactile and visual stimuli during binocular rivalry. Here, 
tactile stimuli do not only increase dominance durations of congruent visual stimuli, but also 
shorten suppression durations of these congruent visual stimuli (Lunghi & Alais, 2013; 
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Lunghi et al., 2010, 2014; Lunghi & Morrone, 2013). These findings seem to indicate a 
relatively early phase in the processing hierarchy at which these signals already interact, not 
only because the tactile stimuli can influence suppression durations, but also because these 
studies have shown that these effects are tuned to both orientation (Lunghi & Alais, 2013) 
and spatial frequency (Lunghi et al., 2010). On a speculative note, the difference between 
audiovisual and tactile-visual integration in binocular rivalry might be related to the level at 
which these stimuli are integrated. That is, neural processing related to an interocularly 
suppressed stimulus is mostly restricted to early visual areas (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; 
Logothetis, 1998). Given that evidence for integration between a suppressed visual stimulus 
and a tactile but not auditory stimulus is found, this could lead one to hypothesize that 
tactile-visual integration is possible in early visual areas (at least for the stimuli used in these 
studies) but that audio-visual integration requires a contribution from higher areas. Indeed, 
studies have consistently reported an important role for the superior temporal sulcus in 
audio-visual integration (Stevenson, Geoghegan, & James, 2007; Stevenson & James, 2009; 
Tyll et al., 2013). Suppressing a visual stimulus through interocular suppression might thus 
block the feed forward progression of visual input to a stage in the system where audio-
visual integration can exert its synergistic effects. 
A notable exception to this general pattern is the recent study of Lunghi et al. (2014). 
In this study, the authors demonstrated not only an increased probability of maintaining the 
current percept when it was congruent with an auditory or tactile stimulus, but also an 
increased probability of switching to the other stimulus when the current percept was 
incongruent with the tactile or auditory stimulus. As such, Lunghi et al. (2014) provided 
evidence that both auditory and tactile stimuli can be integrated with suppressed visual 
stimuli during binocular rivalry. It should be noted, however, that this study relied on 
temporal frequency rivalry (Alais & Parker, 2012). Although temporal frequency rivalry 
resembles spatial rivalry with respect to dominance duration distributions and alternation 
rates, the mechanisms through which it acts might as well allow for integration between a 
supraliminal auditory or tactile stimulus and a suppressed visual stimulus whereas spatial 
rivalry might not. Lastly, compared to our study, Lunghi et al. (2014) tracked dominance 
durations, whereas we were interested in potential integration at the first stage of 
suppression. Taking together these findings, one might thus speculate that integration 
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between a supraliminal auditory or tactile stimulus and suppressed visual stimulus only 
plays out in the later phases of stimulus presentation, after a few alternations between 
stimuli have occurred. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study sought to address whether multisensory integration between an auditory 
stimulus and a visual looming stimulus can be achieved when the looming stimulus is 
presented in the absence of awareness induced through CFS. In four experiments, contrast 
detection thresholds of the visual looming stimulus were measured in a static (Experiment 
1), visual looming (Experiments 1, 2, 3 and 4), audio-visual congruent (Experiments 1, 2, 3 
and 4) and audio-visual incongruent (Experiments 2, 3 and 4) condition. The accumulated 
evidence from these four studies suggests that congruent audio-visual signals are not able to 
reduce the contrast detection threshold at which visual stimuli can be detected. Thus, for 
audio-visual looming stimuli, no evidence for multisensory integration in the absence of 
visual awareness was found. Although these results are in line with the general pattern of 
results on audio-visual interactions in binocular rivalry (but see Lunghi et al., 2014; Palmer & 
Ramsey, 2012; Plass et al., 2014), it is currently unclear whether differences with previous 
studies reflect methodological differences in the measurement techniques used (contrast 
detection thresholds, b-CFS, or priming), in the modalities tested (auditory vs. tactile) or the 
types of stimuli used (abstract vs. naturalistic). 
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Chapter 6.  
Launching awareness: causal events enter awareness 
faster than non-causal events 
Philosophers have long argued that causality cannot be directly observed, but that causality 
has to be inferred (Hume, 1738). Albert Michotte however developed numerous visual 
phenomena in which people seemed to perceive causality as a primary visual property (like 
color or motion), tightly coupled to specific spatiotemporal stimulus properties and 
apparently not requiring a conscious cognitive inference (Michotte, 1946). Over the last 
seventy years, advocates of both sides have continued this debate and no consensus has been 
reached (Rips, 2011; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Wagemans, van Lier, & Scholl, 2006; Weir, 
1978; Wolff, 2007). Using a continuous flash suppression (CFS) paradigm, we show that 
causal events enter awareness faster than non-causal events. We presented observers with 
‘causal’ and ‘non-causal’ events, that participants were not immediately aware of, and found 
consistent evidence that participants become aware of causal events more rapidly than of 
non-causal events. Since CFS disrupts neural activity beyond early visual areas, our results 
suggest that, whilst causality must be inferred from sensory evidence, this inference is 
computed at low levels of perceptual processing, and does not depend on a deliberative 
conscious inference. This work therefore supports Michotte’s contention that, like color or 
motion, causality is an immediate property of our perception of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moors, P., Wagemans, J., & de-Wit, L. (in preparation). Launching awareness: causal events enter 
awareness faster than non-causal events. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers and psychologists alike have long debated whether causality can be 
directly perceived or requires a conscious cognitive inference (Hume, 1738; Michotte, 1946). 
In the 1940s, Albert Michotte provided an important contribution to this discussion by 
demonstrating that parametric variations in the spatiotemporal attributes of a stimulus could 
predictably influence whether a causal percept was elicited. Based on this series of 
experiments, Michotte argued that human observers perceive causality, and that causality is a 
primary visual property such as color or motion. In one classic example, Michotte presented 
observers with a launching event in which an object moves toward another stationary object, 
stops right in front of it, and then the second object immediately starts to move along the 
same trajectory (Figure 6.1a). This event almost irresistibly evokes a causal impression, in 
which the first object appears to cause the motion of the second object. In the seventy years 
following his seminal contribution, the discussion on the perceptual versus cognitive basis of 
causality perception has remained wide open (Arnold, Petrie, Gallagher, & Yarrow, 2015; 
Rips, 2011; Rolfs et al., 2013; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Wagemans et al., 2006; Weir, 1978; 
Wolff, 2007). In this work, we attempted to address this issue by asking whether conscious 
processing of causal and non-causal events is necessary for them to be differentially 
processed. To render causal and non-causal events invisible, we used a modified version of 
continuous flash suppression (CFS) (Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2014; Tsuchiya & Koch, 
2005) that was able to perceptually suppress moving events for extended periods of time. 
CFS is a potent technique for suppressing stimuli presented to one eye by presenting a 
dynamic noise pattern to the other eye. Furthermore, CFS is known to disrupt neural activity 
beyond early visual areas (Hesselmann & Malach, 2011; Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 2013). 
Hence, if a differential sensitivity to causal and non-causal events is revealed through CFS, 
this implies that the visual system processes these events at a very early stage during visual 
processing.  
 
In our first experiment, we presented observers (n = 24) with launching (causal) and 
passing (non-causal) events while these were rendered invisible through CFS. In the 
launching event, a disc would start moving toward a stationary disc, stop right in front of it, 
after which the stationary disc would start moving. The passing event was the same, except 
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that the first disc completely overlapped the second disc before the latter started moving 
(Figure 6.1a). These events were continuously repeated until observers detected any aspect of 
the discs emerging through the CFS mask. Importantly, we never informed observers on the 
nature of the events. Suppression time was then taken as a measure of the extent to which 
the events were processed during perceptual suppression (Gayet, Paffen, & Van der Stigchel, 
2013; Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). Our results indicated that launch events 
entered awareness faster than pass events (BF > 100), for nearly every observer (Figure 6.1c). 
In our second experiment (n = 27), we sought to replicate this effect whilst including an event 
that controlled for differences in local motion saliency between the launch and pass event. 
The control event (pseudo-launch) was exactly the same as the launch event, except for the 
starting position of the first disc, which was shifted such that it would stop after passing by 
the side of  the second stationary disc. Thus, the secondary disc would only start moving 
after the first disc had stopped in a location where it could not logically have caused the 
motion of the second (Figure 6.1a). The results of this second experiment replicate the result 
of the first study showing that launch events broke suppression faster than pass events (BF > 
100). Critically, launch events also broke suppression faster than pseudo-launch events (BF = 
54), and pass and pseudo-launch events broke suppression equally fast (BF < 0.05). 
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Figure 6.1. Study overview. (a) Events used in both experiments. In the launch event, a disc 
starts moving toward a stationary disc, stops right in front of it, and the stationary disc then 
starts moving. In the pass event, a disc starts moving toward a stationary disc, stops when it 
fully overlaps with the stationary disc, and the stationary disc then starts moving. In the 
pseudo-launch event, a disc starts moving toward a stationary disc, and stops after passing 
by the side of the stationary disc, after which the stationary disc starts moving. (b) Trial 
sequence used in the experiment. After a fixation period (1 second), the moving CFS mask 
was presented to the dominant eye and the (non-) causal event to the other eye. The disc 
events repeated and gradually increased in contrast until observers detected any part of the 
discs. (c) Results of Experiment 1. Launch event enter awareness faster than pass events. 
Almost all data points lie above the identity line. (d) Results of Experiment 2. Launch events 
enter awareness faster than pass or pseudo-launch events and pass and pseudo-launch 
events do not differ. Again, nearly all data points lie above the identity line.  
 
Reflecting back on the philosophical debate regarding the perception of causality, the 
claim from Hume (1738) that “… we are never sensible of any connexion betwixt causes and 
effects” may be true on one level, but only to the extent that our senses have no direct access 
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to any physical properties. When we sense motion, color or shape we are only ever aware of 
a perceptual inference made by our visual system (Helmholtz, Gregory, Hoffman). In this 
sense, just as we do not have to consciously infer that movement has occurred, or that an 
apple is round or red, so too this result suggests that the distinction between causal and non-
causal events is computed without a conscious inference. Michotte’s (1946) previous 
demonstrations suggested that this was the case by highlighting that systematic parametric 
variations influenced the perception of causality in a way that would not obviously be 
predicted if this perception was dependent upon a conscious inference. Participants in 
Michotte’s experiments were however fully aware of the stimuli being presented, and were 
primed to think about, and make judgements in terms of causality, thus it was always 
impossible to rule out that participants were in some way influenced to adopt a strategy that 
biased their perception, or at least their perceptual reports. In this experiment however, the 
distinction between causal and non-causal events influenced participants behavior in a way 
that could not have been shaped by a conscious bias towards one stimulus or another. Our 
results suggest that the distinction between causal and non-causal events must be inferred at 
early stages of visual processing, and that Michotte was correct in asserting that “there is 
actual perception of causality, in the same sense that there is perception of shapes, movements (il y a 
veritablement perception de la causalité, au meme titre qu’il y a perception de formes, de 
mouvements).” In sum, privileged access to awareness for causal events provides strong 
evidence for a perceptual account of causality perception, suggesting that causality, like 
shape or motion, is a basic feature of our experience of the world.  
 
METHODS 
Participants.  
We recruited 24 participants in Experiment 1 and 26 participants in Experiment 2. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and participated in return for course 
credit or a monetary compensation. Both experiments were approved by the local ethics 
committee of the KU Leuven. All participants provided written informed consent prior to the 
start of the experiment.  
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Apparatus. 
Stimuli were shown on two 19.8-in. Sony Trinitron GDM F500-R (2048 x 1536 pixels at 
60 Hz, for each) monitors driven by a DELL Precision T3400 computer with an Intel Core 
Quad CPU Q9300 2.5 GHz processor running on Windows XP. Binocular presentation was 
achieved by a custom made stereo set-up. Two CRT monitors, which stood opposite to each 
other (distance of 220 cm), projected to the left and right eye respectively via two mirrors 
placed at a distance of 110 cm from the screen. A head- and chin rest (15 cm from the 
mirrors) was used to stabilize fixation. The effective viewing distance was 125 cm. Stimulus 
presentation, timing and keyboard responses were controlled with custom software 
programmed in Python using the PsychoPy library(Peirce, 2007, 2009). The experimental set-
up was the same for both experiments.  
 
Stimuli.  
The background of the display in both eyes consisted of a random checkerboard 
pattern to achieve stable binocular fusion. The individual elements of the checkerboard were 
0.34° by 0.34°. In both eyes, a gray frame (10° by 10°) where the stimuli were presented was 
superimposed on the checkerboard pattern. A black (eye dominance measurement) or red 
(main experiment) fixation cross was continuously present during the experiment (size 0.5° 
by 0.5°). In the eye dominance measurement phase, the target consisted of an arrow 
(maximal width 4°, maximal height 2°) and the CFS mask consisted of 150 squares with 
randomly selected sizes between 1° and 2° and a random luminance value. Two gray discs 
(1° of visual angle) were used to generate the launch, pass (Experiment 1), and pseudo-
launch (Experiment 2) events. The starting position of the first disc was located at one of 8 
different positions along a virtual circle (2.5° radius) at equally spaced angles (0 – 270°, in 
steps of 45°). The starting position of the second disc was always in the center of the virtual 
circle. The center of the virtual circle was jittered on each trial (in a range of +- 0.5° 
horizontally and vertically). The discs moved at a speed of 5°/s. The first disc always 
appeared from behind a virtual occluder and the second disc would disappear behind a 
virtual occluder as the event sequence ended. After 100 ms, the event initiated again in the 
reverse order and this event loop would continue until the participant’s response. In the case 
of a launch, the first disc always stopped just before the second disc after which the second 
131 
 
disc started moving. For a pass event, the first disc stopped when it fully overlapped with 
the second disc after which the second disc started moving. The pseudo-launch event was 
modified from the sequence of the launch event. A pseudo-launch event was generated by 
shifting the starting position of the first disc upward or downward (relative to the second 
disc, orthogonal to the direction of motion of the disc) by half the size of the disc. The 
starting position of the first disc was also shifted forwards 1.5 times the size of the disc in the 
direction in which it would travel, such that during its movement it would pass next to the 
second disc, and stop just after it had passed by the side of the second disc. The second disc 
would then move in exactly the same manner in which it moves in the launch event. The CFS 
mask (8° x 8°) consisted of 104 moving squares(Moors et al., 2014) with a random luminance 
value and size (uniform range 0.2 to 2°), moving at a speed between 3°/s and 7°/s (randomly 
determined for each element using a uniform range). The mask elements would be partially 
occluded if they moved outside of the 10° x 10° frame. If they disappeared completely from 
behind one side of the frame, they would be moved behind the opposite side of the frame 
continuing on the same trajectory. 
 
Procedure.  
In the first part of the experiment, participants’ eye dominance was measured 
according to the procedure outlined by Yang et al.(E. Yang, Blake, et al., 2010). Here, on each 
trial, a CFS mask was presented to one eye while an arrow pointing either to the left or the 
right was presented to the other eye and gradually increased in contrast. Upon breakthrough 
of the arrow stimulus, the participant had to indicate its direction as quickly as possible. Eye 
dominance was then determined by comparing the mean suppression times for both eyes, 
and the eye for which the CFS mask elicited the longest mean suppression times was taken 
as the dominant eye. In all subsequent parts of the experiment, the CFS mask was presented 
to this eye.  
In the main part of the experiment, participants were presented on each trial with a 
moving CFS mask in one eye and a launch or pass event in the other eye (presented in one of 
eight directions). The discs started at  3% contrast at the beginning of the trial  and the 
contrast was increased by 3% after each iteration of the event sequence. The participants’ 
task was to indicate as quickly as possible when they perceived one or more discs that 
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became visible among the moving squares. We included catch trials in which no event was 
presented. These catch trials self-terminated after 10 seconds, upon which a new trial was 
initiated. Participants were told before the start of the experiment that trials could sometimes  
self-terminate, and that this was a characteristic of the experiment to ensure trials would not 
take too long to complete. Before starting the main experiment, participants completed a 
practice block to become acquainted with the task. 
 
Design.  
The experiment consisted of a 2 x 8 within-subjects design with the factors event type 
(launch vs. pass) and event direction (eight different, evenly spaced, directions). Participants 
completed 192 experimental trials in total. 48 catch trials were included. All conditions were 
randomized across trials. The practice block consisted of 16 trials. 
 
Data-analysis. 
All participants that responded on more than 10% of catch trials were removed from 
the data (Experiment 1: n = 2; Experiment 2: n = 5). Furthermore, because we wanted to 
analyze suppression times that were recorded after the first appearance of an event (which 
was after 500 ms), we excluded all trials in which the suppression time was shorter than 1 
second. This ranged from deleting no trials to 38% of trials (Experiment 1: M = 7.6, SD = 12; 
Experiment 2: M = 6.5, SD = 10.5). Please note that including these trials, or including the 
participants that did not perform well on the catch trials, does not change the outcome of the 
analyses. Suppression times were logarithmically transformed due to their positive 
skewness, before subjecting them to any analysis. All analyses were conducted in R 3.2.0, a 
statistical programming language (R Core Team, 2014). All statistical tests were performed in 
the Bayesian framework relying on model selection through Bayes Factors, using the R 
BayesFactor package (version 0.9.11-1; Morey & Rouder, 2015). The Bayes Factor quantifies 
the relative degree of evidence of one statistical model versus another and therefore provides 
an intuitive measure to quantify the degree of belief in one statistical model over another 
(e.g., a model with and without a main effect of event type). All fitted models were ANOVA 
style models including random intercepts for participants, and the default settings for the 
priors (medium prior scale for fixed effects and nuisance prior scale for the participant 
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effect). As a guideline to interpret the resulting Bayes Factors, we use the classification 
proposed by Jeffreys (1961) in that Bayes Factors from 3 onwards constitute substantial 
evidence for one model over the other. All reported Bayes Factors can be interpreted as how 
much less likely a model is compared to the best fitting model. 
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Chapter 7.  
Motion coherence, not body inversion affects the entry 
of point-light walkers into visual awareness during 
continuous flash suppression 
 
In order to learn more about which kinds of perceptual processing are possible when stimuli 
are not consciously perceived, we investigated breakthrough times of  a configural biological 
motion stimulus with continuous flash suppression (CFS). That is, we asked whether 
inverting a biological motion stimulus would differentially affect the time it takes to enter 
visual awareness. This question was motivated by the consistent finding of inversion effects 
for static face and body stimuli. Moreover, similar neural regions are active during face and 
body perception and the perception of biological motion. However, our results revealed no 
effect of stimulus inversion on breakthrough times, although motion coherence of the point-
light figures did affect suppression times such that scrambled point-light figures broke 
suppression slower than coherent ones. These results indicate that a limited form of 
spatiotemporal integration can take place during CFS, yet that this integration does not profit 
from the properties that are specific to the higher-level meaningful Gestalts of the point-light 
figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moors, P., Wagemans, J., & van de Cruys, S. (under review). Motion coherence, not body inversion 
affects the entry of point-light walkers into visual awareness during continuous flash suppression. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The extent to which perceptual stimuli are processed automatically and without 
awareness is a topic of enduring interest in cognitive science (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). 
For example, can local elements be grouped into a coherent form without being consciously 
perceived (Schwarzkopf & Rees, 2015)? If so, does this extend to global objects with salient 
meanings? Might unconscious processing even be selectively sensitive to some object 
categories, as sometimes suggested, for example based on their familiarity or behavioral 
relevance (e.g., faces)? In our current contribution to these issues, we used a biological 
motion stimulus, an easily manipulable, dynamic and meaningful configuration that relies 
on local and global integration of multiple elements across time and space. 
As our method for rendering visual stimuli invisible (Kim & Blake, 2005), we used 
continuous flash suppression (CFS), in which a dynamic flashing pattern consisting of 
shapes of various colors is presented to one of the observer’s eyes while a static stimulus is 
presented to the other (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). The flashing pattern renders the static 
stimulus invisible to the observer in the order of several seconds, enabling the researcher to 
study the extent to which the suppressed stimulus is still processed. One of the ways in 
which CFS has often been implemented is by measuring the time it takes for the suppressed 
stimulus to become visible to the observer (referred to as the breaking CFS paradigm; b-CFS). 
The reasoning behind this paradigm is that stronger stimuli will break suppression faster, 
suggesting privileged processing during interocular suppression. The use of b-CFS has 
generated a rich literature on the degree to which various stimuli break suppression 
differentially (for an overview, see http://gestaltrevision.be/s/cfs). 
One of the most consistent findings that has been obtained using the b-CFS paradigm 
is that upright faces break suppression faster than inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, 
Hebart, et al., 2011). The effect resembles the well-known face inversion effect (FIE) for fully 
visible face stimuli (Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995; Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005), even though 
this concerns discrimination performance rather than mere detection. The fact that a FIE can 
be obtained in b-CFS suggests that mechanisms related to face processing might still be 
preserved during interocular suppression. This is supported by some neuroimaging studies 
showing that differential BOLD activity can be observed for perceptually suppressed face 
stimuli, varying in their emotional expression (Jia
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voxel pattern analysis, Sterzer, Haynes, and Rees (2008) showed that it is possible to decode 
from the fusiform face area whether a perceptually suppressed face or house stimulus had 
been presented. 
A recent study by Stein, Sterzer, and Peelen (2012) showed that not only faces but also 
whole bodies show an inversion effect. That is, headless bodies, human silhouettes, and 
variable body postures all consistently showed inversion effects in breaking suppression, yet 
this was not the case for inanimate objects. From this, Stein et al. concluded that the 
processes that mediate the time it takes for stimuli to break suppression are particularly 
sensitive to conspecifics (bodies and faces of other animals showed considerably less 
inversion effects). Again, the inversion effect observed for body postures in general 
resembles the body inversion effect (BIE; Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003) that is 
observed for consciously visible body stimuli (again concerning improved discrimination for 
upright bodies). Interestingly, this BIE seems mediated by face-selective, rather than body-
selective, brain regions (Brandman & Yovel, 2010), suggesting both BIE and FIE rely on 
(partly) similar mechanisms. 
The effortlessness with which human observers can recognize their conspecifics’ 
behavior even in the case of impoverished perceptual input is clearly exemplified by point-
light figures (Johansson, 1973). These stimuli are generated by placing dots on the joints of a 
human body. When statically presented, this stimulus is perceived as a meaningless group of 
dots, but once set in motion, human observers swiftly organize the dots into a meaningful 
whole and perceive a conspecific performing a certain action (hence, biological motion) 
rather than a set of  independently moving dots. A substantial amount of research has 
addressed the extent to which intentions, emotions, gender, etc. can be derived from point-
light figures (e.g., Blake & Shiffrar, 2007; Pollick, Lestou, Ryu, & Cho, 2002). Moreover, it has 
been shown that the detection of biological motion develops early in life (Simion, Regolin, & 
Bulf, 2008) and is robust against noise in the input (Neri, Morrone, & Burr, 1998).  
As is the case for face and body stimuli, inversion of the point-light figure impairs the 
perception of biological motion, across experimental tasks (Bertenthal & Pinto, 1994; Pavlova 
& Sokolov, 2000). Similar to the FIE, the BIE in biological motion has been attributed to high-
level configural processing (which seems greatly diminished by inversion), although the 
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local motion profile in the feet region also plays a role (Chang & Troje, 2009; Troje & 
Westhoff, 2006).  
Combining the evidence for privileged processing of faces and bodies in b-CFS with 
the shared mechanisms through which faces and bodies and biological motion stimuli are 
being processed, raises the question whether it would also be possible to observe a body 
inversion effect for perceptually suppressed biological motion stimuli. This would indicate 
that the separate collection of dots can be integrated into a meaningful whole during 
interocular suppression, which can subsequently bias the interocular competition process to 
facilitate access to awareness for biological motion stimuli. In addition, to ensure that we 
could show that motion information was indeed extracted during interocular suppression, 
we manipulated motion coherence (coherent vs. scrambled) of the point-light figure.  Indeed, 
previous studies have shown that coherently moving stimuli break suppression faster than 
randomly moving stimuli (Chung & Khuu, 2014; L. Kaunitz et al., 2013). 
If the dots comprising the biological motion stimulus indeed are integrated during 
interocular suppression, we predicted to observe a body inversion effect for the coherent 
condition, yet none for the scrambled condition. Furthermore, based on the observations of 
Kaunitz et al. (2013) and Chung and Khuu (2014), we expected that scrambled stimuli would 
break suppression more slowly than coherently moving stimuli.  
 
METHODS 
Participants 
17 people participated in the experiment for a monetary compensation. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve with respect to the 
purposes of the experiment. Every participants signed an informed consent before the start 
of the experiment. The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee of the faculty. 
 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were shown on two 19.8-in. Sony Trinitron GDM F500-R (2048 x 1536 pixels at 
60 Hz, for each) monitors driven by a DELL Precision T3400 computer with an Intel Core 
Quad CPU Q9300 2.5 GHz processor running on Windows XP. Binocular presentation was 
achieved by a custom made stereo set-up. Two CRT monitors, which stood opposite to each 
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other (distance of 220 cm), projected to the left and right eye respectively via two mirrors 
placed at a distance of 110 cm from the screen. A head- and chin rest (15 cm from the 
mirrors) was used to stabilize fixation. The effective viewing distance was 125 cm. Stimulus 
presentation, timing and keyboard responses were controlled with custom software 
programmed in Python using the PsychoPy library (Peirce, 2007, 2009). 
 
Stimuli  
A random checkerboard pattern consisting of white and black square elements (0.34° 
x 0.34°) was used as a background and presented to both eyes to achieve stable binocular 
fusion. A gray square frame was superimposed on the checkerboard pattern to present all 
stimuli (10° x 10°). A white fixation cross was continuously present throughout the 
experiment (0.5 ° x 0.5°). In the eye dominance phase, an arrow was used as a target stimulus 
(maximal width 4°, maximal height 2°) and the CFS mask consisted of 150 squares with 
randomly picked sizes between 1° and 2° and a random grayscale value.  
The point-light walker stimuli were adapted from previous studies (Schouten & 
Verfaillie, 2010; Van de Cruys, Schouten, & Wagemans, 2013). 15 small white dots (size 0.2°) 
were placed on coordinates from (Troje, 2002) (size 2°). The point-light walker moved at a 
speed of 2°/s. Scrambled versions of the walkers were generated by simultaneously phase 
and position scrambling. Phase scrambling was achieved by taking a random starting 
location for each element trajectory. Position scrambling was achieved by randomly 
displacing the position of each dot between 0 and 1 standard deviation up/downwards and 
left/rightwards from the original x- and y-coordinates. Because feature similarity between 
mask and stimulus has been shown to be important for effective suppression (Hong & Blake, 
2009; Maehara et al., 2009; P. Moors et al., 2014; E. Yang & Blake, 2012), the CFS mask 
consisted of 400 grayscale discs with varying sizes between 0.2° and 1.2°. In both phases of 
the experiment, the rate at which the CFS mask refreshed its contents was set at 10 Hz.  
 
Procedure  
First, eye dominance was measured using the procedure of Yang, Blake, and 
McDonald (2010). On every trial, a fixation cross was presented for 1 second. Next, an arrow 
was presented in one eye and the CFS mask in the other. Participants had to indicate the 
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direction of an arrow as soon as it broke through the CFS mask by pressing “1” (for left) or 
“3” (for right) on a numerical keyboard. The CFS mask was randomly presented to the left or 
right eye (40 trials per eye) and after 80 trials eye dominance was determined as the eye in 
which the mean suppression time of the arrow was lowest. In all subsequent parts of the 
experiment, the CFS mask was presented to the participant's dominant eye. 
In the main part of the experiment, participants were presented on each trial with a 
(biological) motion stimulus located either to the left or right of the fixation cross. The 
contrast of the motion stimulus increased linearly from 0 to 30% over 4.25 seconds and 
remained fixed at 30% until the participant's response. Upon breakthrough of the stimulus, 
participants had to indicate the stimulus location (left/right) as quickly as possible by means 
of a button press. Every trial started with a 1 second fixation period after which the motion 
stimulus was presented to the non-dominant eye and the CFS mask to the dominant eye. 
Participants first completed a practice block to get acquainted with the task before they 
started the main part of the experiment.  
 
Design  
The experiment consisted of a 2x2 full-factorial within-subjects design with stimulus 
inversion (upright vs. inverted) and stimulus scrambling (coherent vs. scrambled) being the 
factors manipulated. Every condition was tested 80 times, resulting in 320 trials in total. All 
conditions were presented in a fully random order. Participants could take a break after 
every fourth of the trials was completed. Before starting the main experiment, participants 
completed 8 practice trials. 
 
RESULTS 
Suppression times were log transformed due to their positive skew and only correct 
responses were included in the analysis. Outliers were defined as being higher than the 
mean plus three times the standard deviation of the suppression times and these were also 
removed from the data set (for each observer separately). This resulted in the removal of 
2.5% of the data in total. The mean suppression times for each condition are depicted in 
Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1. (left) Mean suppression times for all different conditions. Error bars denote 95% 
within-subject confidence intervals according to Morey (2008). (right) Motion coherence 
effect for each observer. Connected dots refer to the same participant. 
 
All statistical analyses were performed in a Bayesian framework relying on a model 
selection approach through Bayes Factors. The Bayes Factor quantifies the relative degree of 
evidence of one statistical model over another and therefore provides an intuitive measure to 
quantify the degree of belief in one statistical model over another (e.g., a model with and 
without a main effect of stimulus type). The R package BayesFactor (version 0.9.9) was used 
to compute the Bayes Factors (Morey & Rouder, 2015). All considered models were ANOVA-
style models including random intercepts for participants, and the default settings for the 
priors (medium prior scale for fixed effects and nuisance prior scale for the participant 
effect). As a guideline to interpret the resulting Bayes Factors, we use the classification 
proposed by Jeffreys (1961) in that Bayes Factors from 3 onwards constitute substantial 
evidence for one model over the other. All reported Bayes Factors can be interpreted as how 
much more likely the best fitting model is relative to the model under consideration. For 
example, a Bayes Factor of 3 can be interpreted as the best model being three times more 
likely than the model under consideration. The results of the Bayes Factor analysis are 
summarized in Table 7.1. As is apparent from this analysis, the model with only a main effect 
of scrambling was preferred strongly over a model with no effects or with both main effects 
of scrambling and stimulus inversion.  
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Table 7.1. Bayes Factor analysis. 
Model Bayes Factor 
Scrambling 1 
No effect 12.7 
Scrambling + Inversion 28.7 
All other models > 100 
Note. All Bayes Factors can be interpreted relative to the best fitting model (for which the 
Bayes Factor is 1). Bayes Factors > 1 can be interpreted as being that many times less likely as 
the best fitting model. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The goal of this study was to assess whether perceptually suppressed moving point-
light figures would break CFS differentially when they were presented upright or inverted. 
This question was motivated by the fact that face and body inversion effects have been 
observed in a b-CFS context before, yet relying on static rather than dynamic stimuli. 
Furthermore, studies have shown that processing of biological motion stimuli and face and 
body stimuli share similar neural regions. Privileged access to awareness for upright rather 
than inverted point-light figures could thus indicate that the separate elements are integrated 
into a global, coherent whole during perceptual suppression. Our data reveal that, contrary 
to what is reported for static faces and bodies, inverted moving point-light figures do not 
break CFS any later than upright ones. What does impact suppression times, according to 
our findings and in line with the observations of Kaunitz et al. (2013) and Chung and Khuu 
(2014), is spatiotemporal coherence, since phase- and position-scrambled point-light walkers 
were, on average, slower to break suppression. The latter finding indicates that motion 
information indeed was extracted during interocular suppression.  
These findings show that the inversion effect for static (grayscale) images of bodies as 
reported by Stein et al. (2012) does not generalize to dynamic, point-light figures. 
Importantly, this is also contrary to the (static) face inversion effect, one of the most robust 
findings in the b-CFS literature (Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). There are at least 
two ways to interpret this. The first is to question the power of inversion in eliminating all 
the characteristic configural biological motion perception. This implies that the difference 
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between inverted and upright is smaller than usually assumed. Indeed, while the 
interpretation of biological motion is greatly diminished by inversion, the superior temporal 
sulcus, one of the key brain regions responsive to biological motion, is still activated by 
inverted point-light figures similarly to intact figures and more than for scrambled figures 
(Grossman & Blake, 2001; Thompson, Clarke, Stewart, & Puce, 2005). However, virtually any 
behavioral task performed on point light figures shows clear inversion effects, so it is 
reasonable to assume this to be the case under CFS as well. 
The second interpretation has to do with the type of processing that is possible under 
CFS. Apparently, although global motion coherence was extracted, the single elements of the 
point-light figure were not integrated such that they were represented as a meaningful, 
coherent whole. The precise mechanisms responsible for biological motion perception are 
still to be elucidated, but multiple studies suggest that both bottom-up and top-down 
processing is required (reviewed in Blake & Shiffrar, 2007). The lower level spatiotemporal 
integration may be similar to other cases of structure-from-motion, but at later stages this 
will be guided by top-down constraints (priors) of biological body and movement structure. 
Evidence for such an interplay between these processes comes from a study by Neri (2009) 
who suggests that bottom-up local moving elements are first grouped to form separate 
limbs, which are subsequently integrated to the whole Gestalt of a moving agent. Two other 
indications that top-down influences are important in biological motion perception can be 
found in the literature. Firstly, psychophysical studies find that local motion perception is 
affected by being embedded in a global (biological) form (Chatterjee, Freyd, & Shiffrar, 1996; 
Tadin, Lappin, Blake, & Grossman, 2002). A second indication comes from a set of 
neuroimaging studies reporting that activity in brain regions sensitive to motion (MT/V5) is 
also modulated by a global biological form (e.g., Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Peuskens, 
Vanrie, Verfaillie, & Orban, 2005). 
In the light of these findings, inversion may not matter under CFS, because the 
second, higher-level and possibly top-down driven phase is precluded by CFS. Indeed, 
neuroimaging studies have mostly indicated that neural activity related to the suppressed 
stimulus is mainly restricted to early visual areas (Hesselmann & Malach, 2011; Sterzer, 
Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, & Hesselmann, 2014). Related to this, the current results are 
consistent with a recent series of behavioral studies that have called into question whether 
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high-level processing of a perceptually suppressed stimulus is at all possible (Hedger et al., 
2015a; Hesselmann & Knops, 2014; Hesselmann & Moors, 2015; Heyman & Moors, 2014; P. 
Moors, Huygelier, et al., 2015; P. Moors, Wagemans, van Ee, & de-Wit, 2015). On a 
speculative note, this could imply that the inversion effects previously observed for faces and 
bodies might be driven more by a lower-level bottom up mechanism rather than genuine 
face- and/or body-specific processing mechanisms. 
While suppression may interfere with the second, higher-level top-down type of 
processing underlying the perception of biological motion, we did find evidence that the first 
component, which is not specific to biological motion, is still possible under CFS. 
Specifically, scrambled figures that lack spatial and temporal coherence are slower to break 
through than intact figures (upright or inverted). Hence, at least for local ranges, the 
spatiotemporal coherence of invisible stimuli is processed. This idea is supported by  recent 
studies of Kaunitz et al. (2013) and Chung and Khuu (2014), who have found that coherently 
moving dots are better detected under CFS than randomly moving dots. Thus, it seems to be 
the case that, during CFS, a limited form of spatiotemporal integration takes place yielding 
facilitated access to awareness for spatiotemporally coherent stimuli. However, this does not 
seem involve higher-level, meaningful Gestalts such as point-light figures. Following up on 
this, two points deserve some discussion. First, it is interesting to note that Kaunitz et al. 
(2013) also included a biological motion stimulus in their experiments and failed to observe a 
scrambling effect. However, their implementation of scrambling the walkers also involved 
rotating the individual elements, which might imply that their scrambling resembles our 
inversion manipulation more than our scrambling manipulation. Furthermore, our sample 
size was about twice as big as in the study of Kaunitz et al. (2013), increasing our statistical 
power to detect an effect of motion coherence in biological motion stimuli. Second, a recent 
study by Faivre and Koch (2014) reported evidence that observers could adapt to the gender 
of invisible point-light walkers, which seems to suggest that the point-light walkers were 
fully integrated during CFS. However, the results also showed that kinematic rather than 
structural cues mainly contributed to the adaptation effect. Therefore, these results could 
also be interpreted in the sense that observers, during CFS, adapt to local parts of the motion 
stimulus, rather than adapting to the global, structured, whole stimulus. 
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One could ask whether the absence of an inversion effect has any implications for the 
often assumed selective “exquisite sensitivity” of humans to biological motion stimuli 
(Pavlova, 2012). Here, it should be noted that this very idea has been questioned before in 
other contexts. For example, when visibility of point-light figures is reduced by a noise mask 
(instead of suppressed as in CFS), Hiris (2007) demonstrated that people can detect biological 
motion just as well as non-biological motion, where the latter consisted of translating or 
rotating dot structures without biological form (e.g., rectangles). Related to this, Jastorff, 
Kourtzi, and Giese (2006) showed that complex movement patterns that are not based on 
biological, familiar shapes, can be learned just as quickly as biological motion stimuli, and 
the former also resulted in a strong orientation dependence (inversion effect) in 
discrimination performance. The authors suggest that top-down guidance in perception may 
emerge quickly as long as there is an articulated “skeleton” underlying complex movements. 
Together these studies suggest that the detection nor the inversion effect of biological motion 
stimuli is special. However, this does not do away with the inferential richness of these 
stimuli, i.e the fact that we readily attribute gender, intentions, emotions, etc. to these figures, 
once detected (which may sometimes be confused with detection sensitivity per se). 
However, it does urge us to devise better control stimuli to examine the contributions of 
bottom-up and top-down processing, of local integration and (learned) priors concerning 
global form. In this respect, although little is known about the precise mechanisms of CFS, 
we would argue that the dissociation we report here shows that it is fruitful to apply CFS to 
complex, multi-level, but well-controlled stimuli such as point-light figures to probe different 
stages or types of processing.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, we found that spatiotemporal coherence of point-light figures can 
facilitate access to awareness during CFS, because when point-lights are spatially scrambled 
and out of phase with each other, they take longer to break through. Consistent with 
previous studies, this means that there are limits to configural processing under CFS, even 
for what are usually described as biologically relevant stimuli. Contrary to what is 
consistently found for faces, our biological motion stimuli did not show an inversion effect 
under suppression. This implies that the characteristic biological motion processing is 
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hindered under suppression, possibly because it requires higher and/or top-down processing 
that is prevented by CFS. 
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Chapter 8.  
Faces in commonly experienced configurations enter 
awareness faster due to their curvature relative to 
fixation. 
 
The extent to which perceptually suppressed face stimuli are still processed has been 
extensively studied using the continuous flash suppression paradigm (CFS). Studies that rely 
on breaking CFS (b-CFS), in which the time it takes for an initially suppressed stimulus to 
become detectable is measured, have provided evidence for relatively complex processing of 
invisible face stimuli. In contrast, adaptation and neuroimaging studies have shown that 
perceptually suppressed faces are only processed for a limited set of features, such as its 
general shape. In this study, we asked whether perceptually suppressed face stimuli 
presented in their commonly experienced configuration would break suppression faster than 
when presented in an uncommonly experienced configuration. This study was motivated by 
a recent neuroimaging study showing that commonly experienced face configurations are 
more strongly represented in the fusiform face area. Our findings revealed that faces 
presented in commonly experienced configurations indeed broke suppression faster, yet this 
effect did not interact with face inversion suggesting that, in a b-CFS context, perceptually 
suppressed faces are potentially not processed by specialized (high-level) face processing 
mechanisms. Rather, our pattern of results is consistent with an interpretation based on the 
processing of more basic visual properties such as convexity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moors, P., Wagemans, J., de-Wit, L. (2016). Faces in commonly experienced configurations enter 
awareness faster due to their curvature relative to fixation. PeerJ, 4:e1565. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The extent to which invisible stimuli are still processed has become a popular line of 
research over the last decades (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Hesselmann & Moors, 2015). One 
particularly compelling paradigm to render visual stimuli invisible is continuous flash 
suppression (CFS) (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). In CFS, a salient dynamic pattern composed of 
various colored shapes is presented to one eye while another stimulus is presented to the 
other eye. Due to the dynamic nature of the mask, the other stimulus is perceptually 
suppressed and invisible to observers for a time period on the order of seconds. CFS has 
been implemented in various ways to study processing of perceptually suppressed stimuli, 
one being the breaking CFS paradigm (b-CFS) (Gayet et al., 2014; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). 
Here, the contrast of the initially suppressed stimulus is gradually increased until it causes a 
perceptual breakthrough (i.e., becomes detectable to the observer). The breakthrough or 
suppression time is then used as an index of the strength of the representation of that visual 
stimulus during suppression. That is, as in regular binocular rivalry, ‘stimulus strength’ is 
predicted to influence suppression durations such that stronger stimulus representations 
break CFS faster than weaker stimuli (Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011). Here, it 
should be noted however that ‘stimulus strength’ is not a well-defined construct and that 
there is some debate as to which factors contribute exactly to differences in suppression 
times. That is, the factors driving breakthroughs could be low-level or high-level (Gayet, Van 
Der Stigchel & Paffen, 2014; Hesselmann & Moors, 2015), or involve the feature overlap 
between the CFS mask and the suppressed stimulus (P. Moors et al., 2014; E. Yang & Blake, 
2012).  
A number of studies have considered the degree to which face stimuli are still 
processed while perceptually suppressed and have used the b-CFS paradigm, amongst 
others, to tackle this question (for a review of unconscious face processing, not limited to CFS 
studies only, see Axelrod, Bar & Rees, 2015). A now-classic study by Jiang, Costello and He 
(2007) showed that upright face stimuli broke suppression faster than inverted face stimuli, 
resembling the well-known face inversion effect for consciously presented stimuli (Farah et 
al., 1995; Yin, 1969). Following this study, several b-CFS studies have replicated this face 
inversion effect (Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, Rogers, et al., 2013; Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, 
Hughes, & Cipolli, 2013; Heyman & Moors, 2014; Stein, End, & Sterzer, 2014; Stein, Hebart, et 
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al., 2011; Stein, Peelen, et al., 2011; Stein & Sterzer, 2012; Stein, Sterzer, et al., 2012; G. Zhou, 
Zhang, Liu, Yang, & Qu, 2010). Other studies have furthermore indicated that stimulus-
related factors such as eye gaze (Chen & Yeh, 2012; Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, Hughes, et al., 
2013; Stein, Senju, Peelen, & Sterzer, 2011; Xu et al., 2011), facial expression (Capitão et al., 
2014; Stein & Sterzer, 2012; Sterzer, Hilgenfeldt, Freudenberg, Bermpohl, & Adli, 2011; E. 
Yang et al., 2007), face identity (Geng, Zhang, Li, Tao, & Xu, 2012; Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, 
Rogers, et al., 2013), face race (Stein, End, et al., 2014), or the trustworthiness or dominance of 
a face (Stewart et al., 2012) can influence suppression times. Taken together, these findings 
seem to suggest that, while perceptually suppressed, the representation of a face stimulus is 
a fairly integrated one involving the high-level analysis of several complex features. 
In apparent contrast with these b-CFS findings, a more complicated pattern of results 
has arisen from studies that rely on adaptation to invisible face stimuli or investigate the 
representation of invisible face stimuli using neuroimaging techniques. For example, 
adaptation studies have indicated that visual awareness of a face is required for adaptation 
to complex features such as facial expression (E. Yang, Hong, et al., 2010), face race or gender 
(Amihai, Deouell & Bentin, 2011), face identity (Moradi et al., 2005), face shape (Stein & 
Sterzer, 2011), or eye gaze (Stein, Peelen, et al., 2012). The main conclusion of these studies is 
that adaptation effects for invisible stimuli are sometimes observed, but they are largely 
specific to the adapted eye and size of the stimulus. For example, Stein and Sterzer (2011) 
observed face shape aftereffects for fully invisible stimuli, yet these aftereffects were only 
observed if the test stimulus had the same size as the adaptor and was also presented to the 
same eye as the adaptor. This suggests that the adaptation occurred at a low level of 
processing, and was specific to simple features such as its exact size and shape. Similarly, 
neuroimaging studies have shown that neural responses to invisible face stimuli are strongly 
reduced in the fusiform face area (Jiang & He, 2006; Sterzer et al., 2014), although the pattern 
of activation still enables the successful decoding of certain stimulus distinctions (Sterzer, 
Haynes & Rees, 2008; Sterzer, Jalkanen & Rees, 2009).  
Taken together, behavioral studies relying on adaptation and neuroimaging studies 
call into question whether the results obtained using the b-CFS paradigm are genuinely 
attributable to high-level configural processing of the invisible face. Rather, they suggest that 
the representation of the perceptually suppressed face is limited to lower-level aspects such 
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as its general shape. Therefore, in this study, we were interested to further study the 
representation of a perceptually suppressed face in a b-CFS context, capitalizing on the 
findings of a recent neuroimaging study. That is, Chan et al. (2010) recently showed that 
representations of body parts and faces were strongest in the extrastriate body area and 
fusiform face area, respectively, when they were presented in their commonly experienced 
configuration (e.g., the left side of a face presented in the right visual field). This result is 
intriguing since all conditions simply involved presenting the same stimulus (e.g., right or 
left side of a face) to a different side of the visual field. Thus, if stimulus strength influences 
suppression time, we would predict that perceptually suppressed face stimuli presented in 
their commonly experienced configuration would break suppression faster compared to 
those presented in the other part of the visual field. Moreover, given that the effect for the 
face stimuli seems to be specific to the fusiform face area, the presence of such an effect in a 
b-CFS setup could be indicative of the extent to which invisible face stimuli are processed 
during suppression. To this end, we also included a face inversion condition. That is, if a 
congruency effect is observed, this inversion condition will enable us to test whether this 
effect is dependent on specialized processing for upright faces. 
 
METHODS 
Participants 
43 people participated in the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were naïve with respect to the purposes of the study. The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee of the faculty (the Social and Societal Ethics 
Committee of the KU Leuven (SMEC) under the approval number G-2014 08 033). All 
participants provided written informed consent before the start of the experiment. 
 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were shown on two 19.8-in. Sony Trinitron GDM F500-R (2048 x 1536 pixels at 
60 Hz, for each) monitors driven by a DELL Precision T3400 computer with an Intel Core 
Quad CPU Q9300 2.5 GHz processor running on Windows XP. Binocular presentation was 
achieved by a custom made stereo set-up. Two CRT monitors, which stood opposite to each 
other (distance of 220 cm), projected to the left and right eye respectively via two mirrors 
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placed at a distance of 110 cm from the screen. A head- and chin rest (15 cm from the 
mirrors) was used to stabilize fixation. The effective viewing distance was 125 cm. Stimulus 
presentation, timing and keyboard responses were controlled with custom software 
programmed in Python using the PsychoPy library (Peirce, 2007, 2009). 
 
Stimuli 
The background of the display consisted of a random checkerboard pattern to achieve 
stable binocular fusion. The size of the individual elements of the checkerboard was equal to 
0.34°. In both eyes, a black frame (10° by 10°) was superimposed on the checkerboard 
pattern, onto which the stimuli would be presented. A black (eye dominance measurement) 
or white (main experiment) fixation cross was continuously present during the experiment 
(size 0.5 by 0.5°). In the eye dominance measurement phase, the target consisted of an arrow 
(maximal width 4°, maximal height 2°) and the CFS mask consisted of 150 squares with  
randomly picked sizes between 1 and 2° and a random luminance value (range: 1 – 100 
cd/m²). 
We obtained the stimuli used in the original study of Chan et al. (2010) and used a 
subset of those in this study (see Figure 8.1A). That is, we only used the face configurations 
of their stimulus set, which consisted of four different half-face exemplars (size 3° of visual 
angle). For the specific details of the stimulus generation procedure, we refer to the original 
study. In the main experiment, the CFS mask (6° x 6°) consisted of 200 grayscale squares with 
a random size between 0.75° and 1.5°. In all parts of the experiments, the CFS mask refreshed 
its contents every 100 ms (i.e., at 10Hz).  
 
Procedure 
In the first part of the experiment, observers performed an eye dominance task 
according to the procedure outlined by Yang, Blake and McDonald (2010). That is, on each 
trial, the CFS mask was presented to one of the observer’s eyes and an arrow stimulus to the 
other eye. The arrow stimulus gradually increased from 0% to 100% contrast over a period of 
2 seconds after which it remained present at full contrast. Upon breakthrough of the arrow 
stimulus, participants had to indicate as quickly as possible whether the arrow was pointing 
to the left or right. Participants performed this task for 80 trials in total (40 trials per eye). The 
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dominant eye was determined by taking the eye for which the mean suppression was the 
lowest. In all subsequent phases of the experiment, the CFS mask was always presented to 
the dominant eye. 
In the main part of the experiment each trial consisted of a 1 second fixation phase 
after which the CFS mask was presented to the dominant eye and the face stimulus to the 
non-dominant eye (Figure 8.1B). The face stimulus gradually increased from 0% to 100% 
contrast in a period of 1 second after which it remained on screen at full contrast until the 
participants’ response. Upon breakthrough, participants had to indicate as quickly as 
possible whether the face stimulus was presented to the left or right of fixation by means of a 
button press. Prior to the start of the main experiment, participants first completed a practice 
block to become acquainted with the task. 
 
Design 
The experiment consisted of a 2 x 2 x 2 full-factorial within-subjects design. Each 
stimulus (left or right side of a face) was presented in the left or right visual field in an 
upright or inverted fashion. Participants completed a total of 96 trials. The practice block 
consisted of 8 trials. 
 
Data analysis  
All analyses were performed in R, a statistical programming language (R Core Team, 
2014). All statistical analyses were performed in a Bayesian framework, relying on model 
selection through Bayes Factors (Rouder et al., 2009, 2012). In Bayesian statistics, statistical 
inference is performed by relying on Bayes’ rule:  
 
| = |  
 
where  refers to a vector of parameters (e.g., the effect parameters of an ANOVA 
model) and  to the data under consideration. In Bayes’ rule, the prior probability 
distribution, , is then updated by the likelihood | to yield the posterior probability 
distribution, |. In the Bayes Factor approach, the focus is on the marginal likelihood, 
:  
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 
The Bayes factor then refers to the ratio of marginal likelihoods of different statistical 
models under consideration (e.g., a model with main effects of congruency and inversion 
versus a model with only a main effect of congruency), quantifying the change from prior to 
posterior model odds: 
 
|
| = 	

	
|
| 
where  
 
 = || = 	
 |

 |

 
In itself, the Bayes Factor can be interpreted as a relative measure of evidence for one 
statistical model compared to another (e.g., a model with two main effects versus a model 
with two main effects and their interaction). That is, the value of the Bayes Factor has no 
absolute meaning, and should always be interpreted relative to the statistical models under 
consideration.  
All Bayes Factors were computed using the R package BayesFactor version 0.9.11-1 
(Morey & Rouder, 2015) using all default settings. The statistical models for which Bayes 
Factors were computed are akin to classical repeated measures ANOVA models, yet 
including random intercepts for both subject as well as stimulus (given that we used 
different face exemplars in our experiment, also known as a crossed random effects model: 
see Clark, 1973; Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008). Rouder et al. (2012) developed a default 
class of Bayes Factors for ANOVA designs and described the prior distributions used for 
calculating these Bayes Factors in detail. In short, normal distributions are used as priors for 
the fixed and random effects. These have a prior mean of zero, and an independent variance 
(width) for each of these effects, based on so-called g-priors developed by Zellner and Siow 
(1980). The settings that can be adjusted in the BayesFactor package relate to the width of the 
prior distributions on the fixed and random effects (quantified by the scaling factor r). For 
the fixed effects we used the “wide” setting (r = 0.5) whereas for the random effects the 
“nuisance” option was used (r = 1). Following the classification proposed by Jeffreys (1961), 
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Bayes Factors > 3 are considered to be convincing evidence for one model compared to 
another. In this paper, all Bayes Factors quantify how much more likely the best fitting 
model is compared to another model. That is, the best fitting model is always put in the 
numerator, whereas the other models under consideration are put in the denominator of the 
Bayes Factor equation. 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Stimuli and procedure. (A) Four different configurations for one face exemplar. 
Each configuration was presented either to the left or right side of the fixation cross. 
Presenting the top left stimulus to the right side of fixation would constitute an upright, 
congruent stimulus. (B) Trial sequence used in the experiment. Each trial started with a 
fixation period of 1 second after which the face stimulus was presented to the non-dominant 
eye and the CFS mask to the dominant eye. The face stimulus gradually increased in contrast 
and remained present at 100% contrast until the participants’ response.  
 
RESULTS 
Before subjecting the data to any analysis, suppression times were first log 
transformed to account for their positive skew. Only correct responses were considered. 
Outliers were defined as suppression times that deviated more than three standard 
deviations from the mean suppression time (for each observer separately) and these were 
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also excluded from the analysis. This led to a removal of 5.5% of the data. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the data, we converted the factors visual field and stimulus side to a single 
variable termed ‘congruency’. A congruent stimulus would be one that constitutes a 
commonly experienced configuration (e.g., right side of the face in the left visual field, 
assuming fixation in the center). For inverted stimuli, we applied the same transformation 
such that congruent stimuli would be the ones for which the overall configuration would be 
the same (e.g., an inverted left side of the face would now have to be presented in the left 
side of the visual field to be coded as congruent). Table 8.1 depicts the results of the Bayes 
Factor analysis. The betting fitting model (BF = 1) is one that includes a main effect of 
congruency and a main effect of inversion. This model is preferred 5.2 times over a model 
including also the interaction between the main effects. Furthermore, a model including only 
a main effect of inversion and no congruency effect is 3.6 times less likely than the best fitting 
model. For all other models (e.g., a model with a main effect of congruency only), the best 
fitting model was more than 100 more likely (i.e., BFs > 100). The mean suppression times for 
all combinations of congruency and face inversion are depicted in Figure 8.2. In line with the 
Bayes Factor analysis, inverted faces yielded longer suppression times than upright faces 
(the well-known face inversion effect). Furthermore, face stimuli presented in congruent 
configurations broke suppression faster than the incongruent ones, yet this main effect did 
was not modulated by stimulus inversion.  
 
Table 8.1. Bayes Factor analysis. 
Model Bayes Factor 
Congruency + Inversion  1 
Inversion  3.6 
Congruency * Inversion  5.2 
All other models > 100 
Note. All Bayes Factors can be interpreted relative to the best fitting model (for which the 
Bayes Factor equals 1). A + indicates that only main effects are included in the model. A * 
denotes both main effects and the interaction between the conditions. 
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Figure 8.2. Mean suppression times for all conditions. Error bars denote 95% within-subject 
confidence intervals as described by (Morey, 2008).  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study was to assess whether face stimuli presented in their commonly 
experienced configurations would break suppression faster than the same stimuli presented 
in other configurations. Our results indicated that this indeed was the case, yet the effect was 
not specific for upright face stimuli. That is, similar configurations also broke suppression 
faster when they were presented inverted rather than upright. This result implies that shape 
differences relative to fixation were responsible for the observed congruency effect rather 
than processing mechanisms specific for upright faces. 
This study was motivated by the fact that a lot of b-CFS studies on face processing 
obtained evidence for relatively complex (high-level) processing of invisible faces during 
CFS. In contrast, studies relying on adaptation or neuroimaging techniques consistently 
showed that processing of invisible faces is severely reduced compared to visible faces and is 
possibly only specific to the general face shape rather than the identity, facial expression, or 
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other high-level face attributes. Therefore, we decided to capitalize on the findings of a 
neuroimaging study in which it was shown that the pattern of responses in the fusiform face 
area was strongest for face stimuli presented in their commonly experienced (congruent) 
configuration. Assuming that stimuli with a strong representation break suppression faster, 
one would predict the same difference between congruent and incongruent configurations to 
be observed in a b-CFS setup. Moreover, given the specificity of the effect to the fusiform 
face area, we also predicted that the effect should be absent or at least greatly reduced for 
inverted faces (Yovel & Kanwisher, 2005). As highlighted above, our results indicated both 
an effect of configuration as well as inversion but no interaction between those factors. This 
indicates that the differences in suppression time between conditions are more likely 
attributable to shape-specific differences between conditions rather than mechanisms relying 
on the configural processing of faces, which are known to be affected by inversion (Yin, 1969; 
Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995). Indeed, studies on holistic face perception have shown that 
face inversion is a stimulus manipulation that strongly influences performance on a wide 
range of tasks (for a review, see Rossion, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2010). Nevertheless, it has also 
been argued that inverted faces can still be processed holistically (Richler, Mack, Palmeri, & 
Gauthier, 2011). This last study has mainly indicated qualitatively similar patterns for 
upright and inverted faces, but still observed quantitative differences. In our study however, 
the congruency effect was also quantitatively similar between upright and inverted faces 
given the absence of an interaction between face inversion and congruency. Therefore, we 
think the most parsimonious explanation of our results is one that does not rely on face-
specific (high-level) configural processing of perceptually suppressed face stimuli.  
One particularly important difference between the stimuli presented in both types of 
configurations is the curvature of the face shape relative to fixation. That is, in congruent 
configurations, the curved contour is convex relative to fixation compared to being concave 
in the incongruent configurations. Several behavioral studies have shown that convex 
features are often perceptually dominant, for instance, in determining figure-ground 
relationships or shape similarity (Bertamini & Wagemans, 2013; Kanizsa & Gerbino, 1976). 
Moreover, neurophysiological recordings have shown a similar bias towards convex features 
in macaque area V4 (Pasupathy & Connor, 1999). Last, a recent fMRI study has shown that 
cortical area LOC shows higher sensitivity for convex rather than concave shapes 
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(Haushofer, Baker, Livingstone, & Kanwisher, 2008). Although our study only consisted of 
face stimuli, the pattern of results observed in this study is similar to what would be 
predicted based on a convexity/concavity account. Thus, in the light of these studies, we can 
speculate that our findings can be interpreted as potentially reflecting the heightened 
sensitivity of the visual system to convex features (relative to fixation).  
This interpretation is in accord with a larger set of studies that has questioned 
evidence of high-level processing of stimuli suppressed through CFS. For example, Hedger, 
Adams and Garner (2015a) recently showed that the advantage of fearful faces breaking 
suppression faster than neutral ones is predicted by effective contrast of the stimuli. 
Furthermore, another recent study by the same group observed that attentional orienting 
due to threat stimuli is completely absent when threatening stimuli were rendered 
completely invisible (Hedger et al., 2015a). Other studies have cast doubt on whether 
invisible words can be processed (Heyman & Moors, 2014), numerosity can be extracted 
during suppression (Hesselmann, Darcy, Sterzer, & Knops, 2015; Hesselmann & Knops, 
2014; Liu, Zhang, Zhao, Liu, & Li, 2013), or integration between a suppressed visual looming 
stimulus and a supraliminal auditory stimulus can occur (P. Moors, Huygelier, et al., 2015). 
In sum, the results of this study provide evidence that stimuli that are more strongly 
represented in the visual cortex break suppression faster than other stimuli. However, the 
fact that the observed congruency effect was not specific for upright face stimuli indicates 
that the face stimuli used in this study were presumably not processed by specialized face 
recognition mechanisms, but rather at a more basic level limited to more general shape 
properties such as convexity. 
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Chapter 9.  
Scene integration without awareness: No conclusive 
evidence for processing scene congruency during 
continuous flash suppression 
 
A recent study showed that scenes with a semantically incongruent object-background 
relationship break interocular suppression faster than scenes with a semantically congruent 
relationship. These results implied that semantic relations between objects and background 
of a scene could be extracted in the absence of visual awareness of the stimulus. In this study, 
we assessed the replicability of this finding and tried to rule out an alternative explanation 
based on low-level differences between the stimuli. Furthermore, we used a Bayesian 
analysis to quantify the evidence in favor of the presence or absence of a scene congruency 
effect. Across three experiments, we found no convincing evidence for a scene congruency 
effect nor a modulation of scene congruency by scene inversion. These findings question the 
generalizability of previous observations and cast doubt on whether genuine semantic 
processing of object-background relationships in scenes can manifest during interocular 
suppression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moors, P., Boelens, D., van Overwalle, J., & Wagemans, J. (2016). Scene integration without 
awareness: No conclusive evidence for processing scene congruency during continuous flash 
suppression. Psychological Science, in press. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the scope and limits of unconscious visual processing has become a 
central research topic in cognitive neuroscience (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). A recent study 
claimed to have obtained evidence that complex, high-level visual scene processing can 
happen unconsciously (Mudrik, Breska, Lamy, & Deouell, 2011). These authors presented 
participants with scenes that were rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression 
(CFS, Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). Scene congruency was manipulated and participants had to 
indicate when an initially suppressed scene broke suppression. Mudrik et al. (2011) observed 
that incongruent scenes broke suppression faster than congruent scenes. This led the authors 
to argue that consciousness of a scene is not required for high-level scene processing 
mechanisms to unfold and hence extract the congruency relation between object and 
background.  
Because the results of Mudrik et al. (2011) have profound implications for theories on 
the extent of unconscious visual processing during CFS, it is of utmost importance that the 
congruency effect can be attributed to genuine scene processing mechanisms rather than 
differences between scenes on low-level visual aspects. Although image analyses (Itti & 
Koch, 2000; Neumann & Gegenfurtner, 2006) on the stimulus set used in these experiments 
did not seem to reveal any consistent bias on low-level visual aspects for the (in)congruent 
category, a stronger control for image-related characteristics is to include an experimental 
condition in which the scenes are inverted, which dramatically reduces their identifiability 
while fully preserving the low-level image properties. 
The goal of this study was threefold. First, we wanted to assess the replicability of the 
original findings. Second, by including a scene inversion condition, we wanted to rule out 
any potential low-level confounds related to the particular stimulus set. Third, we 
complement the traditional repeated measures ANOVA with a Bayesian analysis based on 
linear mixed-effects modeling with crossed random effects for participants and stimuli 
(Clark, 1973). Given that the experiment consists of presenting various exemplars of 
congruent and incongruent scenes to participants, a random effect of stimulus should also be 
included if one aims to generalize to the population of congruent and incongruent scenes. 
Furthermore, Bayesian statistics allows to quantify the evidence for the absence of an effect 
(Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 consisted of a replication experiment of Mudrik et al. (2011), using the 
same stimuli and methods, yet also including a scene inversion condition. If the results 
observed in Mudrik et al. (2011) are genuinely attributable to unconscious scene processing, 
we predicted to observe a scene congruency effect in the upright, but not in the inverted 
condition. Conversely, if the effect does not pertain to processing the semantic aspects of the 
interocularly suppressed scenes, we predict a similar congruency effect in the inverted 
condition and, critically, no (statistical) interaction between scene inversion and scene 
congruency. 
 
METHODS 
Participants 
45 people participated in the study in return for money or course credit. All 
participants were naïve with respect to the purposes of the study and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Because the original sample size of 18 participants used in 
Mudrik et al. (2011) yielded a post-hoc power of 75%, we decided to substantially increase 
the sample such that the power based on the effect size reported in the original study was 
99% for this experiment. This increase in sample size was further motivated by the fact that 
one needs sufficient measurements for each item to fit a linear mixed-effects model with 
crossed random effects. 
 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were shown on two 19.8-in. Sony Trinitron GDM F500-R (2048 x 1536 pixels at 
60 Hz, for each) monitors driven by a DELL Precision T3400 computer with an Intel Core 
Quad CPU Q9300 2.5 GHz processor running on Windows XP. Binocular presentation was 
achieved by a custom made stereo set-up. Two CRT monitors, which stood opposite to each 
other (distance of 220 cm), projected to the left and right eye respectively via two mirrors 
placed at a distance of 110 cm from the screen. A head- and chin rest (15 cm from the 
mirrors) was used to stabilize fixation. The effective viewing distance was 125 cm. Stimulus 
presentation, timing and keyboard responses were controlled with custom software 
programmed in Python using the PsychoPy library (Peirce, 2007, 2009). 
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Stimuli 
The background of the display consisted of a random checkerboard pattern to achieve 
stable binocular fusion. The size of the individual elements of the checkerboard was equal to 
0.34°. In both eyes, a gray frame (10° by 10°) was superimposed on the checkerboard pattern 
to present the stimuli. A black (eye dominance measurement) or white (main experiment) 
fixation cross was continuously present during the experiment (size 0.5 by 0.5°). In the eye 
dominance measurement phase, the target consisted of an arrow (maximal width 4°, 
maximal height 2°) and the CFS mask consisted of 150 gray squares with randomly picked 
sizes between 1 and 2° and a random luminance value for each element.  
The scene stimuli (2.86° x 2.03°) were the same as in Mudrik et al. (2011). For a 
detailed description of the stimulus set, we refer to the original study. In short, the scenes 
depicted various human actions involving a certain object. Both congruent and incongruent 
versions of the scene were created by pasting an object into the scene that was related or 
unrelated to the action (Mudrik et al., 2011). In the main experiment, the CFS mask consisted 
of 200 square elements with a randomly chosen color and size between 0.75° and 1.5° for 
each element. The positions of the elements were generated in a 5.26° x 5.26° square window 
centered at fixation. Because the maximal size of each element was 1.5°, the effective size of 
the CFS mask was thus minimally 5.26° x 5.26° and maximally 6.76° x 6.76° (compared to 
always 5.26° x 5.26° in the original study). In both the eye dominance phase as well as the 
main experiment, the refresh rate of the CFS mask was set at 10 Hz. 
 
Procedure 
In the first part of the experiment, participants’ eye dominance was measured using 
the method of Yang, Blake, and McDonald (2010). On every trial, a fixation cross was 
presented for 1 second. Next, an arrow that gradually increased to 100% contrast in 2 
seconds was presented to one eye and the CFS mask in the other. Upon breakthrough of the 
arrow, participants had to indicate the direction of an arrow by pressing “1” or “3” on a 
numerical keyboard for left and right pointing directions, respectively. The CFS mask was 
randomly presented to the left or right eye (40 trials per eye) for a total of 80 trials. The 
dominant eye was determined as the eye in which mean suppression time was shortest when 
the arrow was presented to that eye. In all subsequent phases of the experiment, the CFS 
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mask should have been presented to the participants’ dominant eye. Due to a programming 
error, however, the mask was always presented to the participant’s right eye (in Experiments 
1 and 2). In this experiment, 44% of the observers was left-, rather than right-eye dominant 
according to the criterion defined above , and thus received the mask in their non-dominant 
(right) eye. 
The main experiment consisted of 160 CFS trials, divided into four blocks of 40 trials. 
In each block, all four conditions (all combinations of scene congruency and scene inversion) 
were balanced. Only one version of a scene was presented in each block. Within each block, 
the ordering of conditions was completely randomized, whereas in the original study a 
constraint was used that items of the same type could not be presented on four or more 
consecutive trials. Before the start of the main experiment, participants completed 16 practice 
trials based on four scenes that were not included in the main experiment. 
On each trial, a CFS mask was presented to the participants’ right eye while the scene 
was presented to the left eye and gradually increased from 0 to 100% contrast in steps of 10% 
every 100 ms. After the scene had reached full contrast, the CFS mask began to decrease in 
contrast to 0% over the course of 5.1 seconds. Upon breakthrough, participants had to 
indicate as fast as possible whether the scene was presented to the left or right of fixation (see 
Figure 9.1 for an overview of the trial sequence). Contrary to the original study, we did not 
perform a post-experimental rating session in which participants were asked to categorize all 
scene stimuli as being unusual or not. In the original study, incorrectly categorized stimuli 
were then removed prior to the start of the analysis. Because categorization performance 
could influence the results, we invited participants afterwards to perform the rating session 
in an online experiment. Here, we presented the scene stimuli in a random order and 
participants had to indicate for each stimulus whether it was unusual or not.  
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Figure 9.1. Trial sequence for all experiments. A fixation cross was presented to both eyes for 
1 second, after which the scene stimulus was presented to the nondominant eye and the CFS 
mask to the dominant eye. The scene stimulus gradually increased in contrast for 1 second 
after which the CFS mask started decreasing in contrast for 5.1 seconds. Upon breakthrough, 
participants had to indicate as quickly as possible whether the scene stimulus was presented 
to the left or the right of the fixation cross. 
 
RESULTS 
All analyses were performed on the correct trials (M = 0.99, SD = 0.01) of which the 
suppression time did not exceed the time at which the mask reached 0% contrast (M = 0.92, 
SD = 0.13), after removing outliers defined as suppression times higher than the mean 
suppression time plus three times the standard deviation (for each observer separately, M = 
0.005, SD = 0.007) . For the Bayesian analysis, we logarithmically transformed the 
suppression times to account for the positive skew in the suppression time distributions. 
Bayes Factors (BF) were computed to quantify the evidence for the presence/absence of a 
main effect or interaction. The R package BayesFactor (version 0.9.11-1, default settings, 
“medium” prior scale for fixed effects and “nuisance” prior scale for random effects) was 
used to compute the BFs (Morey & Rouder, 2015). All models were linear mixed-effects 
models with crossed random effects, including a random intercept for both participants and 
stimuli (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012). To compute the BFs for the main 
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effects and interaction, we compared a full model (including the two main effects and 
interaction) with a reduced model in which the effect of interest was not included (i.e., 
similar to the classical repeated measures ANOVA). According to the classification provided 
by Jeffreys (1961) a BF of 3 constitutes substantial evidence for one model over the other 
whereas a BF of 10 is considered to be strong evidence for one model over the other. It is 
important to stress that Bayes Factors constitute a relative measure of evidence for one 
statistical model compared to another (i.e., it is a ratio of marginal likelihoods computed for 
two statistical models). In this paper, we always report Bayes Factors with the reduced 
model in the numerator and the full model in the denominator. Thus, BFs > 3 indicate 
evidence for the absence of a main effect or interaction under consideration. BFs < 0.3 indicate 
evidence for the presence of the effect under consideration. Because the Bayes Factor is 
asymmetric around 1, we visualize the Bayes Factors after logarithmically transforming them 
(with base 10 logarithm) such that a BF of 1 or -1 indicates strong evidence for the absence or 
presence of an effect, respectively.  
Before analyzing the data, we first checked the consistency across observers with 
respect to which stimuli broke suppression fast and slow. That is, if the images were being 
processed during suppression, at least the low-level image characteristics should have an 
influence on suppression times and this should be apparent from calculating Cronbach’s α 
for the suppression times. Indeed, Cronbach’s α was high for the suppression durations (α= 
.83) indicating that there was consistency across observers in which stimuli broke 
suppression fast and slow. 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the mean correct suppression times 
revealed no main effect of scene congruency (Mcongruent = 2.53, Mincongruent = 2.56; SDcongruent = 0.87, 
SDincongruent = 0.85; F(1,44) = 1.08, p = .30, d = -0.16), a main effect of scene inversion (Mupright = 
2.49, Minverted = 2.61; SDupright = 0.87, SDinverted = 0.86; F(1,44) = 16.1, p = .0002, d = 0.61), and no 
interaction between scene congruency and scene inversion (F(1,44) = 0.022, p = .88, d = -0.02). 
As is apparent from Figure 9.2, inverted scenes on average broke suppression slower than 
upright scenes. Furthermore, congruent scenes on average broke suppression numerically 
faster than incongruent scenes, yet the p-value associated with this difference did not reach 
the significance threshold.  
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Figure 9.2. Results of Experiment 1. (left) Bar plot depicting mean suppression times for each 
condition. Error bars refer to 95% within-subject confidence intervals with the adjustment 
suggested by Morey (2008). (right) Scatter plot of mean suppression times for congruent and 
incongruent scenes for each participant. Black dots refer to the upright condition, red 
triangles to the inverted. The gray dashed lines connect the same participants. 
 
The results of the repeated measures ANOVA were complemented by those of the Bayesian 
analysis. Specifically, the Bayes factor indicated strong evidence in favor of the absence of a 
scene congruency effect (BF = 17), strong evidence in favor of the presence of a scene 
inversion effect (BF < .01) and strong evidence for the absence of an interaction effect (BF = 
24).  
Figure 9.3 depicts a sequential analysis of the data for both statistical techniques. The 
upper panels depict how the p-values of the repeated measures ANOVA evolved as more 
participants were tested. As is apparent, several times throughout data collection, the main 
effect of congruency passed the significance threshold of .05. In contrast, the interaction 
never reached significance. In this respect, it is interesting to compare these patterns to the 
evolution of the Bayes Factors, which depict a different story. Here, the main effect of 
congruency nearly always hovers around a value of log10BF = 1 (i.e., a BF of 10), indicating 
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strong evidence for the absence of a congruency effect. The BF of the interaction effect also 
shows a gradual increase towards more evidence in favor of the absence of an interaction 
effect. Interestingly, for the main effect of inversion, both patterns show a gradual increase in 
evidence for an inversion effect. 
Taking into account participants’ categorization on the rating experiment did not 
change the results of this experiment (see Supplementary Materials). We also reanalyzed the 
data by excluding all participants for whom the CFS mask was presented to the non-
dominant eye. Again, this did not influence the results (see Supplementary Materials).  
 
 
Figure 9.3. Sequential analysis of the data. (top row) Evolution of p-values as more data were 
collected for the main effects of scene congruency and scene inversion and their interaction, 
respectively. Black dots indicate p-values higher than .05 whereas red dots indicate p-values 
smaller than .05. (lower row) Evolution of Bayes Factors. Bayes Factors higher than 0 indicate 
evidence for the absence of an effect whereas Bayes Factors smaller than 0 indicate evidence 
for the presence of an effect. 
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DISCUSSION 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to replicate the scene congruency effect  observed in 
Mudrik, Breska, et al. (2011) and to assess whether it would be influenced by scene inversion. 
If genuine integration between the objects of a scene and its background can still proceed 
during CFS, one would predict that inverting the scenes would reduce or diminish the scene 
congruency effect. The results of Experiment 1 showed no convincing evidence for a main 
effect of scene congruency nor an interaction between scene congruency and scene inversion. 
In contrast, a reliable scene inversion effect was found in that upright scenes broke 
suppression faster than inverted scenes.  
To increase our confidence in the absence of a scene congruency effect, we ran a 
second experiment in which we increased the number of trials for each observer. 
Furthermore, we dropped the inversion condition. This allowed us to run a quasi-exact 
replication of the original study and to assess whether increasing the number of trials for 
each observer would give us more power to detect a scene congruency effect. Furthermore, 
we decided to drop the mask fade-out procedure because this forced us to exclude a high 
number of trials for observers for which suppression was very effective.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
METHODS  
Participants 
24 new people participated in the study in return for money or course credit. All 
participants were naïve with respect to the purposes of the study and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli  
The set-up and stimuli were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. Inverted scenes 
were no longer included. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except as noted here. In this 
experiment, 50% of participants was identified as left-eye dominant. The CFS mask was thus 
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presented to the non-dominant eye for half of the participants. We did no longer include the 
scene inversion condition. The experiment was set up such that each block constituted a 
fairly exact replication of the original study. That is, the experimental procedure was the 
same as in the original study and this procedure was repeated four times. We only did no 
longer include the mask fade-out procedure to ensure that the absence of a scene congruency 
effect could not be attributed by limiting the observations for observers for which 
suppression was very effective and thus excluding the upper tail of the suppression time 
distributions for these participants. Experiment 2 also did not include the post-experimental 
rating session, but we contacted the participants afterwards to complete it online, as we did 
for Experiment 1. 
 
Design 
Scene congruency was the only factor that was manipulated. Participants completed 8 
practice trials, and the main experiment consisted of four repetitions of the full stimulus set 
amounting to 320 trials in total. 
 
RESULTS 
The results were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1. That is, all analyses were 
performed on the correct trials (first block: M = 0.98, SD = 0.02; all data: M = 0.99, SD = 0.02), 
after removing outliers defined as suppression times higher than the mean suppression time 
plus three times the standard deviation (for observers separately, first block: M = 0.007, SD = 
0.01; all data: M = 0.02, SD = 0.008). We separately report analyses for the first block only 
(quasi-exact replication of the original study) and all four blocks combined.  
First, we again analyzed the consistency of suppression times for images across 
observers. This again indicated high reliability for the suppression times of the images across 
observers (α = 0.67 and 0.81, for the first block and all data respectively). Interestingly, the 
ordering of which items broke suppression fast and slow correlated highly across both 
experiments (r = 0.89, BF < 0.01). 
As in Experiment 1, no effect of scene congruency was observed neither in the first 
block (Mcongruent = 2.87, Mincongruent = 2.90; SDcongruent = 1.09, SDincongruent = 1.05; t(23) = -0.44, p = .66, d 
= -0.09) nor when considering the data as a whole (Mcongruent = 2.34, Mincongruent = 2.36; SDcongruent = 
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0.77, SDincongruent = 0.75; t(23) = -0.69, p = .50, d = -0.14). Similarly, a BF analysis of the data 
always indicated convincing evidence for the absence of a scene congruency effect (BF = 15 
and BF = 32, for the first block and all data, respectively).  
As can be derived from the figure depicting the results of the sequential analysis, we 
crossed the significance boundary twice during the data collection process when only the 
first block would be considered. Increasing the number of trials per observer, however, never 
led to a significant main effect of congruency. Again, and in contrast to the results of the 
traditional analysis, the BF analysis showed a gradual increase in evidence for the absence of 
a scene congruency effect as the data came in. 
Supplementary analyses indicated that the results did not change when participants’ 
categorization performance on the post-experimental rating session was taken into account 
nor when only participants were included for whom the CFS mask was presented to the 
dominant eye. 
 
Figure 9.4. Results of Experiment 2. (left) Bar plot depicting mean suppression times for the 
first block only and all data. Error bars refer to 95% within-subject confidence intervals with 
the adjustment suggested by Morey (2008). (middle) Scatter plot of mean suppression times 
for congruent and incongruent scenes for each participant. Red triangles refer to the data of 
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the first block, black dots to all data together. The gray dashed lines connect the same 
participants. (right) Sequential analysis of the data. (top row) Evolution of p-values as more 
data were collected for the effect of scene congruency. Black symbols indicate p-values 
higher than .05 whereas red symbols indicate p-values smaller than .05. (lower row) 
Evolution of Bayes Factors. Bayes Factors higher than 0 indicate evidence for the absence of 
an effect whereas Bayes Factors smaller than 0 indicate evidence for the presence of an effect. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Although we did not obtain any evidence in favor of a scene congruency effect in both our 
experiments, one might still raise objections to our current attempts. That is, compared to the 
original study, we did not implement a post-experimental rating procedure in which 
participants were asked to categorize the images as being unusual or not (i.e., incongruent 
versus congruent). Second, the CFS mask was not presented in every participants’ dominant 
eye. Third, the addition of an inversion condition in Experiment 1 and dropping the mask 
fade-out procedure as well as repeating the images more than once in Experiment 2 might 
have obscured a subtle congruency effect. We addressed these concerns in a third 
experiment, in which we presented every scene upright and only once across two 
experimental blocks and always in the participants’ non-dominant eye. We included the 
mask fade-out procedure again, and implemented a post-experimental rating session. At this 
point, we invited participants from Experiments 1 and 2 to conduct this rating session on-
line and reanalyzed the data based on their responses.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
METHODS 
Participants 
A new sample of 50 people participated in the experiment in return for money or 
course credit. All participants were naïve with respect to the design of the study and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants provided written informed consent 
prior to the start of the experiment.  
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Apparatus and Stimuli  
The experimental set-up and stimuli were exactly the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.  
 
Procedure and Design 
Up to the post-experimental rating session, the procedure was exactly the same as in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Participants first completed the eye dominance experiment after which 
they completed two blocks of trials in which the scenes were presented to the participants 
non-dominant eye and the CFS mask to the dominant eye, according to the same procedure 
as in the previous experiments. After completing the CFS experiment, each scene was 
presented binocularly and participants had to indicate whether they thought the presented 
scene was unusual our not. 
The experiment consisted of a within-subject design with two conditions (i.e., 
congruent versus incongruent scenes). In the main experiment, participants completed 8 
practice trials, and 80 experimental trials. Within a block, the order in which trials were 
presented was completely randomized. The post-experimental rating session also consisted 
of 80 trials, presented in a random order. 
 
RESULTS 
The data of Experiment 3 were analyzed in the same way as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
That is, analyses were performed on correct trials (M =0.98, SD = 0.03) including only trials of 
which the suppression time did not exceed the time at which the mask reached 0% contrast 
(M = 0.91, SD = 0.18), after removing outliers defined as suppression times higher than the 
mean suppression time plus three times the standard deviation (for observers separately, M 
= 0.005, SD = 0.01). Furthermore, only stimuli that were correctly categorized after the 
experiment (i.e., congruent as incongruent and vice versa) were included in the analysis (M = 
0.71, SD = 0.06). An analysis including the incorrectly rated scenes (see Supplementary 
Materials) did not change the results of the analysis. 
The consistency of which stimuli broke suppression fast and slow (across observers) 
was similar to what was observed in Experiments 1 and 2 (α = 0.85). Furthermore, the 
ordering again correlated very strongly with the ordering observed in Experiment 1 (r = .89, 
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BF < 0.01) and Experiment 2 (r = .94, BF < 0.01), indicating that the images (irrespective of 
their congruency) were processed similarly across all three experiments.  
As in Experiments 1 and 2, an analysis on mean correct suppression times did not 
reveal any effects of scene congruency (Mcongruent = 2.65, Mincongruent = 2.66; SDcongruent = 1.14, 
SDincongruent = 1.09; t(49) = -0.15, p = .88, d = -0.02). Similarly, the BF analysis indicated strong 
evidence for the absence of a congruency effect (BF = 20). Figure 9.5 depicts the results of the 
sequential analysis. As is apparent from this figure, we observed a significant congruency 
effect in the classical analysis early on during data collection, yet the BF never crossed the 
boundary for indicating evidence in favor of a congruency effect and again gradually 
accumulated evidence in favor of the absence of a congruency effect.  
In a supplementary exploratory analysis (see Supplementary Materials), we 
examined the relationship between various statistical image properties and the mean 
suppression times of the images in all three experiments. That is, given the absence of a scene 
congruency effect, yet high consistency of which images broke suppression slow and fast, we 
were interested in exploring whether some statistical properties of the images would predict 
suppression times. The results indicated that a measure of spatial coherence (an indicator of 
scene fragmentation) correlated positively with mean suppression duration. That is, when 
images were more cluttered, suppression times were on average higher. 
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Figure 9.5. Results of Experiment 3. (left) Bar plot depicting mean suppression times for both 
conditions. Error bars refer to 95% within-subject confidence intervals with the adjustment 
suggested by Morey (2008). (middle) Scatter plot of mean suppression times for congruent 
and incongruent scenes for each participant. (right) Sequential analysis of the data. (top row) 
Evolution of p-values as more data were collected for the effect of scene congruency. Black 
symbols indicate p-values higher than .05 whereas red symbols indicate p-values smaller 
than .05. (lower row) Evolution of Bayes Factors. Log10BFs higher than 0 indicate evidence 
for the absence of a congruency effect whereas log10BFs smaller than 0 indicate evidence for 
the presence of a congruency effect. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study was to assess the replicability of the findings reported in 
Mudrik et al. (2011) and to gauge whether the scene congruency effect was attributable to 
low-level differences between the stimuli by including a scene inversion condition. In 
Experiment 1, using a larger sample as in the original study, we did not observe an effect of 
scene congruency, and critically, no interaction between scene inversion and scene 
congruency, highlighting that the inversion did not modulate the effect of scene congruency, 
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which would have been expected if the scene congruency effect was a semantic effect. 
Furthermore, a Bayes Factor (BF) analysis relying on linear mixed-effects models with 
crossed random effects showed convincing evidence for the absence of a scene congruency 
effect. A sequential analysis of our data highlighted a strong discrepancy between the 
inferences based on a classical repeated measures ANOVA and the BF analysis. Indeed, at 
several steps throughout our data collection, the classical analysis yielded a significant main 
effect of scene congruency whereas this was never the case for the BF analysis, indicating 
that not considering the random item variation yields a too liberal statistical procedure 
(Clark, 1973). Interestingly, in the case of the scene inversion effect, both the classical and the 
Bayesian analysis converged to the same conclusion. In Experiment 2, we increased the 
number of trials fourfold for each observer to assess whether increasing the precision of the 
effect size estimate for each observer would reveal a more consistent scene congruency effect. 
Again, we did not observe a scene congruency effect. Experiment 3 consisted of a third high-
powered replication attempt in which we also included a post-experimental rating task to 
exclude stimuli that were not perceived as (in)congruent by our participants. The results of 
this last experiment also indicated strong evidence for the absence of a scene congruency 
effect.  
What do the results of these experiments tell us? Could it be that the images were not 
processed at all? We contend that several aspects of our results argue against such an 
interpretation. In all experiments, we observed high internal consistency in which items 
broke suppression fast and slow across observers. Moreover, this pattern of slow and fast 
items correlated strongly across all experiments in independent sets of observers. Third, a 
measure of spatial coherence correlated with suppression times (with a similar magnitude) 
in all experiments. These aspects indicate that the scene stimuli did not break suppression in 
a completely random fashion.  
In Experiment 1, we observed a consistent scene inversion effect. Could this be an 
indication that the stimuli were somehow interpreted during suppression? Although 
inversion reduces the identifiability of the scenes and preserves low-level image statistics, it 
may also influence higher-order image statistics to which the visual system is sensitive 
(Okazawa, Tajima, & Komatsu, 2015). Therefore, an inversion effect does not by definition 
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indicate that a stimulus is processed up to a semantic level, yet it could also reflect the 
sensitivity of the visual system to natural input. 
Although the original scene congruency effect was interpreted as evidence for 
unconscious integration, our results cannot be interpreted as providing evidence against 
unconscious integration per se. That is, there remain some differences between our study 
and the original one. Besides the obvious differences in hardware, experimental 
environment, and pools of observers, there were also slight differences in our trial 
randomization procedure and the size of our CFS mask display. Our findings therefore show 
that the results of Mudrik et al. (2011) do not generalize across these particular testing 
differences, indicating that, if true, the scene congruency effect is particularly fragile. 
However, this lack of generalizability is hardly compatible with the conclusions derived 
from the original result. If unconscious integration can manifest under CFS, such an effect 
should not be dependent upon factors such as particular testing conditions or a different 
participant pool. Indeed, what our results show is that there is no evidence for scene 
integration without awareness under CFS. Indeed, although CFS initially proved to be a 
promising technique to assess the limits of unconscious visual processing (Bahrami et al., 
2010; Jiang et al., 2006, 2007; Sklar et al., 2012), our findings fit well in a series of more recent 
findings highlighting rather limited visual processing during CFS (Hedger et al., 2015a; 
Hesselmann & Knops, 2014; Heyman & Moors, 2014; P. Moors, Huygelier, et al., 2015; P. 
Moors, Wagemans, et al., 2015). In hindsight, this is also not too surprising given that it is 
known that binocular rivalry disrupts processing of the suppressed stimulus beyond early 
visual areas (Fogelson et al., 2014; Hesselmann & Malach, 2011; Yuval-Greenberg & Heeger, 
2013). This does not imply, however, that unconscious integration per se cannot take place. 
Indeed, some forms of unconscious integration have been shown to exist (see Mudrik, 
Faivre, & Koch, 2014 for a review), yet often relying on different suppression paradigms.  
While this study highlights the importance of replication and the inclusion of 
appropriate control conditions, it also reveals a much broader point. That is, it provides an 
important example of how different statistical methods can strongly disagree throughout the 
data collection process. Indeed, although both types of analysis yielded the same conclusion 
at the end of data collection, it is important to highlight that the traditional repeated-
measures ANOVA more than once indicated a significant scene congruency effect as the data 
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came in. The BF analysis, however, yielded a more consistent picture in that it always 
provided evidence for the absence of a scene congruency effect while the evidence also 
gradually accumulated when more data was collected. Furthermore, in Experiment 1, the BF 
indicated convincing evidence for the presence of an inversion effect and here, the results of 
the repeated measures ANOVA converged on those of the BF analysis. This highlights that 
for experimental designs in which the dependent measure can vary across participants and 
items, the classical repeated measures ANOVA approach might be too liberal (Clark, 1973) 
and an approach based on crossed random effects is recommended (Baayen et al., 2008). 
In sum, our study questions the replicability and generalizability of the findings 
reported in Mudrik et al. (2011) by obtaining strong evidence for the absence of a scene 
congruency effect across three experiments and moreover showing that scene congruency 
was not modulated by scene inversion. Therefore, it is unlikely that during CFS, complex 
high-level scene processing can ensue. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
In this Supplementary Material, we report on additional analyses for Experiments 1 
and 2 as well as an exploratory analysis on the relationship between mean suppression times 
obtained for each image averaged across observers and four statistical properties of the 
images.  
In Experiment 3, we implemented a post-experimental rating procedure in which 
participants had to indicate whether they thought a presented scene was unusual or not. This 
procedure was not implemented in Experiments 1 and 2 and might have influenced the 
results. Therefore, we invited the participants of the first two experiments to participate in an 
on-line experiment in which they had to rate all 80 scenes. The data of the first two 
experiments were then reanalyzed by first excluding incorrectly rated scenes (i.e., an 
incongruent scene was rated as congruent and vice versa). Second, in Experiment 3, a 
technical issue was also fixed. That is, due to a bug in the code, after the eye dominance 
measurement, the CFS mask was always presented to the right eye rather than the dominant 
eye. For Experiments 1 and 2, we also reanalyzed the data by excluding participants for 
which the CFS mask was not presented to the dominant eye (i.e., participants for whom the 
dominant eye was the left one). 
 
Supplementary analysis for Experiment 1 
23 out of 45 (51%) participants responded to our invitation to participate in the rating 
experiment. Figures S9.1 and S9.2 depict the results of Experiment 1 for these 23 participants 
after also excluding all data points from incorrectly rated scenes. The results are very similar 
to those observed when analyzing the full data set. That is, a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA on the mean correct suppression times revealed no main effect of scene congruency 
(Mcongruent = 2.36, Mincongruent = 2.35; SDcongruent = 0.94, SDincongruent = 0.88; F(1,22) = 0.06, p = .81, d = 
0.04), a main effect of scene inversion (Mupright = 2.31, Minverted = 2.40; SDupright = 0.92, SDinverted = 
0.90; F(1,22) = 5.52, p = .03, d = 0.38), and no interaction between scene congruency and scene 
inversion (F(1,22) = 0.082, p = .78, d = -0.06). The Bayes Factor analysis indicated strong 
evidence in favor of the absence of a scene congruency effect (BF = 22), moderate evidence in 
favor of the presence of a scene inversion effect (BF = 6) and strong evidence for the absence 
of an interaction effect (BF = 16). 
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Figure S9.1.  
 
 
Figure S9.2 
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We conducted the same analysis, but now excluding all participants for which the 
CFS mask was not presented to the dominant eye. This reduced our sample to 25 
participants (20 were excluded). The results of this analysis are depicted in Figures S9.3 and 
S4. Again, the results are very similar to those observed when analyzing the full data set. 
That is, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the mean correct suppression times 
revealed no main effect of scene congruency (Mcongruent = 2.73, Mincongruent = 2.67; SDcongruent = 1, 
SDincongruent = 0.97; F(1,24) = 2.94, p = .1, d = 0.20), no main effect of scene inversion (Mupright = 
2.67, Minverted = 2.73; SDupright = 1.01, SDinverted = 0.96; F(1,24) = 2.13, p = .16, d = 0.20), and no 
interaction between scene congruency and scene inversion (F(1,22) = 0.05, p = .82, d = -0.05). 
The Bayes Factor analysis indicated evidence in favor of the absence of a scene congruency 
effect (BF = 6), evidence in favor of the presence of a scene inversion effect (BF = 4) and strong 
evidence for the absence of an interaction effect (BF = 17). 
 
 
Figure S9.3.  
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Figure S9.4.  
 
For the sake of completeness, including only those people that responded to the 
invitation to participate in the rating experiment and those for which the CFS mask was 
presented to the dominant eye further reduced our sample to 15 participants. This analysis 
yielded slightly different results compared to the analysis of the full data set and is depicted 
in Figures S9.5 and S9.6. That is, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on the mean correct 
suppression times revealed a main effect of scene congruency (Mcongruent = 2.53, Mincongruent = 
2.43; SDcongruent = 1.09, SDincongruent = 1.03; F(1,14) = 17.06, p = .001, d = 0.59), no main effect of 
scene inversion (Mupright = 2.44, Minverted = 2.52; SDupright = 1.08, SDinverted = 1.05; F(1,14) = 3.38, p = 
.09, d = 0.38), and, critically, no interaction between scene congruency and scene inversion 
(F(1,14) = 0.38, p = .55, d = -0.16). The Bayes Factor analysis did not indicate a preference for 
the presence or absence of a congruency effect (BF = 1.3), indicated evidence in favor of the 
presence of a scene inversion effect (BF = 4) and indicated strong evidence for the absence of 
an interaction effect (BF = 7). 
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Figure S9.5.  
 
 
Figure S9.6.  
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Supplementary analysis for Experiment 2  
We now report on the same reanalysis of the data of Experiment 2 by first considering 
those participants that performed the rating experiment, then considering those for which 
the CFS mask was presented in the dominant eye, and ending with combining both 
exclusion criteria.  
18 out of 24 (75%) participants responded to our invitation to participate in the rating 
experiment. Excluding all incorrectly rated scenes yielded a similar picture as the results for 
the full data set. That is, no effect of scene congruency was observed neither in the first block 
(Mcongruent = 2.73, Mincongruent = 2.81; SDcongruent = 1.03, SDincongruent = 0.95; t(17) = -1.42, p = .17, d = -
0.34) nor when considering the data as a whole (Mcongruent = 2.23, Mincongruent = 2.28; SDcongruent = 
0.71, SDincongruent = 0.70; t(17) = -1.79, p = .09, d = -0.42). Similarly, a BF analysis of the data 
always indicated convincing evidence for the absence of a scene congruency effect (BF = 6 
and BF = 14, for the first block and all data, respectively). Figure S9.7 depicts the results of 
this analysis.  
 
 
Figure S9.7.  
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Including only those participants for which the CFS mask was presented to the 
dominant eye reduced our sample to 12 observers. The results are summarized in Figure S9.8 
and are very similar to the analyses for the full data set. That is, no effect of scene congruency 
was observed neither in the first block (Mcongruent = 3.47, Mincongruent = 3.53; SDcongruent = 0.93, 
SDincongruent = 0.91; t(11) = -0.41, p = .69, d = -0.12) nor when considering the data as a whole 
(Mcongruent = 2.77, Mincongruent = 2.80; SDcongruent = 0.67, SDincongruent = 0.65; t(11) = -0.53, p = .61, d = -
0.15). Similarly, a BF analysis of the data always indicated convincing evidence for the 
absence of a scene congruency effect (BF = 13 and BF = 26, for the first block and all data, 
respectively). 
 
 
Figure S9.8.  
 
Last, an analysis combining both exclusion criteria further reduced our sample to 9 
participants. The results of this analysis are summarized in Figure S9.9. Again, these results 
are very similar to those observed for the full data set. No effect of scene congruency was 
observed neither in the first block (Mcongruent = 3.45, Mincongruent = 3.44; SDcongruent = 0.74, SDincongruent 
= 0.66; t(8) = 0.01, p = .99, d = 0.005) nor when considering the data as a whole (Mcongruent = 2.67, 
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Mincongruent = 2.72; SDcongruent = 0.51, SDincongruent = 0.49; t(8) = -1, p = .35, d = -0.33). Similarly, a BF 
analysis of the data always indicated convincing evidence for the absence of a scene 
congruency effect (BF = 9 and BF = 13, for the first block and all data, respectively). 
 
 
 
Supplementary analysis for Experiment 3  
For Experiment 3, we reported an analysis of the mean suppression times after 
removing incorrect responses during the main experiment as well as incorrectly categorized 
stimuli during the post-experimental rating session. Here, we report on the same analysis, 
yet including the stimuli that were incorrectly categorized during the post-experimental 
rating session. The results of this analysis were very similar to those excluding the 
incorrectly categorized stimuli (see Figure S9.10). No effect of scene congruency was 
observed (Mcongruent = 2.64, Mincongruent = 2.63; SDcongruent = 1.12, SDincongruent = 1.06; t(49) = 0.11, p = 
.91, d = .016). Similarly, the BF analysis indicated convincing evidence for the absence of a 
congruency effect (BF = 24). 
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Figure S9.10. 
 
Correlation between suppression times and statistical properties of the images 
A final exploratory analysis pertains to the relationship between mean suppression 
times obtained for each image averaged across observers and four statistical properties of the 
images. These four statistical measures include the intercept (IC) and slope (SL) derived from 
a regression line fitted to the Fourier amplitude spectrum of each image in log-log space. 
Furthermore, for each image, we obtained measures of contrast energy (CE) and spatial 
coherence (SC) as reported in Groen, Ghebreab, Prins, Lamme, and Scholte (2013). These 
measures involve approximations of a Weibull fit to the histograms of local contrast filter 
responses. Note that high values of SC indicate cluttered images, whereas low values 
indicate images that are spatially coherent.  
Figure S9.11 depicts the correlation matrices for all measures considered and mean 
suppression time (ST) for each item, averaged across observers and scene congruency. For all 
experiments, the highest correlation of interest that was observed was the one between 
suppression time and spatial coherence (Experiment 1: r = 0.45; Experiment 2: r = 0.53; 
Experiment 3: r = 0.49). This correlation was also the only one (of the ones that included 
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suppression time) that exceeded a Bayes Factor of 3 for all experiments (Wetzels & 
Wagenmakers, 2012). 
This supplementary exploratory analysis indicates that the observed suppression 
durations  correlate with a measure of spatial coherence of the images, indicating that 
cluttered images on average yield slower suppression times compared to spatially coherent, 
less fragmented images.  
 
Figure S9.11. Relationship between suppression times and image characteristics. Correlation 
matrices for all four measures and suppression time, for both experiments. ST = suppression 
time, SC = spatial coherence, CE = contrast energy, IC = intercept, SL = slope.  
 
Table S9.1. Bayes Factors for correlations between suppression time and each image statistic.  
Statistic Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
SC 7.6 53 21 
CE 0.23 0.12 0.12 
IC 4.2 0.97 1.27 
SL 0.32 0.49 0.97 
Note. Bayes Factors > 1 indicate evidence for a correlation being different from zero.  
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Chapter 10.  
Frequent words do not break continuous flash 
suppression differently from infrequent or nonexistent 
words: Implications for semantic processing of words 
in the absence of awareness. 
 
Continuous flash suppression (CFS) has been used as a paradigm to probe the extent to 
which word stimuli are processed in the absence of awareness. In the two experiments 
reported here, no evidence is obtained that word stimuli are processed up to the semantic 
level when suppressed through CFS. In Experiment 1, word stimuli did not break 
suppression faster than their pseudo-word variants nor was suppression time modulated by 
word frequency. Experiment 2 replicated these findings, but more critically showed that 
differential effects can be obtained with this paradigm using a simpler stimulus. In addition, 
pixel density of the stimuli did prove to be related to suppression time in both experiments, 
indicating that the paradigm is sensitive to differences in detectability. A third and final 
experiment replicated the well-known face inversion effect using the same set-up as 
Experiments 1 and 2, thereby demonstrating that the employed methodology can capture 
more high-level effects as well. These results are discussed in the context of previous 
evidence on unconscious semantic processing and two potential explanations are advanced. 
Specifically, it is argued that CFS might act at a level too low in the visual system for high-
level effects to be observed or that the widely used breaking CFS paradigm is merely ill-
suited to capture effects in the context of words. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heyman, T., Moors, P. (2014). Frequent Words Do Not Break Continuous Flash Suppression 
Differently from Infrequent or Nonexistent Words: Implications for Semantic Processing of Words 
in the Absence of Awareness. PLoS One, 9 (8), art.nr. e104719. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although our visual awareness of the world most of the time is continuous and 
stable, sometimes conscious perception fluctuates while retinal input stays constant. 
Amongst other, this situation arises when the two eyes are presented with different stimuli 
at corresponding retinal locations. Instead of mixing the signals of both eyes based on, for 
example, a weighted sum, the visual system appears to “decide” to categorically favor the 
image presented to one eye or the other and to stochastically alternate between the two 
interpretations, a phenomenon known as binocular rivalry. Since conscious perception 
fluctuates while visual input does not change, binocular rivalry has been proposed as a 
technique to study the (neural) correlates of consciousness (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Kim & 
Blake, 2005; Tong et al., 2006). However, the stochastic nature of the rivalry process made it 
hard for researchers to reliably suppress stimuli for a time period that allowed them to 
measure the extent to which these suppressed stimuli were still processed in the absence of 
awareness. Continuous flash suppression (CFS) proved to be a solution to this problem by 
introducing a repetitive, dynamic signal in one eye which seemed to more effectively 
suppress the stimulus presented in the other eye (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Tsuchiya, Koch, 
Gilroy, & Blake, 2006). Upon its introduction, CFS was rapidly picked up on as a reliable 
technique to study unconscious processing of various classes of stimuli. One of these 
research lines pertained to whether semantic information of words is extracted in the absence 
of awareness. To study unconscious semantic processing of words, the breaking CFS 
paradigm (b-CFS, Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011) has been mostly used. In b-CFS, a stimulus 
is presented in one eye (usually at low contrast) and a CFS mask in the other. Due to its high 
contrast and dynamic nature, the CFS mask dominates initially. The contrast of the other 
stimulus is then gradually increased until it “breaks through” the CFS mask. The time until 
breakthrough (i.e., suppression time) is commonly used as an index of unconscious 
processing of the stimulus. That is, if different stimuli break CFS on average differentially, it 
is assumed that some kind of unconscious representation must have biased the breaking 
through CFS (e.g., see Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007). 
Upon reviewing the literature, it became apparent that some conflicting findings had 
been reported with respect to the unconscious processing of semantic information of words. 
For example, Costello, Jiang, Baartman, McGlennen, and He (2009) observed that 
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suppression times of words were influenced by the prime-target relation of a previously 
presented visible prime word. That is, when a semantically related prime preceded the 
suppressed target, it broke suppression faster than when prime and target were unrelated. 
Seemingly in contrast,  Sklar et al. (2012) found that short semantically incongruent sentences 
broke suppression faster than semantic congruent sentences.  
Another line of research pertains to the question whether semantic information of 
emotional words is extracted in the absence of awareness. To address this question, Yang 
and Yeh (2011) presented participants with neutral and negatively valenced Chinese two-
character words. They observed that negative words take longer to break suppression than 
neutral words. In apparent contradiction with the findings of Yang and Yeh (2011), Sklar et 
al. (2012) report on experiments in which a negatively valenced combination of two neutral 
words (e.g., black eye) broke suppression faster than a neutral combination of two neutral 
words. 
In sum, no consistent pattern of findings has emerged from the studies on 
unconscious semantic processing of words. For semantic congruency relations as well as for 
negatively valenced words or word relations, studies disagree as to whether such stimuli 
break suppression slower or faster. It is noteworthy that these studies all addressed 
relatively specific questions regarding unconscious processing of words. However, it has not 
been clearly established that words indeed have a special status. That is, no study has yet 
probed whether a difference would be observed between suppression times of words and 
non/pseudo-words presented under CFS. Secondly, we sought to assess whether the word 
frequency effect, one of the most robust findings in the psycholinguistic literature (e.g., 
Keuleers, Lacey, Rastle, & Brysbaert, 2012), would manifest itself under CFS. That is, visual 
word recognition occurs faster for highly frequent words. Here, we investigated whether 
suppression times of words also correlate with their respective word frequency. In our first 
experiment, we set out to test both hypotheses. That is, we generated a set of words varying 
in word frequency and an associated set of pseudo-words. These stimuli were presented 
under CFS and participants had to indicate the position of the suppressed stimulus upon 
breakthrough (i.e., either below or above a fixation cross). To preview our results, we found 
no evidence for differential suppression times between words and pseudo-words nor a 
correlation between word frequency and suppression time.  
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Materials and Methods 
Ethics Statement 
The study was conducted in line with the ethical principles regarding research with 
human participants as specified in The Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association 
(Declaration of Helsinki). The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Faculty 
of Psychology and Educational Sciences (EC FPPW) of the University of Leuven, and the 
participants gave written informed consent before starting the experiment. 
 
Participants 
Eighteen healthy subjects (6 male, age range 18 – 30 years) volunteered for the 
experiment and were paid for their participation. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and were naïve with respect to the goal of the study. 
 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were shown on two 19.8-in. Sony Trinitron GDM F500-R (2048 x 1536 pixels at 
60 Hz, for each) monitors driven by a DELL Precision T3400 computer with an Intel Core 
Quad CPU Q9300 2.5 GHz processor running on Windows XP. Binocular presentation was 
achieved by a custom made stereo set-up. Two CRT monitors, which stood opposite to each 
other (distance of 220 cm), projected to the left and right eye respectively via two mirrors 
placed at a distance of 110 cm from the screen. A vertical plate ensured stable projection from 
the left and right screen to the left and right eye, respectively. A head- and chin rest (15 cm 
from the mirrors) were used to stabilize fixation. The effective viewing distance was thus 125 
cm. Stimulus presentation, timing and keyboard responses were controlled with custom 
software programmed in Python 2.7 using the PsychoPy library (Peirce, 2007, 2009). 
 
Stimuli 
A random checkerboard pattern was used as the background display to achieve 
stable binocular fusion. The individual elements of the checkerboard subtended 0.34° by 
0.34°. For stimulus presentation, two grey frames were superimposed on the checkerboard 
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pattern (frame size 10° by 10°). A white fixation cross (0.6° by 0.6°) was continuously present 
during the experiment. 
The main experiment was preceded by an eye dominance measurement phase in 
which the target was an arrow (maximal width 4°; maximal height 2°). For measuring eye 
dominance, the CFS mask consisted of 150 squares with a randomly picked size (between 1° 
and 2° width) and a random grayscale value on each refresh of the mask. In the main 
experiment, the size of the individual elements of the CFS mask ranged between 0.2° and 
1.2°. The mask contained 200 squares with a randomly picked color on each refresh. In all the 
phases of the experiments reported here, the refresh rate of the CFS mask was set to 10Hz. 
A total of 154 Dutch words were selected from the SUBTLEX-NL database, which, as 
a whole, showed a word frequency effect on lexical decision latencies and accuracies 
(Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New, 2010). Word frequency was operationalized as the log-
transformed number of contexts in which a word occurs (Brysbaert & New, 2009) and ranged 
from 0.669 to 3.882 (see Table 10.1 for a summary of the stimulus characteristics). The word 
stimuli were then used as input for Wuggy, a program that generates pronounceable 
pseudo-words (Keuleers & Brysbaert, 2010). Thus, each word had an orthographically 
similar pseudo-word counterpart (e.g., lamp – hamp). The size of the words ranged from 0.92° 
to 3.9° depending on the length of the word, which varied from two to seven letters. The 
height of the words was maximally 0.92°. In addition to word length, we also derived a 
measure of pixel density by summing all pixels comprising each stimulus. Furthermore, we 
obtained more high-level characteristics such as age of acquisition (i.e., an estimate of the age 
at which a word has been learned) and concreteness (i.e., an estimate of how concrete a 
concept is) from Moors et al. (2013) and Brysbaert, Stevens, De Deyne, Voorspoels, and 
Storms (2014). 
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Table 10.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Words in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Factor Mean (SDs in parentheses) 
for Experiment 1 
Mean (SDs in parentheses) for 
Experiment 2 
Word Frequency 2.33 (0.74) 2.29 (0.76) 
Word Length 4.22 (0.83) 4.57 (0.98)  
Pixel Density 5,364 (1,130) 5,799 (1,468) 
Age of Acquisition 7.39 (2.23) 7.37 (2.13) 
Concreteness  4.14 (0.87)  4.11 (0.90) 
Note. Word Frequency is the log-transformed number of contexts in which a certain word 
occurs (Keuleers, Brysbaert, et al., 2010). Word Length is the number of characters. Pixel 
Density refers to the sum of all pixels that comprised the stimulus. Age of acquisition is the 
estimated age in years at which a word is learned (Brysbaert et al., 2014; Moors et al., 2013). 
Concreteness is an estimate on a five-point likert scale of how concrete a concept is (the 
higher, the more concrete) (Brysbaert et al., 2014). Age of acquisition and concreteness 
estimates were not available for one word in both Experiment 1 and 2. 
 
Procedure 
Prior to the start of the main experiment, participants’ eye dominance was measured 
according to the method of Yang, Blake, and McDonald (2010). On every trial, participants 
were presented with an arrow in one eye gradually increasing contrast from 0 to 100% and 
pointing either left or rightwards. In the other eye, the CFS mask was presented. As soon as 
the arrow broke suppression, participants had to indicate its direction by pressing 1 or 3 on 
the numerical keyboard for the left and right direction, respectively. Subsequently, eye 
dominance was determined by comparing the average suppression times of the left eye to 
that of the right. The eye for which the average suppression time was the lowest was 
considered to be the dominant eye. Consequently, the CFS mask was presented in this eye 
throughout the rest of the experiment. 
In the main experiment, the word or pseudo-word stimuli were presented in lower 
case letters either 2° above or below the fixation cross and gradually faded in from 0 to 50% 
contrast over a period of 2 seconds (see Figure 10.1). Upon breakthrough, participants had to 
indicate as fast as possible the location of the stimulus (above or below fixation) with a 
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button press on the numerical keyboard (1 for above, 3 for below), initiating a new trial. A 
fixation cross was presented during the intertrial interval, which lasted 2 seconds. 
 
Design 
During the eye dominance measurement phase, participants completed 80 trials in 
total, in half of which the target was presented to the left eye. For each eye, half of the targets 
pointed leftwards. Trial presentation was randomized. 
The main experiment consisted of 308 trials, 154 word trials and 154 pseudo-word 
trials, split up in two blocks between which participants took a break of at least one minute. 
Besides the word type manipulation, we also used word stimuli that varied in frequency of 
occurrence. To ensure that one element of a word - pseudo-word pair (e.g., lamp) could not 
prime the other (e.g., hamp), they were always presented in different blocks. That is, the 
words of a random half of the pairs were presented in the first block together with the 
pseudo-words of the second half of the pairs and vice versa for the second block. Block order 
was counterbalanced across participants through their participant number (odd or even). 
Presentation order of the stimuli within a single block was randomized for each participant. 
The position of the stimuli was randomized, such that half of the stimuli appeared above the 
fixation cross and the other half below. Word – pseudo-word pairs were linked in the sense 
that they either appeared both above or below fixation. Furthermore, stimuli presented 
above and below fixation were matched in terms of word frequency (Mabove = 2.33, Mbelow = 
2.33, Bayes Factor = 6). Position was kept constant across participants. Prior to the start of the 
main experiment, participants completed 20 different practice trials to familiarize themselves 
with the task. 
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Figure 10.1. Example of the trial sequence. First, a fixation cross was presented for 2 seconds. 
Subsequently, the CFS mask was presented in one eye and the (non/pseudo)-word stimulus 
in the other. The (non/pseudo)-word stimulus increased in contrast from 0 to 50% over the 
course of 2 seconds and was continuously present until participants made a response. 
 
Results and Discussion 
All analyses were done on correct trials only (1.9% of the data had to be removed). 
Furthermore, data points below 500 ms or more than three standard deviations above each 
participant’s mean suppression time were not included in the analysis (1.5% of the correct 
trials). Suppression times were log-transformed due to their positive skewness. All analyses 
were conducted within the Bayesian statistical framework using the BayesFactor package to 
calculate Bayes Factors (BF) and 95% credible intervals (Rouder & Morey, 2012; Rouder, 
Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012). In contrast to classical null hypothesis testing, a 
Bayesian approach allows to quantify evidence in favor of either the null or the alternative 
hypothesis (Kruschke, 2011; Rouder & Morey, 2012; Rouder et al., 2012). All models tested 
here are so called mixed models as they consist of both fixed and random effects. The 
random part of the models was kept constant across all analyses and included random 
intercepts for participants and for words. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we 
always z-transformed continuous variables and we also report t-statistics and 95% 
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confidence intervals for the same models using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, n.d., p. 4) (see Supplementary Table S10.1). 
Figure 10.2 depicts average log suppression times for words and pseudo-words 
together with individual data points (left) and the relationship between word frequency and 
suppression time (right) (see Figure S10.1 for untransformed suppression times). Through 
eye balling the results it already becomes clear that there is neither an effect of word type nor 
word frequency on suppression time. This was confirmed in the BF analysis (see Table 10.2 
for estimates of the fixed effects). The BF for a model including the effect of word type and 
random intercepts for participants and words was not favored over the random effects only 
model (BF = 26, i.e., the random effects only model was 26 times more likely). Similar results 
were obtained for the word frequency data (BF = 11). Both analyses were run separately since 
there was no meaningful value for word frequency of pseudo-words.  
 
 
Figure 10.2. Results of Experiment 1. (A) The bar plot indicates mean log suppression times 
for words and pseudo-words. The dots show the mean log suppression time for each 
participant (connected dots refer to the same participant). (B) Scatter plot depicting the 
(absence of a) relationship between word frequency and log suppression time. The data 
points refer to mean log suppression time for each item averaged across participants. The 
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black line refers to the posterior estimate of the relationship between word frequency and log 
suppression time based on a mixed-effects model fit (with the BayesFactor package) with 
participants and words as crossed random effects and word frequency as a fixed effect. 
 
Table 10.2. Point Estimates and 95% Credible Intervals of the Fixed Effects in Experiment 1 
and 2. 
Model Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 Estimate 95% CI  Estimate 95% CI 
(1)      
Mu 0.354 [0.164 ; 0.557]  0.330 [0.226 ; 0.435] 
Pseudo/Non - 
word 
0.003 [-0.005 ; 0.010]  0.003 [-0.0006 ; 0.007] 
Word -0.003 [-0.010 ; 0.005]  -0.003 [-0.007 ; 0.0006] 
Inverted NA NA  0.002 [-0.002 ; 0.006] 
Upright NA NA  -0.002 [-0.006 ; 0.002] 
      
(2)      
Mu 0.350 [0.160 ; 0.536]  0.330 [0.221 ; 0.435] 
Word 
Frequency 
-0.007 [-0.022 ; 0.007]  -0.007 [-0.020 ; 0.006] 
Inverted NA NA  0.001 [-0.004 ; 0.007] 
Upright NA NA  -0.001 [-0.007 ; 0.004] 
      
(3)       
Mu 0.350 [0.161 ; 0.538]  0.330 [0.220 ; 0.434] 
Word 
Frequency  
-0.012 [-0.032 ; 0.009]  -0.003 [-0.020 ; 0.013] 
Inverted  NA NA  0.001 [-0.004 ; 0.007] 
Upright NA NA  -0.001 [-0.007 ; 0.004] 
Pixel Density -0.016 [-0.030 ; -0.002]  -0.036 [-0.049 ; -0.025] 
Trial  -0.053 [-0.064 ; -0.042]  -0.051 [-0.057 ; -0.046] 
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Age of 
Acquisition 
-0.008 [-0.029 ; 0.011]  -0.004 [-0.019 ; 0.011] 
Concreteness -0.008 [-0.025 ; 0.009]  -0.005 [-0.018 ; 0.009] 
      
(4)      
Mu 0.352 [0.162 ; 0.547]  0.332 [0.227 ; 0.437] 
Pixel Density  -0.019 [-0.030 ; -0.009]  -0.035 [-0.046 ; -0.025] 
Trial  -0.060 [-0.067 ; -0.052]  -0.052 [-0.056 ; -0.048] 
Note. Per experiment, the parameter estimates of the fixed effects of four models are 
reported. Model (1) comprised only the main effect of word type (and of inversion in 
Experiment 2). Model (2) tested the main effect of word frequency (and inversion in 
Experiment 2). Model (3) is an expansion of Model (2) in that the main effects of pixel 
density, trial number, age of acquisition and concreteness were added. Finally, model (4) 
only consists of the main effects of pixel density and trial number. Models (1) and (4) were 
fitted using all data, model (2) was run on the word data only and model (3) included all 
words except one because concreteness and age of acquisition estimates were not available 
for this stimulus. To facilitate the comparison, all continuous variables were z-transformed 
(see Table 10.1 for means and standard deviations of the variables). 
 
In addition, it is known that word frequency correlates with many other sublexical, 
lexical and semantic variables (Chalard, Bonin, Méot, Boyer, & Fayol, 2003; Morrison, 
Chappell, & Ellis, 1997). Hence, it is possible that the true word frequency effect was masked 
in the previous analysis. To test this hypothesis, a supplementary analysis was conducted in 
which a number of covariates were added to isolate the “pure” word frequency effect. That 
is, besides word frequency, we included main effects of age of acquisition, concreteness, 
pixel density and trial number. As age of acquisition and concreteness data were unavailable 
for one word, the analysis was performed on the remaining 153 words. Word length was left 
out to avoid potential multicollinearity issues as it correlated highly with pixel density (r = 
.80).  
The estimates of the fixed effects (see Table 10.2) seem to suggest that neither 
concreteness, age of acquisition nor word frequency are related to suppression time as their 
corresponding 95% credible intervals all include zero. Trial number and pixel density on the 
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other hand, do seem to have an influence, in that suppression times became faster as the 
experiment advanced and as words contained more pixels. The obtained BFs confirm these 
findings (see Table 10.3). Two models are equally preferable, one with trial as only predictor 
and one with both trial and pixel density as predictors. All other models are at least eight 
times less likely. 
 
Table 10.3. Bayes Factors for the Additional Analysis of Experiment 1. 
Model Bayes Factor 
Trial  1 
Pixel Density + Trial  1 
Word Frequency + Pixel Density + Trial  8 
Word Frequency + Trial  9 
Pixel Density + Trial + Concreteness  10 
Pixel Density + Trial + Age of Acquisition 10 
Trial + Age of Acquisition 12 
Trial + Concreteness 12 
Word Frequency + Pixel Density + Trial + Concreteness 59 
Word Frequency + Pixel Density + Trial + Age of Acquisition 62 
Word Frequency + Trial + Concreteness 72 
Word Frequency + Trial + Age of Acquisition 78 
Pixel Density + Trial + Age of Acquisition + Concreteness 82 
All other models  >100 
Note. The Bayes Factor is relative to the model with trial number as only predictor and 
random intercepts for subjects and words. A Bayes Factor > 1 indicates evidence for the trial 
number only model. Models are ordered from low to high in terms of their Bayes Factor. 
 
To further examine the effects of trial and pixel density, an additional analysis was 
run on both words and pseudo-words using only these two variables (see Table 10.2). The 
results are very similar, except that the model with both trial and pixel density was now 
clearly preferred over a trial only model (BF = 33), a pixel density only model (BF > 100) and 
a null model (BF > 100). 
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In Experiment 1, a set of word stimuli varying in word frequency and word type 
(word vs. pseudo-word) were presented under CFS and participants had to detect, upon 
breakthrough, as fast as possible whether the word stimulus was presented either above or 
below fixation. It was hypothesized that, given that semantic information of word stimuli is 
extracted in the absence of awareness, more frequent words would break suppression faster 
and words would break through suppression faster than pseudo-words. Contrary to our 
predictions, we found neither an effect of word frequency nor of word type. In additional 
analyses, we did however find a trial effect indicating that suppression times shortened over 
the course of the experiment (see (Ludwig, Sterzer, Kathmann, Franz, & Hesselmann, 2013) 
for similar observations). We interpret this trial effect as indicating that participants did not 
press randomly across the experiment, but were engaged in the task until the end. Moreover, 
pixel density of the stimuli also predicted suppression in that stimuli that comprised fewer 
pixels had longer response times. A similar effect was found by Lupyan and Ward (2013) 
using pictures as stimuli, which was taken to mean that the effectiveness of suppression 
depends on stimulus-driven factors like signal strength. 
Although the evidence for a null effect in Experiment 1 was quite strong (according to 
the criteria advanced by Jeffreys (1961), alternative explanations can be devised as to why a 
null effect would be observed. First, the pseudo-words used in Experiment 1 were still word-
like in the sense that they were pronounceable and orthographically similar to existing 
words. Thus, these pseudo-words might have activated the semantic network to an extent 
comparable to real words yielding no suppression time difference between words and 
pseudo-words. Therefore, in Experiment 2, non-words were generated by randomly jittering 
the individual letters of the words (e.g., lamp resulted in mlap). Second, one could argue that, 
although semantic information of words might not be processed, familiarity of the individual 
letters still is. Indeed, the potential role of stimulus familiarity (of the individual letter) 
cannot be disentangled from the design of Experiment 1. Therefore, we included a condition 
in Experiment 2 in which we presented the words and non-words inverted to assess the role 
of familiarity in breaking suppression (Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, Rogers, et al., 2013; Stein, 
Sterzer, et al., 2012). Third, a potential criticism of Experiment 1 could be that our mask was 
just not sensitive enough to detect any difference between our conditions. It should be noted 
though, that this explanation is at odds with the observed pixel density effect. That is, 
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suppression appeared to be stronger when the bottom-up signal was relatively weak (see 
also Lupyan & Ward, 2013). Nevertheless, we addressed this in Experiment 2 by including a 
control experiment in which, instead of a word stimulus, a simpler stimulus (a white disc) 
was presented under CFS. The size of this disc was varied and it was hypothesized that the 
smaller disc would break suppression slower on average than the bigger disc, if suppression 
effectively takes place. Fourth, we observed that the consistency over participants in 
suppression time was rather low (i.e., Cronbach’s α = .20). Put differently, there was no 
stability across participants in which words broke suppression early and which words were 
relatively delayed. To further examine this issue, Experiment 2 consisted of a test-retest 
design such that it was possible to evaluate whether suppression time is stable within 
participants.  
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Twenty new paid participants (4 male, age range 18 – 30 years) were recruited for 
Experiment 2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve 
with respect to the goal of the study. Every participant provided informed consent before the 
start of the experiment. Note that, due to a programming error for participants with odd 
subject numbers, we had to rerun our original sample of 20 participants with 10 new 
participants with an odd subject number, but keeping the original participants with an even 
subject number. Furthermore, 4 participants were not included because they did not 
complete the full experiment. One of them did not show up for the retest session, the others 
did not finish the first session due to suppression being too effective. 
 
Apparatus 
The experimental set-up was the same as in Experiment 1. 
 
Stimuli 
All stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1 except for the following. A partially new 
set of word stimuli was created to ensure that the findings from Experiment 1 could not be 
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attributed to the specific stimulus set used (see Table 10.1 for a summary of the stimulus 
characteristics). Word length varied from three to seven letters and word frequency from 
0.669 to 3.882. There were 115 words in total, from which unpronounceable non-words were 
created by shuffling the letters. To test the effect of stimulus familiarity, the 230 words and 
non-words were inverted, thus yielding 460 stimuli in total. The size of the words ranged 
from 1.56° to 4.35° depending on the length of the word. The height of the words was 
maximally 0.92°. 
In the control experiment, a white disc was presented as a target instead of a word. 
The radius of the disc was manipulated to be either 0.6° or 1.2°.  
 
Procedure 
The experimental procedure was similar to Experiment 1. Prior to the start of the 
main experiment, participants completed the eye dominance experiment. The task in the 
main experiment was exactly the same as in Experiment 1. In the control experiment, a white 
disc increasing in contrast from 0 to 100% over the course of 2 seconds was presented either 
2° above or below fixation. As in the main experiment, participant had to indicate the 
location of the disc as fast as possible once it broke suppression through a button press on 
the numerical keyboard (1 for above, 3 for below). A second session always took place 24 
hours after the first session and included only the main and control experiment. 
 
Design 
The main independent variables were word type (word vs. non-word), inversion 
(upright vs. inverted) and word frequency (ranging from 0.669 to 3.882). In the control 
experiment, disc radius was manipulated (small vs. large; 0.6° vs. 1.2°). Before the start of the 
main experiment, participants again performed 20 practice trials on a different set of stimuli. 
The main experiment now consisted of 460 trials (i.e., 115 words, 115 non-words and their 
inverted counterparts) and therefore was split up into four blocks. Similar to Experiment 1, 
the words of a random half of the word – non-word pairs were presented in the first half of 
the experiment together with the non-words of the second half of the pairs and vice versa. 
The position of the stimuli was again determined at random and kept constant across 
participants. Similar to Experiment 1, word – non-word pairs and their inverted counterparts 
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were all either presented above or below fixation. As a result the number of stimuli 
appearing above and below fixation was not perfectly identical (i.e., 232 stimuli below 
fixation and 228 above). Stimuli were again matched on word frequency (Mabove = 2.24, Mbelow 
= 2.34, BF = 4). 
After completing the main experiment, the experimenter started the control 
experiment in which participants had to detect a white disc that was either presented 2° 
above or below fixation. They first completed 20 practice trials and subsequently performed 
100 trials in the control experiment (50 per condition, randomized on each trial). On the 
second day, participants returned to perform the experiments in the same order again, 
except for the eye dominance measurement which was not repeated. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Main experiment.  
Figure 10.3 summarizes the results of Experiment 2 (see Figure S10.2 for 
untransformed suppression times). As in Experiment 1, analyses were done on the 
logarithmically transformed suppression times after removal of inaccurate responses (1.6% 
of all data) and outlying data points (defined as being below 500 ms or higher than each 
participant’s mean suppression times plus three times the standard deviation; 1.5% of all 
correct trials). Again, all models fitted here are mixed models with random intercepts for 
participants and for words.  
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Figure 10.3. Results of Experiment 2. (A) The bar plot depicts the mean log suppression times 
for each condition. The dots refer to mean log suppression times per participant (connected 
dots refer to the same participant). (B) Mean log suppression times for the control 
experiment. The bar plot depicts the grand mean for both conditions whereas the dots refer 
to single participants (connected dots refer to the same participant). (C) Scatter plot depicting 
the (absence of a) relationship between word frequency and log suppression times for 
upright (black) and inverted (gray) words. The black and gray lines (hardly discernible) refer 
to the estimates of the relationship between word frequency and log suppression time after a 
mixed-effects model fit with subject and word as crossed random effects and word frequency 
and inversion as fixed effects. 
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The results shown in Table 10.4 indicate that neither an effect of word type nor 
inversion nor an interaction between both is present in the data (see also Table 10.2 for the 
parameter estimates of the model including only the main effects of word type and 
inversion). In addition, an analysis on only the word stimuli did not reveal an effect of word 
frequency, inversion or an interaction between both variables (see Table 10.5 for Bayes 
Factors; and Table 10.2 for parameter estimates of the main effects only model). Taken 
together, the (empty) random intercepts only model was always preferred. 
 
Table 10.4. Bayes Factors for the Analysis of Word Type and Inversion of Experiment 2. 
Model Bayes Factor 
Random Intercepts Only  1 
Word Type 15 
Inversion  45 
Word Type + Inversion  > 100 
Word Type * Inversion > 100 
Note. The Bayes Factor is relative to the null model, including only random intercepts for 
subjects and words. A Bayes Factor > 1 indicates evidence for the null model. 
 
Table 10.5. Bayes Factors for the Analysis of Word Frequency and Inversion of Experiment 2. 
Model Bayes Factor 
Random Intercepts Only 1 
Word Frequency 10 
Inversion  36 
Word Frequency + Inversion  > 100 
Word Frequency * Inversion > 100 
Note. The Bayes Factor is relative to the null model, including only random intercepts for 
subjects and words. A Bayes Factor > 1 indicates evidence for the null model. 
 
As in Experiment 1, we ran an additional analysis to statistically control for 
confounding variables (i.e., concreteness, age of acquisition, pixel density and trial number). 
The results replicate our previous findings in that the model with trial number and pixel 
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density was preferred over all other models by a factor of at least ten (see Table 10.6). Also, 
when looking at the model with the main effects of word frequency, inversion, concreteness, 
age of acquisition, pixel density and trial number, it can be seen that only the 95% credible 
intervals of trial and pixel density exclude zero (see Table 10.2). The effects of trial and pixel 
density were confirmed in an additional analysis on both words and non-words using only 
these two predictors (see Table 10.2). That is, the model with both trial and pixel density was 
the best fitting model (all BFs > 100). 
 
Table 10.6 
Bayes Factors for the Additional Analysis of Experiment 2. 
Model Bayes Factor 
Pixel Density + Trial  1 
Pixel Density  + Trial + Concreteness  10 
Pixel Density + Trial + Age of Acquisition  12 
Word Frequency + Pixel Density + Trial  12 
Word Inversion + Pixel Density + Trial 36 
Pixel Density + Trial + Age of Acquisition + Concreteness 97 
All other models  >100 
Note. The Bayes Factor is relative to the model with trial number and pixel density as 
predictors and random intercepts for subjects and words. A Bayes Factor > 1 indicates 
evidence for the trial number and pixel density only model. Models are ordered from low to 
high in terms of their Bayes Factor. 
 
Control experiment.  
As is apparent from Figure 10.3, the data from the control experiment indicate an 
effect in the predicted direction. Concretely, the large disc broke through suppression faster 
than the small disc. This was confirmed by a Bayes factor (BF > 100). The model including 
circle radius as a fixed effect and random subject intercepts was preferred over the random 
intercepts only model. The null effects observed in the main experiment can therefore not be 
attributed to a general lack of suppression elicited by our CFS mask. 
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Test-retest reliability.  
Figure 10.4 depicts a histogram of the test-retest reliability scores for each participant 
in the main experiment. These correlations were computed by correlating the log 
suppression times for all 460 stimuli obtained in session 1 with those obtained in session 2. 
The mean test-retest reliability score was equal to .16 (ranging from -.10 to .37). Note that 
recalculating the test-retest reliability for the word stimuli only did not improve these 
correlations (mean .16, range from -.12 to .38). The right panel of Figure 10.4 depicts the test-
retest reliability for the control experiment. Since this experiment only included repetitions 
of the same two stimuli, the effect size (Cohen’s d) for circle radius was computed for each 
participant on each session and correlated between sessions, yielding a correlation of .51. 
 
 
Figure 10.4. Test-retest reliability. (A) Histogram of test-retest correlations for every 
participant. (B) Scatterplot between the effect sizes obtained in sessions 1 and 2 of the control 
experiment. The black line refers to the best fitting regression line obtained from a simple 
linear regression of session 2 effect sizes on session 1 effects sizes. 
 
In Experiment 2, some potential alternative explanations for the absence of a 
suppression time difference between words and pseudo-words were explored. First, the 
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pseudo-words used in Experiment 1 might still have elicited some partial semantic 
activation, obscuring an effect of unconscious processing of semantic information. Therefore, 
in Experiment 2 unpronounceable non-words were used, generated by scrambling the 
individual letters of each word stimulus. Still, no evidence for an effect of word type was 
obtained. Secondly, stimulus familiarity might have contributed to the suppression times for 
each condition in Experiment 1 instead of semantic processing. Therefore, we included a 
condition in which the words and non-words were inverted, to examine the effect of 
stimulus familiarity while keeping low-level characteristics of the stimulus constant. 
Surprisingly, no evidence of an inversion effect was obtained, contrary to previous findings 
(Yang & Yeh, 2011, 2014). In hindsight, the absence of an inversion effect is not that 
surprising given that inverting letters in the Latin alphabet does not always have a 
disruptive effect. That is, five letters remain the same when inverted (i.e., l, o, s, x, and z), six 
become another letter (i.e., b, d, n, p, q, and u), and some remain letter-like (e.g., m and w).  
Third, the results of Experiment 1 showed low consistency across participants in 
suppression times. Therefore, Experiment 2 employed a test-retest design to further probe 
the reliability in both the main and control experiment. Test-retest reliability in the main 
experiment was on average rather low, indicating that there is considerable instability in the 
suppression times within participants. In the control experiment, the test-retest correlation 
approximated the estimate reported in Yang et al. (2010) in which a similar measure was 
correlated across sessions. Although the latter correlation was still far from perfect, its 
comparability with the correlation reported in Yang et al. (2010) speculatively hints at a 
potential ceiling for correlations of effect sizes based on stimulus manipulations in the CFS 
paradigm. Note that this does not mean that the data from the main experiment have no 
structure whatsoever. That is, some subjects showed a position bias for stimuli either 
presented above or below fixation and these effects correlated well across sessions (test-retest 
correlation for Cohen’s d of the position effect in the main experiment was .87). 
Finally, the results of Experiment 1 could have potentially been explained by a lack of 
suppression initiated by the CFS masks or by a general insensitivity to detect any effect. To 
address this issue, a control experiment was conducted in which a simple stimulus, a white 
disc, was varied in radius. It was predicted that a large disc would break suppression faster 
than a small disc and the results of the control experiment confirmed this prediction. 
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However, both the radius effect in circles and the pixel density effect in letter strings are 
fairly low-level. In principle it is possible that the present set-up is merely not sensitive 
enough to capture any high-level effect. That is, the lack of a word inversion effect could 
indicate a general lack of obtaining inversion effects using our implementation of b-CFS. To 
address this issue we set out to replicate the widely reported face inversion effect, in which 
faces presented upright break suppression faster than inverted faces (Gobbini, Gors, 
Halchenko, Rogers, et al., 2013; Jiang et al., 2007; Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011; Stein, Peelen, et 
al., 2011; Stein, Senju, et al., 2011; Stein, Seymour, et al., 2014; Stein, Sterzer, et al., 2012; E. 
Yang et al., 2007; G. Zhou et al., 2010). In Experiment 3 the same b-CFS set-up was used, but 
the suppressed stimuli were (inverted or upright) faces instead of letter strings. If our b-CFS 
design is indeed unable to obtain high-level effects, one would expect no face inversion 
effect. Alternatively, finding a robust face inversion effect in light of the results of 
Experiments 1 and 2, would suggest that word frequency, word type and letter inversion 
have genuinely no effect on suppression times. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Eight volunteers participated in the experiment (3 male, age range 24 – 34 years). All 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve with respect to the goal of the 
study. Every participant provided informed consent before the start of the experiment.  
 
Apparatus 
The experimental set-up was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Stimuli 
The same CFS mask was used as in Experiments 1 and 2. The face stimuli were 
obtained from the NimStim database (Tottenham et al., 2009). Ten neutral faces were picked 
from the database (five male). These were resized to approximately 2.1° x 2.6° (similar to 
Stein et al. (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011)). Four different neutral faces (two male) were used for 
the practice trials. 
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Procedure 
The experimental procedure was similar to Experiments 1 and 2. A trial started with a 
2 second presentation of the fixation cross after which the CFS mask was presented in the 
dominant eye and the upright or inverted face stimulus in the non-dominant eye. As in Stein 
et al. (Stein, Hebart, et al., 2011), the face stimulus was presented at a random location to the 
left or right of fixation. The participants were instructed to report as quickly as possible the 
location of the stimulus (left or right relative to fixation, through a button press) upon the 
moment it broke suppression.  
 
Design 
The only independent variable was inversion (upright vs. inverted). Prior to the start 
of the main experiment, participants completed 16 practice trials to familiarize themselves 
with the task. During the main experiment, participants completed 120 trials in three blocks 
of 40 trials. For each participant, all ten faces were presented equally often in the inverted as 
in the upright condition and they were shown right of fixation in half of the trials and left in 
the other half. The order of the trials was randomized.  
 
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, all reported analyses were done on the logarithmically 
transformed response times after removal of inaccurate (1.5 %) and outlying data points 
(defined as below 500 ms or higher than each participant’s mean suppression time plus three 
times the standard deviation; 1.6 % of all correct trials). Figure 10.5 summarizes the results of 
Experiment 3 (see Figure S10.3 for untransformed suppression times). There appears to be a 
strong inversion effect in that upright faces break through suppression faster than inverted 
faces. This was confirmed by comparing the model with face inversion as a factor against an 
empty model (both models also included random intercepts for participants and for faces). 
Specifically, the Bayes Factor indicated a clear preference for the model including face 
orientation over the empty model (BF > 100). Furthermore, the 95% credible interval did not 
include zero (95% CI: [0.09; 0.18]). 
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Figure 10.5. Results of Experiment 3. The bar plot indicates mean log suppression times for 
upright and inverted faces. The dots show the mean log suppression time for each 
participant (connected dots refer to the same participant). 
 
Experiment 3 clearly replicated the face inversion effect, one of the most robust 
findings in the b-CFS literature, using the same set-up as in Experiments 1 and 2. Indeed, the 
absence of an inversion effect obtained in Experiment 2 could be due to a general lack of 
obtaining any kind of familiarity effect using our design (in contrast to our explanation of 
inverting individual letters of the Latin alphabet not effectively disrupting familiarity). The 
present results rule out the possibility that our b-CFS implementation disrupted any 
sensitivity to find inversion effects. Thus, it is not the case that the employed set-up did not 
allow us to detect high-level effects. This suggests that the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 
genuinely reflect that more high level characteristics such as word frequency, word type 
(words vs. non-words) and letter inversion do not influence suppression times.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The goal of this study was to explore two hypotheses regarding unconscious 
processing of semantic information of words presented under CFS. First, it was predicted 
that existing words would break suppression faster than their pseudo-word/non-word 
variants. Second, we tested whether the suppression time of words is modulated by their 
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frequency, resembling the word frequency effect in visual word recognition. Across two 
experiments, we found neither a word type effect nor a frequency effect. While the lack of a 
word type effect in Experiment 1 could be attributed to the use of pronounceable pseudo-
words as a baseline, Experiment 2 excluded this explanation, as words did not break 
suppression faster than unpronounceable non-words. In addition, the fact that there was a 
consistent negative relation between pixel density and suppression time, suggests that the 
observed null results can not be attributed to the paradigm being insensitive to differences in 
detectability. The latter was further supported by Experiment 3, which showed that upright 
faces broke suppression faster than inverted ones using the exact same b-CFS set-up. Thus, 
even though the employed paradigm can capture high-level effects, only variability in low-
level word characteristics like pixel density led to differential suppression times. Taken 
together, our findings do not support the claim that words are processed up to a semantic 
level under CFS.  
In the visual masking literature on the other hand, unconscious semantic processing 
has been established (Marcel, 1983; Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009). 
Should there be any reason to expect differences between visual masking and CFS 
paradigms? Discrepancies between unconscious processing of emotional information of faces 
have been reported in the context of masking, interocular suppression, and gaze-contingent 
crowding (Faivre, Berthet, & Kouider, 2012). In visual masking, one explanation as to why 
the masked stimulus does not enter visual awareness is that re-entrant activation from 
higher cortical areas, presumably associated with perceiving the stimulus (Lamme & 
Spekreijse, 2000; Lamme, Supèr, Landman, Roelfsema, & Spekreijse, 2000), is nearly absent, 
yet the feed-forward sweep of activation associated with presentation of the masked 
stimulus is largely intact (Breitmeyer, 2008; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998). CFS, however, 
relies on binocular rivalry of which the suppression mechanisms have mostly been attributed 
to inhibition between monocular neurons, although most recent models of binocular rivalry 
indicate potential inhibition mechanisms between higher levels of the visual system also 
(Blake, 1989; Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Tong et al., 2006). Indeed, neuroimaging studies have 
indicated that processing of suppressed stimuli beyond striate areas is largely absent along 
the ventral visual pathway (Fang & He, 2005; Hesselmann & Malach, 2011). As a 
consequence, any processing of semantic information under CFS seems implausible. Indeed, 
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in a standard dissociation study using CFS, Kang, Blake, and Woodman (2011) explicitly 
showed that parametrically manipulating target visibility attenuated the amplitude of the 
N400 component (an index of semantic congruency) until it was absent when observers 
could not discriminate the meaning of the suppressed words. 
An alternative explanation of the present findings is that semantic information is 
indeed extracted under CFS, but that the b-CFS paradigm is ill-suited to unambiguously 
detect these effects. That is, our results showed that suppression times are unstable both 
between and within participants. Such a poor reliability has rather dramatic effects on the 
probability of detecting a true underlying relation. An average test-retest reliability of .16 as 
observed in Experiment 2 could attenuate a true correlation of, say .60, to .24 (note that this 
example only considers the reliability of one variable, in this case suppression time, thereby 
(unrealistically) assuming that the other measure (e.g., word frequency) is perfectly reliable. 
In practice, the .24 estimate may thus even prove to be too optimistic). So even if there 
actually is a relation between suppression breaking and word frequency, it might go 
undetected using this paradigm. In comparison, reliability estimates of (log-transformed) 
response times in traditional word recognition studies generally range from .70 to .90 (e.g., 
Keuleers, Diependaele, & Brysbaert, 2010; Keuleers et al., 2012). However, the low reliability 
observed here is specific to our stimuli and does not need to generalize to other stimuli like 
pictures or the b-CFS paradigm in general. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that criticisms have been raised concerning the 
validity of the b-CFS paradigm to infer unconscious processing of suppressed stimuli (Stein, 
Hebart, et al., 2011; Stein & Sterzer, 2014). That is, the dependent measure used in b-CFS 
studies is the time it takes for subjects to be able to make a response on a certain attribute of 
the suppressed stimulus (e.g. its location). This suppression time measure per se is based on 
conscious processing. However, the argument to use b-CFS as a valid way to infer 
unconscious processing is that differences in suppression times are attributable to 
unconscious processing of the stimulus while suppressed. For this reasoning to be valid, the 
observed suppression time differences should be due to CFS-specific processing and not non 
CFS-specific threshold differences. To rule out this possibility, Jiang et al. (2007) and 
subsequent studies usually implemented a binocular control condition in which the CFS 
mask and stimulus are simultaneously presented in both eyes. However, Stein, Hebart, et al. 
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(2011) have recently shown that this control condition is ill-suited to exclude non CFS-
specific processing in the CFS condition since both conditions differ on aspects other than 
CFS-specific processing. Based on these findings, Stein and Sterzer (2014) recently argued 
that b-CFS, as it is currently implemented, can not unequivocally provide evidence for 
unconscious processing of the suppressed stimulus. 
Taken together, the criticisms raised by Stein and colleagues (Stein, Hebart, et al., 
2011; Stein & Sterzer, 2014) and our low reliability estimates seem to imply that the use of b-
CFS as a paradigm to study unconscious semantic processing of words is questionable. 
Hence, we would argue that other paradigms combined with CFS might be more 
appropriate to probe the nature of processing of suppressed words (see also Heyman & 
Moors, 2012). For example, it might be valuable to present suppressed words as primes and 
to study their influence on the reaction times to (un)related targets in, for example, a lexical 
decision task. Nevertheless, the question remains as to which mechanisms underlie the 
(seemingly contradicting) effects observed in the literature. Below, we offer some speculative 
explanations, but it should be noted that future research and/or re-analysis of existing 
datasets is needed to assess their validity.  
One possibility is that familiar stimuli break suppression faster than unfamiliar 
stimuli (Gobbini, Gors, Halchenko, Rogers, et al., 2013; Stein, Sterzer, et al., 2012). Such a 
familiarity effect has been observed by Jiang et al. (2007). In one of their experiments, 
Chinese and Hebrew speakers were presented with Chinese and Hebrew words under CFS. 
Jiang et al. (2007) observed that Chinese words broke suppression faster for Chinese speakers 
as well as Hebrew words for Hebrew speakers. Furthermore, Yang and Yeh (2011) also 
examined familiarity effects by comparing upright words with inverted and phase-
scrambled words. Both inverting and phase-scrambling the character words significantly 
increased suppression times relative to upright words. These findings together with those of 
Jiang et al. (2007) do provide evidence for a potential familiarity effect under b-CFS. In 
contrast, we did not obtain an inversion effect in Experiment 2, but in hindsight this is not 
entirely unexpected if individual characters are the locus of the familiarity effect. Specifically, 
inverting Latin letters often yields the same letter (e.g., o) or a different letter (e.g., d becomes 
p and vice versa), thus yielding (partially) familiar character strings. In addition, research 
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shows that an inversion effect is not ubiquitous. For instance, Stein, Sterzer, et al. (2012) 
found an inversion effect of human faces and bodies, but not of inanimate objects.  
Note that a familiarity effect could be the result of bottom-up processes (i.e., 
unconscious processing occurs to a certain extent under CFS and familiar stimuli, or familiar 
parts, break suppression faster) as well as top-down processes (i.e., subjects generate familiar 
representations that are matched with the visual input, which in turn facilitates suppression 
breaking). The latter mechanism could also explain the priming effect found by Costello et al. 
(2009). Presumably, subjects generate a set of candidate targets based on the prime (e.g., dog, 
pet, animal when the prime is cat). The visual representation of these candidates might boost 
the detection of the actual target, when prime and target are indeed related, through a 
matching process. In a recent study by Lupyan and Ward (2013), a similar biasing effect has 
been reported in that informative verbal labels (presented auditorily) biased detection 
performance of suppressed visual stimuli relative to uninformative verbal labels. This effect 
was attributed to top-down activation of the visual shape properties of the suppressed 
stimuli which eventually biased the competition process (Lupyan & Ward, 2013). Note that 
such a top-down process implies that, for example in the study of Costello et al. (2009), 
semantic processing of the suppressed stimulus does not necessarily have to occur. That is, 
the prime stimulus could activate visual representations of related words acting as a 
predictive signal for the visual system (see Lupyan & Ward, 2013). 
Another explanation is based on the data-analysis method used in many studies. That 
is, most studies only perform a standard repeated measures ANOVA on (log-transformed) 
suppression times averaged across stimuli (i.e., the so-called F1 test). In psycholinguistics, 
this has been referred to as the “language-as-fixed-effect” fallacy (Clark, 1973) and 
incorporating stimulus as a random effect is standard in psycholinguistics nowadays. The 
importance of this practice has recently been demonstrated by Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and 
Tily (2013) in a simulation study. In short, they showed that performing only an F1 test 
dramatically increases Type 1 errors especially for between-item manipulations (in that 
respect, it is interesting to remark that a classical repeated measures F1 analysis on the data of 
the main experiment of Experiment 2 yielded a marginally significant effect of word type 
(F1(1,19) = 3.3, p = .09)). Furthermore, in order to quantify the evidence in favor of one or the 
other model, statistical inference in this study was done in a Bayesian framework, which has 
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shown to be more conservative than traditional null hypothesis significance testing with 
respect to the strength of the evidence for an effect (Wetzels et al., 2011). This allows one to 
quantify evidence in favor of the hypothesis that no semantic processing occurs under CFS, 
while traditional test cannot confirm the null hypothesis (Kruschke, 2011; Wagenmakers, 
2007). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, the extent to which words are semantically processed in the absence of 
awareness (induced by CFS) was studied. In Experiment 1, no evidence was obtained for 
differential processing between word and pseudo-word stimuli nor a modulation of 
suppression time of words by word frequency. In Experiment 2, the absence of these effects 
was replicated. In contrast, a control experiment with a simpler stimulus showed that large 
white discs break suppression faster than small white discs. Finally, Experiment 3 replicated 
the face inversion effect, thus ruling out the possibility that the null effects were merely 
caused by our experimental set-up being insensitive to any high-level manipulation. These 
results were explained from the perspective that the suppressed stimuli might not have been 
processed up to the level at which semantic information is usually extracted. Alternatively, 
due to the instability of suppression times within and between participants, b-CFS might be 
an ill-suited paradigm to study unconscious semantic processing of words.  
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES 
Figure S10.1. Results of Experiment 1. (A) The bar plot indicates mean suppression times for 
words and pseudo-words. The dots show the mean suppression time for each participant 
(connected dots refer to the same participant). (B) Scatter plot depicting the (absence of a) 
relationship between word frequency and suppression time. The data points refer to mean 
suppression time for each item averaged across participants. The black line refers to the 
posterior estimate of the relationship between word frequency and suppression time based 
on a mixed-effects model fit (with the BayesFactor package) with participants and words as 
crossed random effects and word frequency as a fixed effect. 
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Figure S10.2. Results of Experiment 2. (A) The bar plot depicts the mean suppression times 
for each condition. The dots refer to mean suppression times per participant (connected dots 
refer to the same participant). (B) Mean suppression times for the control experiment. The 
bar plot depicts the grand mean for both conditions whereas the dots refer to single 
participants (connected dots refer to the same participant). (C) Scatter plot depicting the 
(absence of a) relationship between word frequency and suppression times for upright 
(black) and inverted (gray) words. The black and gray lines (hardly discernible) refer to the 
estimates of the relationship between word frequency and suppression time after a mixed-
effects model fit with subject and word as crossed random effects and word frequency and 
inversion as fixed effects. 
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Figure S10.3. Results of Experiment 3. The bar plot indicates mean suppression times for 
upright and inverted faces. The dots show the mean suppression time for each participant 
(connected dots refer to the same participant). 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE 
Table S10.1 
Point Estimates, t-values and 95% Confidence Intervals of the Fixed Effects in Experiment 1 and 2. 
Model Experiment 1  Experiment 2 
 Estimate t 95% CI  Estimate t 95% CI 
(1)        
Mu 0.353 3.818 [0.167 ; 0.538]  0.331 6.651 [0.231 ; 0.431] 
Pseudo/Non - 
word 
0.003 0.696 [-0.005 ; 
0.011] 
 0.003 1.653 [-0.0006 ; 
0.007] 
Word -0.003 -0.696 [-0.011 ; 
0.005] 
 -0.003 -1.653 [-0.007 ; 
0.0006] 
Inverted NA NA NA  0.002 0.765 [-0.002 ; 0.006] 
Upright NA NA NA  -0.002 -0.765 [-0.006 ; 0.002] 
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(2)        
Mu 0.350 3.841 [0.167 ; 0.541]  0.328 6.495 [0.227 ; 0.429] 
Word Frequency -0.007 -1.209 [-0.019 ; 
0.005] 
 -0.007 -1.227 [-0.019 ; 0.004] 
Inverted NA NA NA  0.001 0.499 [-0.004 ; 0.007] 
Upright NA NA NA  -0.001 -0.499 [-0.007 ; 0.004] 
        
(3)         
Mu 0.352 3.847 [0.168 ; 0.536]  0.329 6.542 [0.228 ; 0.430] 
Word Frequency  -0.012 -1.416 [-0.028 ; 
0.004] 
 -0.003 -0.448 [-0.017 ; 0.011] 
Inverted  NA NA NA  0.001 0.518 [-0.004 ; 0.007] 
Upright NA NA NA  -0.001 -0.518 [-0.007 ; 0.004] 
Pixel Density -0.016 -2.728 [-0.028 ; -
0.005] 
 -0.037 -7.045 [-0.047 ; -
0.027] 
Trial  -0.053 -9.714 [-0.064 ; -
0.042] 
 -0.051 -18.120 [-0.057 ; -
0.046] 
Age of Acquisition -0.008 -1.001 [-0.025 ; 
0.008] 
 -0.004 -0.577 [-0.017 ; 0.009] 
Concreteness -0.008 -1.062 [-0.022 ; 
0.006] 
 -0.005 -0.876 [-0.017 ; 0.006] 
        
(4)        
Mu 0.354 3.822 [0.168 ; 0.540]  0.332 6.674 [0.232 ; 0.431] 
Pixel Density  -0.018 -4.142 [-0.027 ; -
0.010] 
 -0.036 -7.373 [-0.045 ; -
0.026] 
Trial  -0.060 -15.079 [-0.067 ; -
0.052] 
 -0.052 -25.996 [-0.056 ; -
0.048] 
Note. See Table 10.2 for an explanation of the models. One can consider the effect of a 
variable significant (i.e., p < .05, two-tailed) if the absolute value of the t-statistic is above 1.96. 
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However, as Barr et al. (2013) showed, this approach is very error-prone in the context of a 
frequentist hypothesis test using only random intercepts. 
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Chapter 11.  
General Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To put it another way, the answer to the question, “I mean, what exact 
buttons do I have to hit?” is that there is no such button. 
Andrew Gelman, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some thoughts outlined in this discussion have been published in: 
Hesselmann, G., Moors, P. (2015). Definitely maybe: Can unconscious processes perform the same 
functions as conscious processes? Frontiers in Psychology, 6:584. 
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The central question we set out to address at the start of this dissertation was: “What 
is the representation of a visual stimulus perceptually suppressed through continuous flash 
suppression, with a focus on perceptual organization?”  
 
Summary of the main findings 
In Part One, we presented two studies in which the suppressive mechanisms of CFS 
itself were the topic of investigation. The motivation of these studies was to better 
understand the kind of suppression we are dealing with in CFS, because this has important 
implications for the interpretation of studies relying on the paradigm. Indeed, a large 
number of studies have made very general claims about what can and cannot be processed 
for stimuli perceptually suppressed through CFS. This stands in stark contrast with how 
little research has been devoted to unravelling the mechanisms behind the effective 
suppression induced by CFS. The studies in Part One of this dissertation are placed exactly 
in the context of a better understanding of the mechanisms behind CFS. The goal of these 
studies was to consider CFS in the context of binocular rivalry mechanisms in general and to 
explore whether CFS is just a stronger version of binocular rivalry or whether the dynamic 
and rhythmic nature of the CFS mask evokes mechanisms distinct from those known to play 
a role in regular binocular rivalry. In Chapter 2, we observed that the depth of suppression in 
CFS is feature-selective, as has been observed in regular binocular rivalry. That is, 
suppression depth was modulated by the feature overlap (i.e., motion speed) between CFS 
mask and suppressed stimulus. Furthermore, we showed that these results could not be 
explained by the predictions of a simple model relating the effectiveness of suppression to a 
reduction in neural adaptation to the CFS mask due to its transient nature. In Chapter 3, we 
studied the temporal dependency structure in time series of suppression times we obtained 
in several different b-CFS experiments. Akin to observations in regular binocular rivalry, we 
observed that these time series are not completely random and show robust serial 
correlations, providing a footprint of the underlying neural alternation process. Moreover, 
these serial correlations were most pronounced in situations in which the CFS mask was not 
swapped across trials, highlighting that the origin of these correlations was primarily 
monocular. Based on these results, we concluded that CFS and regular binocular rivalry rely 
on common rather than distinct mechanisms.  
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In Part Two, the focus of the chapters shifted to the “fate of the suppressed stimulus.” 
That is, the shared focus of all these studies was to elucidate what the “representation” is of a 
stimulus perceptually suppressed through CFS. In Chapter 4, we showed that the surface 
that is induced in the well-known Kanizsa configuration was not the driving the differences 
observed in suppression durations. Rather, these differences that were observed across all 
different conditions could be related to differences in the orientation spectrum of the stimuli 
that were used. In Chapter 7, we observed that biological motion stimuli (point-light 
walkers) do not differentially enter awareness in the case of stimulus inversion, while motion 
coherence did influence suppression times (coherent walkers entered awareness faster than 
scrambled ones). In Chapter 8, half-face stimuli presented in the configuration as we 
commonly experience them broke suppression faster, but this familiarity effect did depend 
on face inversion. This result led us to conclude that the curvature relative to fixation (i.e., 
convex vs. concave) was mainly driving the difference in suppression times. In Chapters 9 
and 10, we showed that seemingly high-level processing during CFS could either not be 
replicated (Chapter 9 on scene processing), or more basic aspects of the studied processing 
mechanism did not appear (Chapter 10 on word processing). Rather, in Chapter 9 we found 
that certain image properties of scene stimuli consistently broke suppression faster and in 
Chapter 10 we found that higher pixel density in the case of the word stimuli led to a 
difference in suppression times. Hence, both studies thus indicated no convincing evidence 
for high-level processing of stimuli perceptually suppressed through CFS. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 5, we obtained no evidence that a supraliminal auditory stimulus could influence 
processing of a perceptually suppressed visual stimulus, adding to the evidence that CFS 
impoverishes the representation of the suppressed stimulus to a great extent. Given the 
picture sketched from these findings, it was surprising to us, therefore, that we did obtain 
consistent evidence for launching events entering awareness faster compared to passing or 
pseudo-launch events (Chapter 6). Before putting this finding into the broader context of a 
current working hypothesis we have on the representational nature of the stimulus 
perceptually suppressed through CFS, we turn to a discussion of Chapters 2 and 3.  
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CFS – a stronger version of binocular rivalry after all? 
When CFS was introduced by Tsuchiya and Koch (2005), they asked whether CFS 
was merely a stronger form of binocular rivalry. The authors concluded that this was not the 
case, but that CFS rather combines aspects of flash suppression and binocular rivalry (hence 
the name continuous flash suppression). Here, I will argue that the original arguments put 
forward to consider CFS as being different from binocular rivalry are insufficient. In 
addition, based on the evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3, considerations from 
computational modeling of binocular rivalry, as well as pilot data, I will argue that the 
effectiveness of CFS mainly derives from a combination of three factors. First, the feature 
overlap between the mask and suppressed stimulus is a necessary, but not sufficient factor 
for effective suppression. Second, the transient induced by rhythmic updating of the CFS 
mask reduces neural adaptation to the mask. Third, the predictable, rhythmic nature by 
which the CFS mask is refreshed potentially acts as an entraining stimulus inducing cortical 
oscillations in the alpha frequency band leading to increased suppression depth because of 
gating by inhibition. 
 
Considerations on CFS as a continuous form of flash suppression  
In the original study, Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) documented that the temporal 
frequency at which the CFS mask is updated modulates the effectiveness of suppression. In 
this experiment, observers were presented with a sinusoidal grating stimulus in one eye 
perceptually suppressed by the CFS mask presented to the other eye. In a one-minute trial, 
observers had to track their percept (mask, grating, mix) while the temporal frequency of the 
CFS mask was varied across trials. The authors observed that the total and mean dominance 
duration of the CFS mask were modulated by the temporal frequency in an inverse U-shaped 
fashion. Peak durations were observed in the range of 3 to 12 Hz. The critical observation 
was that this pattern held for both total and mean dominance durations, which was not in 
line with Levelt’s second proposition of binocular rivalry (Brascamp, Klink, & Levelt, 2015; 
Levelt, 1965). This proposition states that changing the strength of stimulus A (e.g., through 
manipulating temporal frequency of the CFS mask) will primarily affect the mean 
dominance durations of the other stimulus (here, the grating stimulus), leaving the mean 
dominance durations of stimulus A unaffected. Thus, mask temporal frequency did not 
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behave according to the predictions of “stimulus strength” according to Levelt’s second 
proposition. Therefore, it cannot be conceptualized as such. This led the authors to argue that 
the relationship between mask temporal frequency and CFS effectiveness is better described 
akin to the effectiveness of flash suppression. That is, in flash suppression the effectiveness 
varies in function of the pre-adaptation period to the to be suppressed stimulus (i.e., the 
slower the pace at which the CFS mask refreshes, the longer the pre-adaptation period, and 
the more successful the next flash will be). In addition, Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) showed 
that the pattern of dominance durations could be described by a simple phenomenological 
model of binocular rivalry based on Levelt (1965), but only if a flash suppression component 
was added to the model (i.e., the probability of a successful continuation of CFS had to 
depend sigmoidally on the mask temporal frequency, with a higher probability of success for 
lower frequencies). This led the authors to argue that CFS is not simply a stronger form of 
binocular rivalry, but rather a continuous, accumulated form of flash suppression (Tsuchiya, 
Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 2006). In a follow-up study, Tsuchiya et al. (2006) showed that 
suppression is also much deeper for CFS compared to binocular rivalry. Furthermore, the 
number of flashes during a trial modulates the depth of suppression such that they 
“synergistically summate to yield suppression equivalent to that measured using CFS 
(Tsuchiya et al., 2006, p. 1069).” I will argue that, when critically examined, these arguments 
run short of consistently explaining all findings. Furthermore, I think it is theoretically more 
coherent and parsimonious to explain CFS in terms of what we know of binocular rivalry 
and its underlying mechanisms.  
First, the observations of Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) indeed do not follow Levelt’s 
second proposition. It has recently been shown, however, that Levelt’s second proposition 
only holds for a limited contrast range (Brascamp, van Ee, Noest, Jacobs, & van den Berg, 
2006). When the suppressed grating stimulus is presented at maximal contrast, the 
proposition holds. When it is presented at moderate contrast, however, as is regularly the 
case in CFS, varying suppression strength also influences the mean dominance duration of 
the dominant stimulus (in this case the CFS mask). Thus, the observations of Tsuchiya and 
Koch (2005) are actually in line with other studies on binocular rivalry (Brascamp et al., 
2006), yet the reason they did not follow Levelt’s second proposition is presumably caused 
by the regime in which CFS operated during the experiment. Second, the flash suppression 
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component that was added to the phenomenological model to explain the behavioral results 
seems theoretically inconsistent. That is, in regular flash suppression, the canonical 
observation is that the longer the pre-adaptation period of the to be suppressed stimulus, the 
higher the probability this stimulus will be suppressed effectively by the stimulus presented 
to the other eye. In their model however, Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) implemented the flash 
suppression component such that the lower the mask frequency (i.e., longer adaptation to 
the mask), the more successful the mask refresh will be in maintaining the current percept. 
However, with respect to the relationship between mask frequency and effectiveness of 
suppression, their results showed an inverted U-shape rather than a sigmoidal pattern. 
Although their implementation of the model including a flash suppression component 
outperformed the simpler model, it seems theoretically untenable. Third, in a follow-up 
study, Tsuchiya et al. (2006) varied the number of flashes and the stimulus onset asynchrony 
between the number of flashes and the onset of a contrast increment probe. They observed 
that contrast detection thresholds were comparable to those obtained in a first experiment 
measuring suppression depth using regular CFS when there were five flashes and the 
stimulus onset asynchrony is zero. Based on these results, the authors argued that 
consecutive flashes summate to achieve suppression depth comparable to regular CFS. 
Therefore, CFS can best be considered as a continuous version of flash suppression. 
However, this interpretation suffers from a confound with probe duration. That is, probes 
were presented for 500 milliseconds, while five flashes also constituted 500 milliseconds of 
transient visual input. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the highest detection thresholds 
were obtained when these events fully overlapped. When the stimulus onset asynchronies 
slightly diverged (i.e., +- 100 ms), detection thresholds associated with five flashes 
dramatically dropped. A more precise interpretation of these results thus would be that 
suppression depth of CFS peaks when transients in the CFS mask completely overlap with 
the presentation of the probe stimulus.  
Rather than interpreting CFS as a continuous form of flash suppression, it might 
make more sense to interpret CFS as a continuous form of flash facilitation (Brascamp, 
Knapen, Kanai, van Ee, & van den Berg, 2007). Indeed, flash facilitation refers to a situation 
opposite to flash suppression in which previewing a stimulus (pre-adapting) actually 
facilitates the dominance of the stimulus subsequently presented to that eye. In their study, 
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Brascamp et al. (2007) showed that flash facilitation and suppression occurred in function of 
the contrast and duration of the prior stimulus. Interestingly, when the prior stimulus 
duration was set at 100 milliseconds (akin to the 10 Hz regularly used in CFS), flash 
facilitation was observed for all but the lowest contrasts. In addition, the authors showed 
that both facilitation and suppression can be modeled using a computation model of 
binocular rivalry (Noest, van Ee, Nijs, & van Wezel, 2007), unifying these apparently 
opposing phenomena to the same underlying mechanisms. 
 
Considerations on CFS as a stronger form of binocular rivalry 
In the light of these arguments, I propose it is more reasonable to consider CFS as a 
form of binocular rivalry that, under particular circumstances, elicits remarkably effective 
suppression. Nearly all computational models of binocular rivalry include two components 
to account for the seemingly stochastic, oscillatory behavior of the perceptual states. That is, 
two pools of neurons representing the stimuli presented to both eyes mutually inhibit each 
other, and a self-adaptation component is included for gradual decay of the stimulus 
strength of the current dominant percept (Noest et al., 2007; Wilson, 2007). Because such a 
circuitry is deterministic, white noise is often added to generate realistic dynamics. Several 
predictions follow when CFS is considered as a form of binocular rivalry. First, it should be 
possible to model the temporal dynamics of CFS using a computation model of binocular 
rivalry which relies on cross-inhibition and self-adaptation. Indeed, Shimaoka and Kaneko 
(2011) showed that the data reported in Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) and Tsuchiya et al. (2006) 
could be modeled with the model proposed in Wilson (2007) – with minimal extensions to 
the model. Second, feature-selective depth of suppression has often been observed in 
binocular rivalry (Alais & Melcher, 2007; Stuit, Cass, Paffen, & Alais, 2009). Similarly, as we 
reported in Chapter 2, and other studies have reported elsewhere, feature overlap between 
CFS mask and suppressed stimulus yields deeper suppression than when the CFS mask and 
suppressed stimulus are dissimilar (Hong & Blake, 2009; Maehara, Huang, & Hess, 2009; 
Moors, Wagemans, & de-Wit, 2014; Yang & Blake, 2012). Third, one would predict to observe 
serial dependence in dominance (or suppression) durations, as has been observed in studies 
on binocular rivalry and other bi-stability phenomena (Mamassian & Goutcher, 2005; 
Pastukhov & Braun, 2011; van Ee, 2009). Indeed, in Chapter 3 we reported that time series 
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obtained in several b-CFS studies show serial dependence, the size of which was comparable 
to previous studies. Furthermore, this serial dependence was predominantly monocular, in 
line with the monocular nature of binocular rivalry suppression that has frequently been 
observed (Blake, 1989; Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Tong, Meng, & Blake, 2006). 
If CFS relies on similar circuits as binocular rivalry, how is such effective and deep 
suppression achieved? First, it is important to highlight that “shared stimulus complexity” or 
“feature overlap” is particularly important to achieve stable suppression. Indeed, when the 
suppressed stimulus and CFS mask do not “share” any neural resources, it is highly likely 
that the transient nature of the CFS mask will not achieve any deeper suppression at all. This 
is evident from our results in Chapter 2, for example, in which we observed that some 
motion speeds achieved similar suppression as regular CFS. Furthermore, as Figure 11.1 
shows, researchers regularly adapt the properties of their CFS mask to match the suppressed 
stimulus. Indeed, informal discussions at conferences immediately made me realize that this 
was a very important factor for effective CFS suppression.  
 
 
Figure 11.1 An illustration of different implementations of CFS. These studies are a subset of 
examples in which the CFS mask was adapted to include more features of the suppressed 
stimulus. 
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Secondly, one of the most straightforward explanations of the effectiveness of CFS – 
once stable suppression is achieved – is that neural adaptation to the mask is prohibited due 
to the continuous changes of the CFS mask. Indeed, in computational models of binocular 
rivalry perceptual switches are initiated when the activity of the dominant stimulus is no 
longer strong enough (due to self-adaptation) to inhibit the activity of the suppressed 
stimulus, resulting in a perceptual switch. If the visual input is continuously updated, 
however, this reduces adaptation to the mask, therefore prolonging the dominance durations 
substantially. A straightforward prediction derived from this explanation would be that CFS 
masks composed of repeating patterns are less effective compared to regular CFS because 
they allow for more adaptation to the CFS mask. This is exactly what we tested in a pilot 
experiment. The experiment was similar to the one reported in Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) 
where the relationship between mask temporal frequency and dominance durations was 
assessed. In our experiment, observers were presented with a sinusoidal grating stimulus in 
one eye and a CFS mask in the other. The CFS mask either consisted of two, four, eight, or no 
sequentially alternating patterns (see Figure 11.2). Observers had to continuously indicate 
their percept for one-minute trials (grating, mix, or mask). Six observers each completed 16 
trials in total (4 trials in each condition).  
 
Figure 11.2. Illustration of the different conditions used in the experiment. The 2 frames 
condition consisted of two alternating masks. In the 4 frames condition four different masks 
were repeated in the same sequence, as was the case for the 8 frames condition. In the CFS 
condition, masks alternated randomly.  
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Figure 11.3. Results of pilot experiment on the effect of the number of unique frames in a CFS 
mask on dominance durations. (left) Total dominance durations of the CFS mask (in seconds) 
in function of experimental condition. (right) Mean dominance durations of the CFS mask (in 
seconds) in function of experimental condition. The number of frames indicates of how many 
frames the CFS mask was composed. 2 frames implies that the CFS mask was switching back 
and forth between 2 different patterns. 
 
Figure 11.3 depicts the total and mean dominance durations of the CFS mask for each 
of the experimental conditions. A Bayes Factor analysis of the data revealed an effect of 
condition for both the total (BF > 100 compared to a model containing only a random effect of 
participants) as well as the mean dominance durations (BF = 7). This effect was in the 
direction predicted by an account based on reduced neural adaptation to the CFS mask. That 
is, total and mean dominance durations were shorter when the mask was composed of fewer 
frames. Interestingly (and this came to our attention after we conducted these pilot 
experiments), Tsuchiya (2005) reported on a similar unpublished experiment in his 
dissertation. In line with our observations reported here, he also reported an increase of both 
total and mean dominance duration of the CFS mask in function of the number of different 
frames of which the CFS mask is composed (i.e., as they increase, total and mean dominance 
durations of the CFS mask increase). Thus, based on the results of these two (unpublished) 
experiments, it seems reasonable to consider limited neural adaptation to the mask as an 
important factor contributing to the effective perceptual suppression induced by CFS. 
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On a more speculative note, a third factor that might be involved in the robust 
suppression induced by CFS is the rhythmic temporal structure by which the CFS mask is 
updated, and in particular the temporal frequency that is commonly used in CFS. Indeed, the 
canonical temporal frequency used in CFS studies is 10 Hz, which lies midway in the alpha 
frequency band (8-12 Hz) that can be measured using electro- or magnetoencephalography 
(EEG or MEG). A recent series of studies has provided evidence that the phase of the 
ongoing alpha rhythm plays an important role in stimulus detectability (Busch, Dubois, & 
VanRullen, 2009; Mathewson et al., 2012; Mathewson, Gratton, Fabiani, Beck, & Ro, 2009; 
Romei, Gross, & Thut, 2010; van Dijk, Schoffelen, Oostenveld, & Jensen, 2008). Furthermore, 
it has been shown that it is possible to entrain oscillatory activity in the alpha band by 
presenting rhythmic visual stimuli or by applying rhythmic stimulation through transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) and that this significantly influences stimulus detectability at 
threshold, in metacontrast masking, and in the attentional blink (Mathewson et al., 2012; 
Mathewson, Fabiani, Gratton, Beck, & Lleras, 2010; Romei et al., 2010; Spaak, de Lange, & 
Jensen, 2014). Based on this evidence, some authors have proposed that alpha rhythms act as 
a gating mechanism through pulsed inhibition. That is, depending on its phase, the alpha 
rhythm switches rapidly between phases of cortical inhibition and excitability, where the 
latter are time windows in which visual input can reach perceptual awareness (Jensen & 
Mazaheri, 2010; Mathewson et al., 2011). Thus, based on this account, the CFS mask could be 
considered a stimulus that entrains an alpha rhythm at the occipital part of the cortex, 
periodically inhibiting the stimulus presented to the other eye. The hypothesized 
involvement of alpha rhythms in the effectiveness of CFS could be tested in two different 
ways. First, one could consider the relationship between peak alpha frequency – a stable 
inter-individual trait (Angelakis, Lubar, Stathopoulou, & Kounios, 2004) – and the mask 
temporal frequency that yields the deepest suppression for each individual. If these are 
correlated, this might imply that an individually determined optimal temporal frequency at 
which the CFS mask is refreshed taps into the “natural alpha rhythm” of that individual. 
Second, if entrainment of alpha rhythms is genuinely mediating the effectiveness of CFS, it 
should be possible to pick up the periodic changes in suppression depth in function of the 
current phase of the alpha rhythm. We have attempted to test this latter prediction by 
measuring suppression depth of CFS across time. That is, we measured contrast detection 
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thresholds for a sinusoidal grating stimulus at various time points during a one-second trial, 
time points which were supposedly located at peaks and troughs of the ongoing alpha 
rhythm. Due to the short cycle of these rhythms however (i.e., 100 milliseconds), we had to 
present our target stimuli through very brief flashes. Recently, it has been shown that CFS is 
much less effective for abrupt, transiently presented targets (Kaunitz, Fracasso, Skujevskis, & 
Melcher, 2014). Due to the abrupt nature of our stimulus presentation, it proved very 
difficult to obtain any consistent results and this line of research was therefore no longer 
continued. 
 
An alternative account of the effectiveness of CFS based on the broader framework of predictive coding 
Before turning to a discussion of the results we presented in Chapters 4 to 10, we 
consider an alternative explanation of the effectiveness of CFS, relying on the predictive 
coding framework, which has recently gained considerable popularity (Friston, 2005; 
Mumford, 1992; Rao & Ballard, 1999).  
Hohwy, Roepstorff, and Friston (2008) start from the idea that the brain is an 
inference machine (akin to Gregory, 1998; von Helmholtz, 1860). Perception can thus be 
conceptualized as a type of unconscious inference which can be formalized through 
hierarchical Bayesian inference relying on generative models with predictive coding or error 
minimization. In this view, perceptual content is determined by the hypothesis that 
generates the best predictions compared to the sensory input. The (visual) system matches 
bottom-up input with top-down predictions such that only the differences between them 
remain as a bottom-up signal – the prediction error. This notion of prediction error 
minimization is crucial to explain binocular rivalry (and perceptual bi-stability more 
generally) from a predictive coding framework. Indeed, the top-down predictions pertain to 
the dominant stimulus only, such that the bottom-up signal elicited by this stimulus is 
gradually explained away, yet the error signal associated with the suppressed stimulus 
remains, eventually causing the perceptual switch to this stimulus. Considering CFS within 
this context paves the way for an explanation of its effectiveness in terms of a general lack of 
reduction of prediction errors associated with the CFS mask (due to its continuously 
changing content) consequently prolonging dominance durations. Here we outline an 
experiment that aims to put this explanation of the effectiveness of CFS based on predictive 
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coding to the test by independently manipulating the spatial and temporal predictability of 
the CFS mask. Indeed, introducing predictability should make it easier to minimize 
prediction error and consequently decrease suppression strength. Importantly, predictability 
should be decoupled from adaptation, which we know influences the effectiveness of CFS 
(supra). In a potential experiment to test this hypothesis, one could measure suppression 
strength of CFS by determining contrast detection thresholds of a suppressed target stimulus 
in four different conditions (by crossing spatial and temporal predictability). The spatially 
unpredictable/temporally predictable condition is equivalent to how CFS is regularly 
implemented. That is, the mask content is updated at regularly spaced intervals (i.e., every 
100 ms). In the spatially unpredictable/temporally unpredictable condition, the time points at 
which the mask will be updated will be randomized with the constraint that the mask has to 
refresh 10 times per second, yet at irregularly spaced intervals. In the spatially predictable 
conditions, the CFS mask alternates between a mask that contains squares and one that 
contains circles, yet the positions of the individual elements are still randomized at each 
refresh of the mask. The experimental procedure would be similar to Yang and Blake (2012), 
in which oriented Gabor patches were presented on each trial at a contrast level determined 
by an adaptive procedure and participants had to indicate the orientation of the Gabor patch 
on each trial. Instead of using trials in which the CFS mask and target stimulus are presented 
concurrently for a period of about a second, one could use continuous presentation of the 
CFS mask and present targets at regularly spaced intervals during this trial. The participants’ 
task would be to indicate the location of the presented target. In this way, the target contrast 
can be adaptively increased when the targets go undetected and decreased again whenever 
they are detected. The reason why one would opt for continuous presentation of the CFS 
mask is that the spatiotemporal structure might need some time to be extracted and have its 
influence on suppression. 
The predictions for this experiment are most clear for the spatial predictability. That 
is, if predictability of the spatial content matters for the effectiveness of CFS, suppression 
strength will be reduced in the predictable condition. For the temporal predictability, it is 
more difficult to derive a clear-cut prediction. That is, the visual system could “prefer” 
bottom-up signals in a temporally predictable fashion and consequently suppression 
strength might be highest for temporally predictable conditions. In contrast, if reduction of 
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prediction error works in a similar vein in the temporal domain, suppression strength is 
predicted to be highest in the temporally unpredictable condition. Nevertheless, irrespective 
of the direction of the effects, the results will shed light on how spatiotemporal predictability 
influences the dynamics of CFS. Furthermore, it would address the viability of the predictive 
coding framework as an explanatory model of binocular rivalry and CFS. 
In the following section, we turn to a discussion on high-level processing during (b-
)CFS, which is inspired by and further extends the ideas formulated in Hesselmann and 
Moors (2015). 
 
Why high-level processing in b-CFS is theoretically incoherent 
Since its introduction about ten years ago, CFS has been picked up relatively quickly 
as a potent technique to study unconscious processing of (visual) stimuli. Indeed, CFS has 
been described as “… a more optimal technique for examining preconscious processing 
mechanisms [compared to binocular rivalry]” (Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007, p. 882) up to even 
“a cutting edge masking technique that allows subliminal presentations that last seconds. 
CFS is a game changer in the study of the unconscious…” (Sklar et al., 2012, p. 19614). The 
studies we presented in Chapters 4 to 10 inevitably provide a more nuanced, and perhaps 
slightly more realistic picture of the expectations one can have on the potential of CFS as a 
tool to study processing of perceptually suppressed stimuli. That is, the main picture that can 
be sketched based on our results is that the representation of a perceptually suppressed 
stimulus (measured through suppression times in a b-CFS paradigm) is a fairly 
impoverished and fractionated rather than integrated one, limited to very basic features such 
as orientation and spatial frequency (e.g., Chapter 4), and perhaps some more complex shape 
attributes such as convexity or complex image characteristics such as spatial coherence (e.g., 
Chapters 8 and 9).  
In line with these observations, I would like to argue that the initial (and for some 
researchers, continued) enthusiasm for the potential of CFS to explore uncharted territories 
in consciousness research is most likely premature and farfetched. The principal reason for 
this argument derives from the fact that CFS highly likely relies on mechanisms similar to 
those observed in binocular rivalry. In this light, the problem with nearly all studies that 
embark on finding high-level unconscious processing during CFS ignore the representation 
243 
 
 
 
of the stimulus while it is rendered invisible. Indeed, any paradigm that perceptually 
suppresses a visual stimulus does so by interfering with the processing of the stimulus in 
some way (Fogelson, Kohler, Miller, Granger, & Tse, 2014). If not, the stimulus would always 
be visible to the observer. CFS is closely related to binocular rivalry, of which it is known 
that the activity related to the perceptually suppressed stimulus is mainly confined to early 
visual areas (Alais, 2012; Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Logothetis, 1998; Tong et al., 2006). 
Indeed, rather limited cognitive processing has been observed during binocular rivalry 
(Blake, 1988; Cave, Blake, & McNamara, 1998; Kang, Blake, & Woodman, 2011; Zimba & 
Blake, 1983). Therefore, it seems reasonable to adopt the default stance not to expect much 
high-level unconscious processing during CFS (Breitmeyer, 2015). Indeed, recent 
neuroimaging data suggests that the presence of CFS masks dramatically reduces neural 
activity related to the suppressed stimulus already in early visual cortex (Yuval-Greenberg & 
Heeger, 2013). Thus, the representation of the suppressed stimulus is expected to be rather 
limited to a loose collection of elemental features that are presumably coded in these early 
visual areas, despite the fact that the stimulus is presented unbeknownst to the observer for 
extended periods of time (Gayet, Van Der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014).  
Given that most studies on binocular rivalry were already conducted prior to the 
introduction of CFS, why have so many researchers embarked on unraveling high-level 
unconscious processing using CFS? I think the fact that CFS allows for such robust 
perceptual suppression has led many researchers to think along the following lines: “Because 
CFS allows to present a stimulus unconsciously in the order of seconds, this might allow for 
more elaborate processing compared to other blinding paradigms such as binocular rivalry or 
visual masking.” At least, I have heard this argument many times when fellow researchers 
were presenting their results at a conference. However, this type of reasoning exactly ignores 
the representation of the stimulus during perceptual suppression. It seems very unlikely that 
a fractionated stimulus, reduced to its basic features will evolve into an integrated one, if the 
processing mechanisms that are usually involved for integrating features of a stimulus never 
come into play during CFS. Given that one of the first studies using b-CFS then shows that 
upright faces break suppression faster than inverted ones, as well as that Chinese words 
break suppression faster for Chinese speakers compared to Hebrew speakers and vice versa 
(Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007), it became tempting to push the limits of unconscious visual 
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processing further and further, until we can read and do arithmetic unconsciously 
(Karpinski, Yale, & Briggs, 2016; Sklar et al., 2012). 
When I outline these arguments to fellow researchers at conferences, I often get the 
following response: “But why have so many researchers found evidence for so-called high-level 
processing of perceptually suppressed stimuli in b-CFS experiments? Why should I believe you? Why 
can I not rely on the studies that have been published in international peer-reviewed highly esteemed 
journals?”6 I usually try to respond to this question in a diplomatic way but here, I will put it 
bluntly: I think the majority of positive findings on high-level processing during b-CFS are 
Type I errors, potentially due to intentionally (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) or 
unintentionally (Gelman & Loken, 2013) undisclosed flexibility in data analysis. The problem 
is that, with the best possible intentions, I cannot provide a proof for this argument. None of 
these published studies have provided the data along with the paper, let alone pre-registered 
the experiments that are reported. There is no way for me to even verify the published 
results, without having to contact the original authors. Second, for all studies that do not 
belong to this category and of which the findings prove to be replicable, I think a simpler 
explanation more than likely will be found. Our studies on the Kanizsa stimulus (Chapter 4) 
and the half-face stimuli (Chapter 8) are excellent cases in point. Indeed, in both studies we 
obtained results that could be interpreted as evidence for high-level processing during CFS. 
In both cases, however, the critical difference between conditions could be explained by 
lower-level aspects of the stimuli. Last, I think the CFS literature severely suffers from a file 
drawer problem (Rosenthal, 1979). Conferences and workshops have proven an invaluable 
source of information on this topic, and I know of several (unreported) studies that failed to 
replicate when tested by other labs. In addition, I also learned about studies starting off with 
a novel research question but which eventually were not published because they failed to 
reveal a difference between the experimental conditions – even though they revealed really 
interesting and important information on stimulus processing during CFS. Although this is a 
general problem in psychological science, I think CFS studies are a particularly important 
example of this problem because they can substantially influence contemporary theories on 
the scope and limits of unconscious visual processing. In this respect, we have tried to 
provide some counterweight to this issue by reporting all our completed studies irrespective 
                                                   
6 Ok, I admit I made up that last question 
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of their outcome. In fact, the type of discussion outlined here could never have arisen should 
we have adopted a different strategy throughout our research. Personally, I think 
consciousness research and research on unconscious visual processing in particular would 
benefit greatly from an attitude change towards embracing null findings showing that this or 
that paradigm does not allow for this or that type of processing. Such an attitude change is 
tightly linked to adopting the appropriate statistical methods that allow for such conclusions 
to be drawn on statistical grounds (e.g., Bayesian methods). Although there is still a long and 
bumpy road ahead of us, I do think the tide is already turning for consciousness research, 
thanks to other advocates of this stance (Dienes, 2015, 2016). 
 
CFS – a tool to probe the default processing mode of early visual cortex or the low-level 
statistics of the environment we are sensitive to 
It seemed pretty straightforward to devise an argument for why high-level 
processing should not be observed in b-CFS (or in any kind of CFS study). It proves to be 
much more difficult however to outline a coherent hypothesis about what exactly is driving 
the differences in suppression times observed in b-CFS studies or the differences in reaction 
times in priming studies relying on CFS. I preface that, given my beliefs on high-level 
processing in b-CFS studies, the discussion outlined here will necessarily be a biased one. 
Some published findings will fit the discussion and others will not.  
 
The general philosophy behind b-CFS is that breakthrough or suppression time 
reflects the strength of the representation of the perceptually suppressed visual stimulus. 
That is, as in regular binocular rivalry, “stimulus strength” is predicted to influence 
suppression durations such that stronger stimulus representations break CFS faster than 
weaker stimuli. We are stuck however at this concept called “stimulus strength”. Indeed, it is 
not a well-defined construct and different researchers might mean different things when 
using the term. Therefore, it would be very useful to attempt to delineate this concept in the 
context of perceptually suppressed stimuli, because it can guide future hypothesis 
generation. 
Our current hypothesis is that b-CFS reveals the default (or current) sensitivity of 
early visual cortex to input statistics we have been exposed to throughout our life (e.g., color, 
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orientation, spatial frequency, etc.), which in turn has shaped the neural representation of 
these statistical features as well as the strength of their connectivity pattern (Field, 1987; 
Simoncelli & Olshausen, 2001). Here, it is critical to stress that these sensitivities pertain only 
to the level at which the stimulus is still represented during interocular suppression. This 
inevitably implies that some statistical regularities in the environment that are obvious to us 
might not be revealed through b-CFS, because the representation of the suppressed stimulus 
might not yet be sufficiently differentiated at the level of early visual cortex. What does this 
hypothesis imply and, importantly, what does it not imply?  
First, as already highlighted, stimuli that require some form of contextual integration 
relying on iterative feedforward-feedback loops such as the Kanizsa stimulus (Chapter 4) or 
the biological motion stimulus (Chapter 7) are not processed as such during CFS. Indeed, in 
line with our observations, other studies have shown that three-dimensional cast shadows or 
implied motion are not processed during CFS (Faivre & Koch, 2014; Khuu, Gordon, Balcomb, 
& Kim, 2014), nor are faces processed holistically (Axelrod & Rees, 2014). Second, simple 
stimulus features should have a processing benefit during CFS. For example, a radial bias for 
orientation and motion direction has been observed in suppression times (Hong, 2015), as 
well as a preference for collinear contours (Li & Li, 2015). Furthermore, suppressed collinear 
flankers have also been observed to still influence detection of a visible target (Hayashi & 
Murakami, 2015). Last, for dynamic stimuli, motion coherence also seems to systematically 
influence suppression times (Chung & Khuu, 2014; Kaunitz, Fracasso, Lingnau, & Melcher, 
2013). 
It is important to stress that this view does not exclude the possibility of modulatory 
or top-down effects on suppression times. Indeed, the contents and load of visual working 
memory have been shown to influence suppression times (De Loof, Poppe, Cleeremans, 
Gevers, & Van Opstal, 2015; Gayet, Paffen, & Van der Stigchel, 2013; Pan, Lin, Zhao, & Soto, 
2013), as well as expectations (Pinto, van Gaal, de Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 2015; Stein & 
Peelen, 2015), and the expertise of the observer (Stein, Reeder, & Peelen, 2015). Furthermore, 
and contrary to our findings in Chapter 5, stimuli presented together with congruent 
auditory stimuli have been shown to enter awareness faster (Cox & Hong, 2015; Tan & Yeh, 
2015). The important point here is that these modulatory or top-down influences play out at 
the representational level of the suppressed stimulus. Indeed, in an elegant study, Lupyan 
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and Ward (2013) showed that presenting an auditory cue that matched a perceptually 
suppressed object (e.g., “kangaroo”) speeded up the breakthrough of this stimulus compared 
to incongruent verbal labels. Critically, the authors showed that this facilitatory effect 
occurred at the perceptual rather than semantic level, implying that effects that “behave like” 
semantic processing are actually better explained by processing at the early, perceptual level.  
A good case in point here is the recent study of Gelbard-Sagiv, Faivre, Mudrik, and 
Koch (2016). They showed that repetition priming for famous faces only occurred when 
observers were aware of the color or location of the face (i.e., “low-level awareness”) without 
being aware of its identity. On trials in which suppression was complete, no repetition 
priming was observed. So far, so good. The authors concluded, however, that low-level 
awareness of the perceptually suppressed face stimulus accompanies “high-level processing” 
of it. It should be stressed that there is absolutely no principled reason to interpret these 
results as providing evidence for identity processing of the suppressed face stimulus. The 
only thing that is being shown here is that repeating an invisibly presented face stimulus 
yields faster responses to the repeated visible face stimulus. This is not a strong test for so-
called high-level processing of invisible stimuli. Any perceptual feature the visual system is 
sensitive to during CFS can yield faster responses. A beautiful illustration of this point are 
the studies by Almeida and colleagues (Almeida et al., 2013; Almeida, Mahon, & Caramazza, 
2010; Almeida, Mahon, Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2008). Based on the reasoning that dorsal 
stream processing would be preserved during CFS (Fang & He, 2005; Ludwig & 
Hesselmann, 2015), the authors obtained evidence that perceptually suppressed tools (a 
supposedly distinct category of objects to which the dorsal stream would be primarily 
sensitive to) could prime other tools, whereas animals (supposedly processed by the ventral 
stream, which is blocked by CFS) failed to prime other animals. In an attempt to pinpoint 
what was actually happening during tool priming, Sakuraba, Sakai, Yamanaka, Yokosawa, 
and Hirayama (2012) showed that stimulus elongation was the critical factor, independent of 
whether these stimuli belonged to the tool category or not. The importance of this study 
should not be underestimated. It shows that it is critical to exclude potential alternative 
explanations before you advance to an interpretation based on high-level stimulus 
processing during CFS. Although this issue applies to any experimental study, it again seems 
particularly important in the context of inferring the scope and limits of unconscious visual 
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processing. I personally think a particularly strong test of the extent to which perceptually 
suppressed stimuli are processed is to use a paradigm in which performance on a visible 
stimulus is measured while invisible stimuli are presented concurrently which, under 
normal visible conditions, elicit an influence on the visible target stimulus. A good example 
of a study that used this strategy examined whether flanker interference (i.e., reduced task 
performance when flanking stimuli are incongruent with respect to the target stimulus on a 
task-relevant stimulus dimension) would still be elicited by invisible flanker stimuli (Wu et 
al., 2015). The authors presented arrows as flanker stimuli, either visible or suppressed. 
Participants had to perform a task on a central visible arrow (i.e., indicate its pointing 
direction). The results revealed that flanker interference was observed in the fully visible 
trials, whereas no flanker interference was observed on the suppressed trials. This indicates 
that the representation of the flanking arrows was not sufficiently “arrow-like” to initiate a 
conflict with the central, visible arrow. We ourselves have conducted a similar study aimed 
at unraveling whether more basic contextual modulation at the perceptual level would occur 
when the context of a stimulus was suppressed. To do so, we used a grating stimulus that is 
perceived as if it is presented through an aperture. This renders the perceived motion 
direction of the stimulus ambiguous in theory, but in practice observers frequently perceive 
motion in the direction perpendicular to the orientation of the grating (illustrated in Figure 
11.4A). Adding a context to this stimulus can bias the perceived motion direction, as 
illustrated in Figure 11.4B. The local motion trajectory within the aperture remains exactly 
the same, yet due to the configuration, a rectangular grating is perceived to move to the left 
behind an occluder. We presented the aperture stimulus either with or without context, as 
well as either with or without a CFS mask, and asked observers to indicate the motion 
direction they perceived for the inner stimulus (trial sequence depicted in Figure 11.4C). We 
presented stimuli that were moving in either of four directions (left, right, up, down). Each 
observer (eight in total) completed 40 trials per condition (160 in total). We summarize the 
data in Figure 11.4D as the proportion of perceived motion in “cardinal” directions (i.e., left, 
right, up, down). As is obvious from the data, adding the context to the stimulus strongly 
biased the perceived motion direction in all but one observer. In all other conditions, 
however, the perceived motion direction substantially dropped to baseline levels of 
perceiving “oblique” directions (down left, down right, up left, up right). These preliminary 
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results indicate that perceptually suppressing a stimulus eliminates the potential to integrate 
a stimulus with its contextual surround. For this type of processing, presenting the context 
stimulus under suppression is similar to not presenting it at all. 
 
 
Figure 11.4. Preliminary experiment on contextual integration between visible and invisible 
stimuli. (A). A translating grating stimulus that appears to move behind an aperture. The 
perceived motion direction that is most frequently reported is the one perpendicular to 
grating orientation. (B) Adding a context to the grating stimulus biases the perceived motion 
direction towards the left direction, despite the same physical input in the central region as 
in stimulus A. (C) Trial sequence used in the experiment. The grating stimulus was 
presented for 1 second in the non-dominant eye (with or without a context, and with or 
without a CFS mask in the other eye). Observers had to indicate the perceived motion 
direction (one of eight possible responses). (D) Mean proportion of perceived motion in 
cardinal directions (n = 8).  
 
Another prediction that could be derived from framing differences in suppression 
times as reflecting the sensitivity to “primitive” stimulus features is that, due to the plasticity 
of the visual system, it should be possible to change representational strength through 
perceptual learning or through changing stimulus relevance by means of conditioning 
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paradigms. Indeed, it has been shown that stimuli break through faster and more frequently 
when participants repeatedly perform the same task across different blocks, sessions, or even 
days (Carmel, 2015; Ludwig, Sterzer, Kathmann, Franz, & Hesselmann, 2013; Mastropasqua, 
Tse, & Turatto, 2015). Similarly, coupling invisible stimuli with rewards changes their 
suppression depth (Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 2009) or presenting electric shocks together with 
perceptually suppressed stimuli influences the electrodermal response to those stimuli (Lipp, 
Kempnich, Jee, & Arnold, 2014; Raio, Carmel, Carrasco, & Phelps, 2012). Furthermore, 
pairing an initially neutral and visible grating stimulus with electric shocks also influences 
suppression times such that grating stimuli associated with shocks break suppression faster 
(Gayet, Paffen, Belopolsky, Theeuwes, & Van der Stigchel, 2016). Interestingly, stimulus-
reward coupling for invisible stimuli is monocular (Seitz et al., 2009), whereas triggering the 
relationship prior to suppression speeds up breakthroughs in both eyes (Gayet et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, Hedger, Adams, and Garner (2015a) showed that threatening stimuli did not 
elicit differential skin conductance responses compared to neutral stimuli when they were 
completely suppressed. Only when these stimuli broke suppression during a trial, a 
differential electrodermal response was observed. This provides an important insight as to 
how threatening or emotional stimuli are represented during suppression. Indeed, it has 
been debated whether the advantage of fearful faces breaking suppression faster than neutral 
faces has more to do with their spatial frequency content than with their emotional value 
(Gray, Adams, Hedger, Newton, & Garner, 2013; Hedger, Adams, & Garner, 2015b; Stein, 
Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2014; Yang et al., 2007). Vice versa, stimuli that do not elicit a 
threat response under normal conditions can be paired up such that they do under 
conditions of suppression. On a final note, two very recent studies showed that associating 
grating stimuli with the self or the other (i.e., by associating it with the word “you” or 
“other”) did not influence suppression times of the gratings (Stein, Siebold, & van Zoest, 
2016). Furthermore, associating faces with affective information similarly does not influence 
subsequent suppression times of these faces (Rabovsky, Stein, & Abdel Rahman, 2016). This 
seems to indicate that not any type of coupling between stimuli can influence processing of 
perceptually suppressed visual stimuli. 
The last aspect of our results we need to consider in the light of this view are those 
presented in Chapter 6, on the perception of causality. In this chapter, we reported two 
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experiments of which the results indicated, to our surprise, that launch events consistently 
enter awareness faster than pass events or pseudo-launch events. If the framework laid out 
above is correct, this result can be interpreted in at least two ways. Either the visual system is 
already very sensitive to spatiotemporal contingencies at a very early level, or we still have 
not pinpointed the low-level confound that can explain our results. Related to this latter 
point, it might be interesting to consider the control event that was originally used in the 
causality adaptation study of Rolfs, Dambacher, and Cavanagh (2013). Here, the authors 
used a “slip” event in which a first disc approached a second stationary disc, passed over it, 
and stopping just in front of the second disc. Subsequently, the second disc would start 
moving. This event might provide an even more stringent control condition in which the 
low-level cues (i.e., motion discontinuities are now both on the same trajectory as the launch 
event) are nearly completely matched. If the suppression time advantage of the launch event 
survives this test, our results might unequivocally be interpreted as providing evidence for a 
sensitivity to causal events at very early stages of visual processing.  
In sum, in this section we proposed that differences in suppression times (and other 
measures used in CFS experiments) reveal the representational strength of the suppressed 
stimulus at the level of early visual cortex reflecting the image statistics we have been 
exposed to throughout our life. In the final section of this General Discussion, we turn to the 
broader implications of having different blinding paradigms that yield different results for 
the same question. 
 
A hierarchy of blinding paradigms: implications for the study of invisible stimuli 
Throughout this dissertation, we have only relied on a single blinding paradigm to 
study the representation of perceptually suppressed visual stimuli. The main conclusion that 
could be derived from our results is that, for CFS, processing of invisible stimuli is highly 
likely limited to simple, visual features such as orientation, spatial frequency, motion 
coherence etc. and only limited, if any, spatiotemporal integration is taking place during 
CFS. Our conclusions are necessarily limited to CFS only. Therefore, a natural question to ask 
is how our results compare to those obtained with other suppression paradigms asking 
similar questions. As we already touched upon in Chapter 1, many other paradigms exist to 
render stimuli invisible and different paradigms have often yielded different results, 
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resulting in a so-called “functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing” according to 
Breitmeyer (2015). Furthermore, a recent neuroimaging study showed that different blinding 
paradigms also yield different neural activation for the perceptually suppressed stimulus 
(Fogelson et al., 2014). Studies which have explicitly compared visual processing of invisible 
stimuli across different blinding paradigms have provided additional evidence for 
differential processing of invisible stimuli under different suppression conditions (Faivre, 
Berthet, & Kouider, 2012; Izatt, Dubois, Faivre, & Koch, 2014; Peremen & Lamy, 2014; Stein et 
al., 2014). For example, more elaborate processing is taking place under conditions of gaze-
contingent crowding or visual masking compared to during CFS with respect to identity 
priming of famous faces (Izatt et al., 2014) or processing of an invisible arrow prime stimulus 
(Peremen & Lamy, 2014). 
Although the results of these studies might not be all too surprising, what are we to 
conclude if different results on unconscious visual processing are obtained with different 
suppression paradigms? For one, it highlights that a study reporting a null finding yet 
relying on a single paradigm can never conclude that “processing of X depends on visual 
awareness”. In the case of CFS studies researchers have all too often concluded this however, 
with respect to implied motion (Faivre & Koch, 2014), 3D cast shadows (Khuu et al., 2014), or 
the mere exposure effect (de Zilva, Vu, Newell, & Pearson, 2013). To the contrary, what these 
studies indicate is that, during interocular suppression, the representation of the stimulus is 
such that process or phenomenon X just cannot unfold. 
Secondly, it renders the discussion on so-called unconscious high-level processing 
somewhat superfluous. Indeed, as long as we have a paradigm at our disposal that allows 
for sufficient processing of the stimulus whilst ensuring invisibility, one can in principle 
expect unconscious processing of anything. Take visual masking for example. Various 
studies have reported high-level processing of masked stimuli, such as semantic priming 
(Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009), cognitive control (Lau & 
Passingham, 2007; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010), or conflict adaptation 
(Desender, Van Lierde, & Van den Bussche, 2013; van Gaal, Lamme, & Ridderinkhof, 2010). 
In contrast, we failed to obtain evidence for semantic processing of word stimuli suppressed 
through CFS in Chapter 10. Does this invalidate the findings from the visual masking 
literature and imply that unconscious semantic processing cannot occur? To the contrary, it 
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only highlights the specificity of the results to the paradigm used to render visual stimuli 
invisible. Indeed, for visual masking it has been argued that the masked stimulus does not 
enter visual awareness because re-entrant activation from higher cortical areas is nearly 
absent, yet the feed-forward sweep of activation associated with the presentation of the 
masked stimulus is largely intact (Breitmeyer, 2008; Macknik & Livingstone, 1998). This 
difference in mechanism most likely explains why more high-level processing is observed in 
the visual masking literature compared to CFS. 
What do our results and this discussion imply for the role of perceptual organization 
in the absence of visual awareness? Certainly, it does not exclude the possibility for 
perceptual organization in the absence of visual awareness. Indeed, using different 
paradigms, it has been shown that Gestalt grouping principles influence processing of an 
invisible stimulus. For example, Mitroff and Scholl (2005) have shown that connectedness, 
good continuation, proximity and common region all can influence processing of invisible 
stimuli during motion-induced blindness. Furthermore, it has recently been shown that 
masked Kanizsa configurations can have an influence on a subsequent shape discrimination 
task (Poscoliero, Marzi, & Girelli, 2013). Lastly, from the literature on visuospatial neglect, it 
is clear that Gestalt grouping cues have an influence on the severity of extinction (Conci et 
al., 2009; Driver & Mattingley, 1998; Mattingley, Davis, & Driver, 1997). The critical thing 
here is that perceptual suppression in these paradigms or neuropsychological conditions 
presumably entails mechanisms that are different from CFS and binocular rivalry. 
 
The observations that studies on unconscious (visual) processing might reach 
different conclusions depending on the blinding paradigm that is used has led some to argue 
that unconscious visual processing is not a single entity, and that while all conscious visual 
processing is alike, each unconscious visual process is unconscious in its own way (Block, 
2015). It seems to be the case that most researchers find this a satisfying stance since it is 
frequently acknowledged in recent papers that it is crucial to understand the similarities and 
differences between different suppression techniques to properly understand unconscious 
visual processing (Dubois & Faivre, 2014). Due to the abundance of different suppression 
paradigms, the literature is necessarily fragmented, but this has never been used to call the 
notion of unconscious visual processing per se into question. What do we actually mean with 
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“unconscious visual processing” when the answer depends on the paradigm used in the 
experiment? Is the overarching research question on the scope and limits of unconscious 
visual processing still an interesting one when we know up front that we will not be able to 
provide a unitary and coherent answer to the question? Might it not be better to drop the 
term unconscious visual processing all along? Or should we embrace the heterogeneity of 
these findings until a theory of consciousness unifies them?  
Are there any alternative views from which we can study the similarities and 
differences between perceptually suppressed and visible stimuli? In my opinion, it might be 
worthwhile to consider the human visual system, and by extension the human observer, as 
(some)one that continuously seeks to interpret the proximal stimulus in order to act onto its 
environment. In some situations this “interpretative act” will yield perceptual suppression of 
the visible input, whereas small tweaks to the input dramatically change the percept to one 
in which the previously invisible stimulus is completely visible. For the case of visual 
masking, a recent paper by Herzog, Hermens, and Öğmen (2014) highlights that invisibility 
might sometimes be a goal the visual system achieves rather than an inherent limitation to 
the temporal precision of the visual system. Indeed, the authors provide several examples in 
which the effectiveness of visual masking is substantially affected when the masked and 
masking stimulus can be perceptually grouped (Hermens, Scharnowski, & Herzog, 2009; 
Herzog & Fahle, 2002). These grouping effects are also well-known in crowding (Manassi, 
Sayim, & Herzog, 2012, 2013; Saarela, Sayim, Westheimer, & Herzog, 2009; Saarela, 
Westheimer, & Herzog, 2010), flash-induced perceptual fading (Vergeer & van Lier, 2007), 
and binocular rivalry (de Weert, Snoeren, & Koning, 2005). Furthermore, substantial 
individual differences in the efficacy of visual masking (Albrecht, Klapötke, & Mattler, 2010), 
perceptual bi-stability (Carter & Pettigrew, 2003; van Loon et al., 2013), or continuous flash 
suppression (Yamashiro et al., 2014) indicate that perceptual suppression is not an all-or-
none or off-the-shelf tool. Therefore, the way in which invisibility is achieved is presumably 
dependent on a complex interplay between inter-individual and stimulus-related factors 
which in itself might be a more interesting topic to study rather than whether we can solve 
invisible polynomials (Sklar & Hassin, 2015) or can extract the syntactic structure of invisible 
words (Hung & Hsieh, 2015). 
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Concluding remarks: a plea for combining blinding paradigms, respecting the absence of 
a difference, and increasing transparent research practices 
I end this General Discussion with some considerations on my view on how studies 
on unconscious visual processing should proceed to be maximally informative. I should note 
that I myself have run short on some of these issues. In hindsight, you can always do better, 
and I am the first to acknowledge that.  
First, if you genuinely want to study unconscious visual processing, I think it is of 
great importance to design experiments that rely on all sorts of different blinding paradigms. 
Even if these yield conflicting results, this provides crucial information on the level at which 
certain aspects of invisible stimuli can be processed. In the end, this might yield a more 
satisfying picture of the hierarchy of processing invisible stimuli. Second, you should include 
the most stringent control conditions imaginable. This might seem an obvious or even 
redundant consideration, but all too often I came across CFS studies for which I could think 
of control conditions that could yield an explanation of the data based on much simpler 
mechanisms. Third, if you fail to find an effect, do not start tinkering with the data, or with 
the design. If you tweak a sufficient number of times, I can guarantee you have a 100% 
chance to stumble upon something (something too good to be true, that is). Do not let the 
asymmetry of statistical inference bug you. And do not put it in your file drawer (really, 
don’t). Think hard about whether it makes sense not to expect a difference. As I argued 
before, in the case of CFS studies it might actually make sense to predict the absence of a 
difference. I am sure in many other domains of psychology this is also true. Last, be as open 
as you can during your research and when you report it. There really is no good reason for 
sneaking that prediction you didn’t make before the data were known into the introduction 
of that paper (not even if this makes a huge difference for the journal in which you can 
publish your results or if Reviewer 2 asks you). There really is no good reason for not 
publicly sharing your data and analysis code. People will understand if not everything is 
crystal clear in your set of experiments, they probably have experienced that too. Last, but 
maybe most importantly, as Richard Feynman put it so elegantly in 1974 : “The first principle 
is that you must not fool yourself – and you are the easiest person to fool.” 
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